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ABSTRACT 
‘OUR FEET ARE MIRED IN THE SAME SOIL’: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY  
WITH THE POLITICAL VIRTUE OF SYMPATHETIC INQUIRY 
 
 
Jennifer Lynn Kiefer Fenton, B.A., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2019 
 
 
This dissertation puts American philosophers and social reformers, Jane Addams 
(1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952), in conversation with contemporary social and 
political philosopher, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006), to argue that an account of 
deliberative equality must make conceptual space to name the problem of 
‘communicatively structured deliberative inequality’. I argue that in order for 
participatory democracy theory to imagine and construct genuinely inclusive deliberative 
spaces, it must be grounded in a relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social 
epistemology.  
 
The literature has largely developed deliberative inequality in terms of access 
(e.g., participation costs) and ‘impoverished capacities’ for political participation (e.g., 
political-process illiteracy; public debate skills). This literature has failed to appreciate 
the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality. Individuals who occupy 
historically stigmatized social groups may participate at a communicatively structured 
disadvantage in participatory forums not because of their own impoverished capacities, 
but because of the identity-prejudiced stereotypes of their interlocutors.  
 
Chapter 1 situates Young’s communicative democracy in contemporary 
deliberative democracy literature and shows the inadequacies of liberal individualism, 
assumed by much of traditional deliberative theory, for naming and addressing the 
problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Chapter 2 draws on 
literature in feminist and resistance epistemologies as well as the social identity approach 
within contemporary social psychology theory to flesh out the problem of 
communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Here, I provide a relational ontology 
of prejudice and examine it’s impact on one’s epistemic and deliberative standing. 
Chapter 3 draws on the work of Addams and Dewey to develop a relational ontology of 
political agency as well as the pragmatist feminist epistemology of communicative 
democracy.  
 
Addams and Dewey, like Young, saw exclusion as a serious social and political 
problem, and they looked to democratic norms and practices as a resource for social 
justice. Thus, Chapter 4 looks to Addams and Dewey’s writings and Addams’s leadership 
at Hull House as a resource for communicative democracy, and more particularly, for 
addressing deliberative inequality and imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative 
spaces in light of the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation puts American philosophers and social reformers, Jane Addams 
(1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952), in conversation with contemporary social and 
political philosopher, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006). The dissertation brings these 
figures together because, although they were separated by almost a century in time and 
grounded in distinct philosophical traditions, they all saw exclusion as a serious social 
and political problem. And they looked to democracy as a means for repairing exclusion 
and as a resource for social justice. They all believed deeply that democratic norms like 
political equality, transparency, reason-giving in decision-making processes, and the 
inclusion of diverse social perspectives in those decision-making processes and 
democratic discussion, could give us a way out of exclusion and a way into more 
fulfilling social life with one another.  
Ultimately, the dissertation develops a pragmatist feminist social epistemology 
from the thought and activism of Addams and Dewey, and introduces this as both a 
foundational contribution for Young’s communicative democracy theory, as well as a 
resource for doing communicative democracy and realizing deliberative equality.   
The title of the dissertation is inspired by Jane Addams’s opening words in 
Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), where she acknowledges the facticity of human 
interdependence. This fact of interdependence motivated her life’s work to promote 
democratic values and facilitate inclusive social spaces where those values may be put 
into practice. On this fact of interdependence she writes,  
…As members of the community [we] stand indicted. This is the penalty of 
democracy, - that we are bound to move forward or retrograde together. None of 
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us can stand aside; our feet are mired in the same soil, and our lungs breathe the 
same air. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 112, the emphasis is mine) 
 
This dissertation argues that the relational ontology that is emphasized in this 
appreciation for human interdependence, is a foundational feature of communicative 
democracy, and ultimately, is what enables for it to be a facilitator of social justice. 
Democracy as such must be understood as far more than a mere aggregation of personal 
preferences. Adolescents often “take it to a vote” thinking themselves civilized, mature, 
and democratic. But the fact that preferences are widely held is not an indication that 
those preferences are reasonable or that they are just. Democracy reduced to popular 
elections or special interest politics, or on the other end of the spectrum, democracy 
surrendered to elitist representative protections, ultimately both collapse into a form of 
rule that is based in power.  
But democracy fulfilled through inclusive and vibrant public discussion, that goes 
all the way down to our most basic institutions (e.g., the family, the workplace), bases the 
legitimacy of decision-making not in power, but in reason-giving, discussion across 
difference, coordinated activity, and ongoing cooperation. Democracy as such is not just 
a form of political machinery, but it is an ethics and an epistemology. It is as Dewey 
remarks in a great deal of his work, a way of life. To say that democracy is an ethics and 
an epistemology is to say that it is a way of interacting with, communicating with, and 
knowing one another. And to say that democracy is a way of life is to say that norms of 
political equality and inclusion must govern all of our social interactions, so that through 
the implementation of these procedural values, human beings may more fully participate 
in all of social life. This requires working to make physical and procedural space, as well 
as communicative space, for all individuals to participate in the formation and ongoing 
3 
 
evolution of the institutions, practices, values, and relationships that frame their lives and 
possibilities. 
The problems modern democracies must solve are complex. Inclusive democratic 
communication about these problems is sometimes messy and disorganized. But with the 
right attitude, these processes can also be creative and cooperative and celebrate, rather 
than deny, difference. The decisions we make in these contexts are difficult, fallible, and 
experimental. But they are also open-ended and forward-looking, and because of this, 
they celebrate continued conversation with one another.  
This dissertation argues that the ability to accurately identify and define these 
complex social problems and to begin strategizing remedies for them is enriched by more 
inclusive democratic communication, in both our formal political institutions and in all of 
our modes of interacting with one another. This mode of inclusive, participatory, 
collective decision-making makes us better and more fulfilled people. We become better 
and more fulfilled in this rich sense not simply because we participate in campaigns or 
because we “rock the vote”. Rather, because we interact with one another in ways that 
honor their political agency through having discussions and not simply backing decisions 
with force, through including diverse perspectives at the table, and through 
communication at that table that honors one another as epistemic and deliberative equals.  
This dissertation makes the case that doing the deep sense of deliberative equality 
that I have alluded to thus far, is much harder to realize than we would like to believe.  
Oppression impacts one’s access to formal deliberative forums. One can be 
formally barred from a deliberative forum on the basis of her gender. Or, the costs to 
participate in a deliberative forum may be too high for someone in poverty (Cooper, 
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2006, p. 69). For example, a town meeting that is scheduled at 7PM on a Tuesday may 
require a single mother who works second shift to take off of work to attend the meeting, 
often without pay, and to find and perhaps pay for transportation to the meeting and 
perhaps even childcare. For those who live in poverty, the costs of participation are too 
high in this case, and this is a result of their marginalization.  
Even assuming that one’s access to participation in a deliberative forum is not 
formally blocked, and even assuming that participation costs are not too high for citizens, 
one’s membership in a stigmatized group can still detract from her inclusion in 
deliberation because oppression has hidden, communicative dimensions. Young explains, 
“Where there are structural inequalities of wealth and power, formally democratic 
procedures are likely to reinforce them, because privileged people are able to 
marginalize the voices and issues of those less privileged” (Young, 2000, p. 34, the 
emphasis is mine). 
One’s membership in a social group that has historically been stigmatized or 
marginalized, can shape how the problems she brings forward for public consideration 
are framed, whether her anger at such problems is interpreted as righteous indignation or 
lunacy, whether those problems even make it to the agenda for deliberation, and 
ultimately, whether an individual is seen as a knower by her peers. These are the 
communicatively structured dimensions of deliberative inequality, and they impact the 
power of one’s participation, that is, her epistemic and deliberative standing. 
In this project I am particularly concerned to provide an account of 
communicatively structured deliberative inequality, inequalities that result not from a 
lack of access to participatory forums nor from a lack of capacity to participate in those 
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forums (certainly both of these are very real concerns for social justice theorists 
concerned with inclusion, democracy, and deliberative equality), but rather from a lack of 
epistemic and social standing to be received, included, acknowledged, and genuinely 
respected and heard as a deliberator and as a political equal.  
I have much in mind here what Miranda Fricker has introduced as “testimonial 
injustice” where “prejudice on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker less 
credibility than he would otherwise have given” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Fricker is 
especially concerned with testimonial injustices rooted in identity prejudices, “prejudices 
against people qua social type” (ibid.). She takes as a central case of this, “the injustice 
that a speaker suffers in receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity 
prejudice on the hearer’s part, as in the case where the police don’t believe someone 
because he is black” (ibid.). I suspect that this form of epistemic injustice is precisely 
what present-day women have in mind when they recount having been “mansplained”.  
What participatory democracy theory is in need of is an appreciation for the 
power of prejudice and epistemic injustice in our communicative lives and on our 
deliberative standing. So to take the example of women as a social group, women who 
have both formal access to participatory forums (e.g., legally protected rights for 
participation, institutions that welcome their participation, and agents that encourage it) 
and strong communicative capacities for participation in those forums (e.g., good 
academic backgrounds, strong critical thinking skills, affinity for leadership, good public 
speaking and communication skills) may still participate at a communicatively structured 
disadvantage in those forums not because of their own doing or failings in capacities, but 
because of the identity prejudices of their interlocutors. Call this form of deliberative 
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inequality, identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. Call the harm that results from 
this inequality, deterioration in one’s deliberative standing. 
So what is identity-prejudiced communicative equality? Why does it matter to 
me? And why does it matter for us? Put simply, identity-prejudiced communicative 
inequality is to be made to feel small because of who one is, that is, because of one’s 
membership in a stigmatized social group or economic class. Identity-prejudiced 
communicative inequality arises when one is made to feel small in communication with 
others because of her interlocutors’ identity-prejudiced habits of interacting with her. Her 
interlocutor’s identity-prejudiced habits of interaction are based in an assumption that she 
has nothing of much importance to say, and that her observations about her social world 
are not reliable or are simply not of any real epistemic significance for forming social 
knowledge and for making decisions.  
Sadly, some members of our society have been made to feel so small for so long 
that they can no longer imagine themselves as knowers, or as participants in democratic 
and social life. Some individuals are not regularly made to feel small because of who they 
are, but they have been made to feel small in various ways throughout their life, and they 
tap into that in order to be compassionate allies for those who are regularly made to feel 
small. Many individuals who have been made to feel small in this way actively protest 
this marginalization of their epistemic and deliberative standing. They protest and resist 
this in creative and brave ways.  
This project looks to these experiences of lost and wounded deliberative standing, 
as well as to individual and communal attempts to re-legitimate deliberative standing in 
communicative interactions and democratic spaces, as an inspiration for communicative 
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democracy theory. I view my project as one small part of a developing body of academic 
thought and activism that recognizes and attempts to respond to José Medina’s call to 
action for democratic societies:  
In democratic societies, given their commitment to free and equal epistemic 
participation, there is a prima facie interest and obligation to detect and correct the 
systematic disparities in the epistemic agency that different members of society 
can enjoy and the inequalities associated with them. (Medina, 2013, p. 4) 
 
Young’s critique of deliberative democracy comes out of her wider critique of 
liberal individualism that is expressed throughout much of her work. But on my analysis, 
this critique of liberal individualism is itself based in a relational ontology and social 
epistemology that she leaves largely unarticulated. Young primarily justifies 
communicative democracy in terms of social justice and inclusion, but she leaves the 
epistemological dimensions of her undertaking somewhat less developed. 
As a whole, the dissertation aims to provide an account of such an ontology and 
epistemology through drawing on recent work in feminist and resistance epistemology, 
the social identity approach within social psychology theory literature, and through 
looking to the historical thought and practice of American philosophers of democracy and 
social reformers, Jane Addams and John Dewey. Ultimately, the dissertation introduces a 
pragmatist feminist social epistemology for communicative democracy. I argue that for 
participatory democracy theory to imagine and construct genuinely inclusive deliberative 
spaces, it must have a relational conception of political agency, a relational account of 
prejudice, and be grounded in a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. I look to the 
thought of American philosophers and social reforms, Jane Addams and Dewey, to help 
me construct this relational framework and pragmatist feminist social epistemology, as 
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well as for resources for strategizing transactional and institutional remedies for identity-
prejudiced communicative inequality. 
Chapter 1 situates Young’s communicative democracy in contemporary 
deliberative democracy literature. Deliberative democracy can be broadly defined as a 
body of democratic thought that bases the legitimacy for lawmaking in the public 
deliberation of citizens, and in so doing, promotes reason over power in politics 
(Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Young, 1996, p. 122). Deliberative 
democrats theorize deliberation as an open and inclusive exercise or process where 
citizens who are free and equal engage in reasoned discussion with one another for the 
purposes of resolving public problems and forming agreed-upon policies.  
This chapter shows the inadequacies of liberal individualism, assumed by much of 
traditional deliberative democracy theory (hereafter, deliberative theory), for naming and 
addressing the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Young is 
particularly concerned that the underlying individualism assumed by deliberative theory, 
particularly owing to its roots in classical liberalism, problematizes deliberative theory’s 
commitment to political equality and inclusion. Traditional deliberative theory idealizes 
too narrow an account of democratic participation through its construction of 
deliberation, an account that emphasizes consensus, impartiality, and correctness. Young 
is critical that this picture of deliberation is itself a problem for inclusion, full democratic 
participation, and deliberative equality.  
Not all democratic theorists have assumed classical liberalism as a starting place 
for democracy. Quite to the contrary, American pragmatists Jane Addams (1860-1935) 
and John Dewey (1859-1952), rooted democracy in a relational ontology, and as a result, 
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developed a robust conception of democracy as a resource for realizing social justice in 
contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social inequality, and oppression. Both Addams 
and Dewey were committed to a relational ontological foundation for democracy. They 
developed a deeply participatory and inclusive conception of democracy and put it into 
practice at Hull House, the social settlement that Addams founded with Eleanor Gates 
Starr in Chicago in 1889. They were also both ahead of their time in how they thought 
about prejudice, social grouping and inequality, and the communicative dimensions of 
oppression. Thus their work is rich with resources for enriching Young’s communicative 
democracy. 
Young is sensitive to the communicative dimension of deliberative inequality, 
particularly it’s more implicit dimensions. In her earlier work she argues that oppression 
persists in “body aesthetic dimensions” in society, what she explains as “interactive 
habits, unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, and group-related feelings of 
nervousness and aversion” (Young, 1990, p. 148). Young anticipates the contemporary 
implicit bias research here. As this body of research has attempted to show, these quieter 
dimensions of oppression significantly impact one’s epistemic standing in democratic 
communication. In her later work, Inclusion and Democracy (2000), Young pushes 
deliberative theory towards a more robust communicative picture of democratic 
participation that is more apt to enable for deliberative equality. She does not, however, 
develop this problem of the implicit dimensions of communicatively structured 
deliberative inequality in significant or systematic detail in this later development of 
communicative democracy (2000).  
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Chapter 2 attempts to fill this gap in communicative democracy, and fills out 
Young’s relational ontology by constructing an account of communicatively structured 
deliberative inequality that is based in a relational account of prejudice. I draw on thought 
in feminist and resistance epistemologies, as well as empirical research in social 
psychology to do this. This chapter serves as a bridge between Young’s communicative 
democracy and Addams’s and Dewey’s contributions. Young briefly points to social 
psychology theorists working in the social identity approach in her discussion of social 
groups in “Five Faces of Oppression” (1990, p. 45; citing Turner, et. al., 1987). The 
social identity approach, based in Henri Tajfel’s empirical research in the 1970’s, poses a 
challenge to the social psychology corpus: that the social dimension of human 
psychology has been lost within a great deal of social psychology research and theory, 
namely because of the individualistic assumptions held among researchers and theorists 
about both the nature of identity and of prejudice. Following after Tajfel’s school, John 
Turner has introduced a relational account of prejudice that is important for grasping the 
significance of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality and for conceptualizing the 
relational ontology at the heart of Young’s communicative democracy. Interestingly, 
Addams and Dewey’s ontology and thought on prejudice anticipates this research. The 
chapter concludes by pointing towards these historical insights. 
Both Chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation look to Addams and Dewey’s 
conceptions and practice of democracy as a resource for communicative democracy. 
Chapter 3 continues the ontological work of Chapter 2 by examining Addams’s thought 
on group moralities and Dewey’s thought on prejudice. Addams exhibits her sensitivity 
to communicative inequality in both her practice and in her discussions of group 
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moralities. And Dewey offers a progressive account of prejudice that is also consistent 
with an appreciation for what I am calling identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.  
In Chapter 3 I also begin to fill in the epistemology of communicative democracy 
by showing that Addams and Dewey saw communicative inequality as a social and 
political problem and that they envisioned democracy as a robust social epistemology 
with the resources to remedy this problem and promote a more inclusive, participatory 
body politic. Addams and Dewey are concerned that human subjectivity hinders the 
production of social knowledge, and they believe this is further problematized by modern 
industrialist society, group moralities, and prejudice. Democracy as they envision it and 
attempted to put it into practice at Hull House, is an ethical and epistemic way of relating 
with others that breathes into life the norms of political equality, reasonableness, 
publicity, and importantly, inclusion in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social 
inequality, and oppression.  
The final chapter of the dissertation builds on the historical foundation established 
in Chapter 3 to show that not only were Addams and Dewey concerned with deliberative 
equality and it’s communicative dimensions, but they actually strategized ways to realize 
their robust conception of democracy in spite of it. Here I look to Addams and Dewey’s 
writings and Addams’s leadership at Hull House as a resource for communicative 
democracy, and more particularly, for addressing deliberative inequality and imagining 
and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of the problem of communicatively 
structured deliberative inequality.  
As a whole, my project aims to provide a pragmatist feminist social epistemology 
for communicative democracy. I build this account from Charlene Haddock’s Seigfried’s 
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recent recovery of Jane Addams and John Dewey’s philosophy of perplexity and method 
of sympathetic inquiry (Seigfried, 1996, 2002). Here I also explore the benefits of 
thinking about sympathetic inquiry as a type of hybrid epistemic-moral political virtue for 
democracy. 
This dissertation is a form of epistemic resistance to identity-prejudiced 
communicative inequality in more ways than one. First, it establishes theoretical space in 
participatory democracy theory for naming identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. 
Second, it introduces two important projects for democratic theorists, practitioners, and 
advocates: (1) imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of this 
problem and (2) strategizing communicative practices and norms of interaction that can 
themselves challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes and mitigate their harmful effects 
on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.  
And finally, the dissertation is my own form of epistemic resistance and protest. 
The project as a whole has come to symbolize, both in the problems it grapples with as 
well as in the process of writing the thing itself, a journey of trying to be seen as a 
knower, by others, as well as to myself.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
THE RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY AND PRAGMATIST FEMINIST SOCIAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF IRIS MARION YOUNG’S  
COMMUNICATIVE DEMOCRACY  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 This chapter demonstrates the value of a communicative conception of democracy 
like Iris Marion Young’s for both identifying and responding to the challenges that 
deliberative inequality pose for inclusion and democracy. I situate this discussion of 
communicative democracy in the deliberative democracy literature, and I focus my 
discussion of deliberative inequality to what James Bohman has termed 
‘communicatively structured political inequality’ (Bohman, 1996, p. 117).  
In this project I am particularly concerned to provide an account of 
communicatively structured deliberative inequality, inequalities that result not from a 
lack of access to participatory forums nor from a lack of capacity to participate in those 
forums (certainly both of these are very real concerns for social justice theorists 
concerned with inclusion, democracy, and deliberative equality), but rather from a lack of 
epistemic and social standing to be received, included, acknowledged, and genuinely 
respected and heard as a deliberator and as a political equal.  
The chapter argues that informal norms of communication carry over into formal 
deliberative realms, and in contexts of social inequality and oppression, this gives rise to 
a form of deliberative inequality that has gone overlooked by traditional deliberative 
theorists, namely, what I introduce as ‘identity-prejudiced communicative inequality’ in 
Chapter 2.  
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I have much in mind here what Miranda Fricker has introduced as “testimonial 
injustice” where “prejudice on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker less 
credibility than he would otherwise have given” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Fricker is 
especially concerned with testimonial injustices rooted in identity prejudices, “prejudices 
against people qua social type” (ibid.). She takes as a central case of this, “the injustice 
that a speaker suffers in receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity 
prejudice on the hearer’s part, as in the case where the police don’t believe someone 
because he is black” (ibid.). 
One of the many reasons Fricker’s attention to the epistemic dimensions of 
injustice is important is because, much like pragmatists like Jane Addams and John 
Dewey, it challenges categorical distinctions between ethics and epistemology as sub-
disciplines in philosophy. Fricker mourns, “It does seem…a pity that ethics has not 
traditionally taken our epistemic conduct into its remit” (Fricker, 2007, p. 2). Something 
of this sort can be said of deliberative theory as well: It does seem a pity that deliberative 
theory has not traditionally taken our epistemic conduct, particularly epistemic injustices 
that result from identity prejudices, into its remit. This is especially concerning because 
of deliberative theory’s historical emphasis on the alleged epistemic value of 
participatory democracy.  
What deliberative theory is in need of is an appreciation for the power of 
prejudice and epistemic injustice in our communicative lives and on our deliberative 
standing. There is a both a practical and theoretical concern here. Practically, how does 
the presence of identity-prejudiced epistemic injustice stifle deliberative standing and 
foster deliberative inequality? And theoretically, how does the presence of identity-
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prejudiced epistemic injustice stifle attempts by deliberative theorists to justify the 
legitimacy of democracy on the basis of its epistemic value?  
Take for example the fact that women are far more likely to be interrupted than 
men.1 This impacts the communicative possibilities for women in both informal 
communications as well as in public space. In this case, a communicative inequality 
arises as a result of gender-based norms of interruption, that is, as a result of gendered 
habits of communication that are on some level, implicit and precognitive. I develop an 
account of these identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities in further detail in the 
following chapter of the dissertation. Various informal communicative norms like norms 
of interruption “enable men to assume wide powers as speakers” (Bohman, 1996, p. 119). 
Thus despite their access to formal deliberative forums, women’s talk gets less space to 
be heard, gets distorted in “the various back-and-forth mechanisms of dialogue through 
which public deliberation works”, and even gets dismissed altogether (Bohman, 1996, p. 
118). Where this norm of interruption is in place, the fullness of women’s deliberative 
standing remains an open question. 
To review, women who have both formal access to participatory forums (e.g., 
legally protected rights for participation, institutions that welcome their participation, and 
agents that encourage it) and strong communicative capacities for participation in those 
forums (e.g., good academic backgrounds, strong critical thinking skills, affinity for 
leadership, good public speaking and communication skills) may still participate at a 
communicatively structured disadvantage in those forums not because of their own doing 
or failings in capacities, but because of the identity prejudices of their interlocutors. Call 
																																																								
     1 See Zimmerman and West (1975) and more recently, Hancock and Ruben (2014).  
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this form of deliberative inequality, identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. Call 
the harm that results from this inequality, deterioration in one’s deliberative standing.  
Both Bohman (1996) and Young (1990; 2000) seem to have an appreciation for 
these more communicative and implicit dimensions of deliberative inequality, but both 
have also left this problem underdeveloped in their theorizing about political equality and 
deliberation. Bohman makes mention of “implicit forms of unequal power, influence, and 
resources that…continue to operate in the public sphere” in his account of deliberative 
inequality itself (Bohman, 1996, p. 123). In her earlier major work Justice and the 
Politics of Difference (1990), Young talks of the “body aesthetic” dimensions of 
oppression, “interactive habits, unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, and group-
related feelings of nervousness and aversion” (Young, 1990, p. 148). She even makes the 
point that, “If unconscious reactions, habits, and stereotypes reproduce the oppression of 
some groups, then they should be judged unjust, and therefore should be changed” 
(Young, 1990, p. 150). Yet Young does not revisit this implicit dimension of 
communicative inequality in her later major work specific to democracy, Inclusion and 
Democracy (Young, 2000).  
This chapter argues that Young’s conception of communicative democracy fares 
much better than traditional deliberative models for both identifying and addressing 
identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities. Young’s communicative democracy is 
uniquely situated for this project because of two important reasons relating to how it 
understands the nature of political agency: (1) it bases political agency in a relational 
ontology; (2) it bases democratic communication in a pragmatist feminist social 
epistemology that advocates for a broader understanding of deliberation as well as of 
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democratic communication more generally than has been traditionally held by 
deliberative theorists. Ultimately, Young’s communicative democracy pushes democracy 
past formal deliberation towards a broader, more inclusive appreciation of democratic 
communication processes. 
The chapter contrasts Young’s robust, relational conception of political agency 
with the individualistic one assumed by traditional deliberative theorists. As I 
characterize it, this traditional approach assumes the ontological individualism and 
veritistic epistemology of classical liberalism. As a result, deliberative theory has tended 
to underemphasize the value of the educative and preference-transformative capacity of 
deliberation. But as this chapter eventually argues, this underemphasized and 
underappreciated aspect of deliberative democracy (i.e., preference transformation) is 
crucial for making the kind of theoretical space in democracy theory that makes possible 
the naming and identification of identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities as well 
as for, more practically speaking, makes space for programs that aim to reduce such 
communicative inequalities themselves.  
Despite Young’s sharp criticism of actual deliberative theories, she views 
deliberative democracy understood as an ideal as an important starting place for realizing 
social justice and inclusion. Young is also drawn to deliberative democracy because, 
unlike models of democracy based in social choice theory, deliberative theory bases the 
legitimacy of political decision-making on reason-giving rather than on power (Young, 
1996, 2000). Thus the chapter begins by examining the features of deliberative 
democracy that Young is drawn to: political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and 
inclusion (Young, 2000).  
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In Section 3 of the chapter, I move through Young’s critique of deliberative 
theory and her introduction of an alternative, more inclusive conception of participatory 
democracy, what she terms, ‘communicative democracy’. Here I introduce three major 
critiques and points of contrast between deliberative and communicative conceptions of 
democracy: First, communicative democracy is critical of narrow constructions of 
deliberation-as-argument, favoring a wider, more inclusive conception of deliberation-
restructured-as-public-reasonableness. Here I develop Young’s critique that a 
construction of deliberation-as-argument has the unintended consequence of violating 
some of the very norms deliberative democracy idealizes, namely, inclusion. Young 
broadens and restructures deliberation as public-reasonableness to account for this 
problem. One important characteristic feature of deliberation-restructured-as-public-
reasonableness, among other things, is that it does not assume that consensus must be a 
starting place of, or goal for, deliberation.  
A second critique and point of contrast, is that communicative democracy is 
critical of the emphasis within traditional deliberative theory on impartiality and 
correctness. Later I explore the individualistic ontology assumed in this emphasis on 
impartiality and construction of deliberation-as-argument, as well as the veritistic 
epistemology assumed in this emphasis on correctness. Rather than impartiality, 
communicative democracy favors the inclusion of multiple social perspectives in public 
processes. And rather than correctness, communicative democracy looks to those 
inclusive public processes for identifying and framing public problems as well as 
strategizing potential remedies for them.  
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A third critique and point of contrast between deliberative and communicative 
conceptions of democracy, is that communicative democracy challenges us to broaden 
our conception of democratic communication beyond deliberation altogether. Young is 
uniquely aware of the identity-prejudiced and communicative dimensions of deliberative 
inequality. Thus her account of communicative democracy introduces not only a wider 
conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness, but also a wider 
account of political participation. That is, communicative democracy does not isolate 
political participation to deliberation, but looks to other alternative communicative 
methods of political participation. Young introduces five additional communicative 
methods in her work: greeting and acknowledgement of one’s interlocutors, rhetoric, 
narrative (Young, 2000), and even questioning (Young, 1997) and protest (Young, 2001). 
Young’s critique of traditional deliberative theory flows out of her wider critique 
of liberal individualism itself. Young does not, however, develop this underlying critique 
in a systematic way in any of her writings on democracy. Thus in Sections 4 and 5 of the 
chapter, I make this contribution to her work and to the literature. The contrast between 
deliberation-as-argument and deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness rests on 
a point of divergence between each respective theory’s underlying ontology and 
epistemology. By way of critical contrast with the individualistic framework assumed by 
deliberative theorists, I introduce Young’s alternative relational ontology and pragmatist 
feminist social epistemology in the third and fourth sections of the chapter.   
Section 6 examines the implications of an individualistic framework on how 
political philosophers think about the value of participatory democracy itself. Here the 
chapter articulates the overarching argument of the chapter, that communicative 
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democracy is uniquely situated to name identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. 
Besides making space to name and reflect on remedies for this form of deliberative 
inequality, this pragmatist feminist framework for communicative democracy makes 
space to make a powerful justification for the legitimacy of democratic institutions on 
both epistemic and justice-producing grounds.  
 
2. Deliberative Democracy in Context  
 
Young is drawn to deliberative theory for its emphasis on four norms that she 
finds valuable for theorizing justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social 
inequality, and oppression: political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and inclusion 
(Young, 2000). Her relationship with democratic theory was tenuous, however. She made 
sharp criticisms of contemporary deliberative theory, yet she also saw deliberative theory 
as an important starting place for theorizing social justice. Despite the flaws invoked by 
deliberative theorists, deliberative democracy understood as an ideal puts forward four 
specific norms that are necessary for theorizing justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism 
of values, social inequality, and oppression: (1) political equality, (2) reasonableness, (3) 
publicity, and (4) inclusion (Young, 2000). From these fundamental norms one can 
derive further democratic values and practices like transparency to one’s constituents, 
accountability of public officials, free expression, equal access to participation, and 
expectations of reason giving in the justification of decisions. Thus Young takes 
deliberative democracy as her starting place for theorizing its reincarnation, 
communicative democracy.  
There is a strong theoretical connection between democracy and justice where 
democracy exists “under ideal conditions of inclusive political equality and public 
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reasonableness” (Young, 2000, p. 17). Democratic institutions protect political autonomy 
by ensuring checks and balances of power, maintaining transparency of public decision-
making, and protecting various avenues for holding public officials accountable to 
serving the public (e.g., protecting a free press). More than merely protecting political 
autonomy, deeply participatory democratic institutions serve as an avenue for exercising 
and developing one’s political agency. And epistemically speaking, inclusive democratic 
processes like transparency, accountability, free expression, equal access to participation, 
and expectations for reason-giving in the justification of decisions are the best means by 
which a society discovers2 the most just policies.  
The introduction of deliberative democracy theory in the 1980’s played a 
significant role in clarifying democratic ideals and defending democracy against 
alternative political institutions.3 Deliberative democracy can be broadly defined as a 
body of democratic thought that bases the legitimacy for lawmaking in the public 
deliberation of citizens, and in so doing, promotes reason over power in politics 
(Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Young, 1996, p. 122). Deliberative 
democrats theorize deliberation as an open and inclusive exercise or process where 
citizens who are free and equal, engage in reasoned discussion with one another for the 
purposes of resolving public problems and forming agreed-upon policies.  
																																																								
     2 It should be noted that this language of ‘discovery’ is one that the pragmatist feminist social 
epistemology of communicative democracy that I defend in this dissertation will ultimately question. On 
the pragmatist feminist epistemology of communicative democracy that I defend, terms like ‘designing’ or 
‘generating’ might be more appropriate for expressing the open-ended processes of producing just policies 
that this framework advocates.  
     3 Joseph Bessette is credited with the introduction of the term ‘deliberative democracy’ with his 1986 
publication, “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government”. Bessette was 
concerned to resolve a tension between aristocratic and populist conceptions of democracy, and introduced 
‘deliberative democracy’ as a third, reason-giving alternative to aristocracy and populism. Aristocratic 
democracies tend towards elitism and populist democracies towards mob-rule, both power-based 
institutions. In contrast, deliberative democracy introduces a reason-giving requirement that distinguishes it 
from power-based conceptions of democracy. While Bessette introduces the term for the first time in the 
literature, he roots the concept of deliberative democracy in the original intent of the framers themselves.  
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Deliberative theorists introduce deliberation to qualify democracy and protect it 
from charges of populism, or ‘mob rule’.4 Without the deliberative qualification there is a 
tendency to lean towards elitism as a protection against populism. The deliberative 
qualification demonstrates that despite their differences, both extremes (i.e., populism 
and elitism) collapse into a form of rule that is ultimately based in power. A third way, 
deliberative democracy, escapes this dichotomy by looking towards reason-giving and 
deliberation processes rather than power, as the basis for political legitimacy. 
It is helpful to explore the merits of deliberative democracy by way of contrast 
with an alternative conception of democracy, preference-aggregative democracy. On an 
aggregative model, “the goal of democratic decision-making is to decide what leaders, 
rules, and policies will best correspond to the most widely and strongly held preferences” 
(Young, 2000, p. 19). On such a model, individual citizens’ preferences are assumed as 
fixed or given and may be formed in isolation from discussion with others, and decision-
making processes are understood as competitive negotiations. As John Elster has 
explained, “the goal of politics is [seen as] the optimal compromise between given, and 
irreducibly opposed, private interests” (Elster, 1997, p. 3). 
The aggregative perspective of democracy is embodied in contemporary social 
choice theory, rooted in the work of French philosopher and mathematician Nicolas de 
Condorcet (1743-1794).5 Social choice theory is a cluster of approaches that is concerned 
																																																								
     4 For an early development of this argument in the literature, see especially Cohen (1986). 
     5 Condorcet was influential in early democratic theory for introducing a method of tallying the collective 
outcome of individual choices expressed through voting. Condorcet’s approach was influential during the 
birth of democracy because it served an important role in defending democracy against competing forms of 
government on the basis of its epistemic powers to obtain a correct answer. Elizabeth Anderson (2006, 10-
11; citing Condorcet 1995 [1785]) summarizes Condorcet’s jury theorem nicely: “If voters (a) face two 
options, (b) vote independently of one another, (c) vote their judgment of what the right solution to the 
problem shot be (i.e., they do not vote strategically), and (d) have, on average, a greater than 50% 
probability of being right, then, as the number of voters approaches infinity, the probability that the 
23 
 
with the aggregation of individual preferences, usually expressed in modern democracies 
through the secret ballet. Social choice theory takes as its goal the ordering of social 
preferences of various alternatives, usually by way of assessing the results of a voting 
procedure of some sort. While the results of preference aggregation processes are public 
(e.g., election results), the decision-making process of each preference holder (i.e., a 
voter) is not. Voters are not asked to share the reasons for their decision on ‘the secret 
ballot’ and they are not tasked with basing their votes on any reasons. They could, after 
all, flip a coin in the voting booth.  
There are a number of reasons to be critical of aggregative models of democracy 
on empirical grounds alone. Aggregative models assume that individuals are the best 
judges of their own interests. But people are not infallible judges of their own interests 
and often become better judges of their interests upon reflection, education, and dialogue 
with others. Aggregative models also assume that individuals will defend their 
[perceived] best interests. Relatedly, the model assumes that the preferences people 
express in a voting exercise, for example, are a good guide to what they really do prefer 
(Elster, 1986, p. 6). But people quite frequently vote against their own self-interest under 
the influence of political propaganda. Or they do so as a result of other social and 
economic factors like economic hardship or as a concession to a perceived lesser evil 
than another alternative. Lastly and speaking to empirical problems for aggregative 
models of democracy, political scientists have pointed to a host of mathematical 
difficulties that arise when attempting to aggregate preferences.6 There simply is not a 
																																																																																																																																																																					
majority vote will yield the right answer approaches 1 (and rapidly approaches 1 even with modest 
numbers of voters).  
     6 For example, Arrow’s Theorem (Arrow, 1951/1963). Philip Pettit (2001) has also shown in his 
discursive dilemma that how a collective decision is framed (premise-based or conclusion-based) can have 
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settled enough account of its empirical reliability for it to serve as an epistemological 
justification for the political legitimacy of aggregative democracy. 
Beyond these empirical concerns, aggregative models fail on reasons relating 
more blatantly to justice, and this critique is largely what makes deliberative democracy 
such an attractive alternative for Young. The mere aggregation of individuals’ 
preferences is not indicative of promoting public goods and justice. Her point is 
normative and pertains to justice, “Policies ought to be adopted not because the most 
powerful interests win but because the citizens or their representatives together determine 
their rightness after hearing and criticizing reasons” (Young, 1996, p. 122). 
History and present are rife with examples of individuals preferring and agreeing 
within groups to choose leaders and enact policies that conflict with democratic norms 
themselves. For example, the result of the voting procedure could be one that restricts 
freedom or equality of some members of society (e.g., majority opinions in the 
antebellum south about slavery).7 Citizens’ preferences for particular leaders or policies 
can be rooted in reasons relating to self-interest rather than to a conception of the public 
good, and as a result, they can actually contradict a conception of the public good.  
																																																																																																																																																																					
significant impact on the outcome of the aggregate. Condorcet (1785/1995) himself acknowledges this 
problematic possibility in his note of the paradox of voting.  
    7 See especially Borgida, Federico, and Sullivan’s (2009) anthology, The Political Psychology of 
Democratic Citizenship. Their collection is an excellent demonstration of the appreciation within political 
psychology for various forms of deliberative inequalities, including communicative inequalities and in 
particular, communicative inequalities based in the more implicit dimensions of oppression. Specifically, 
they have included a number of publications from authors on issues of persuasion, group identity and 
intergroup relations, and stereotype and prejudice. For an historical account of strategic racism and political 
identity formation in U.S. politics, see also Ian Haney López’s (2014) Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded 
Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism & Wrecked the Middle Class.  
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This point is famously made by John Elster (1986/1997) in his influential paper, 
“The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory.”8 It is also a point that 
is commonly cited as an objection to democracy itself. However, Elster and other early 
deliberative theorists draw attention to the fact that this objection is more appropriately 
made of social choice models of democracy, not deliberatively qualified models. Elster’s 
central concern with social choice theory is that uncoordinated private choices can lead to 
outcomes that are far worse off for the body politic than what “could have been attained 
by coordination” (Elster, 1986/1997, p. 4).9 That is, the central concern of politics is with 
‘the common good’, and more particularly, “with the cases in which [that common good] 
cannot be realized as the aggregate outcome of individuals pursuing their private interest” 
(Elster, 1986/1997, p. 4). Thus a reduction of politics to ‘the aggregate outcome of 
individuals pursuing their private interests’ defeats the very purpose of politics itself.  
While individual preferences may coincide with the common good, there is no 
necessary correlation between the two. Rather, it is as Joshua Cohen explains, “The 
interests, aims, and ideals that comprise the common good are those that survive 
deliberation, interests that, on public reflection, we think it legitimate to appeal to in 
making claims on social resources” (Cohen, 1989/1997, pp. 76-76, the emphasis is mine). 
Deliberation has this potential because of the reason-giving requirement inherent in the 
																																																								
     8 Along with Bessette’s “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government” 
(1980) and Cohen’s “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy” (1986), Elster’s (1986/1997) influential 
paper was an important early work for initiating the contemporary deliberative democracy literature. Here 
Elster makes a persuasive and influential critique of ‘the private-instrumental view of politics’, by which he 
has in mind a preference-aggregative and social choice theory model of democracy.  
     9 Elster’s in depth critique provides a number of objections to the inadequacy of social choice theory as 
a collective decision-making procedure. He organizes his objections into two sets: “First, that the 
preferences people choose to express may not be a good guide to what they really prefer; and secondly, that 
what they really prefer may in any case be a fragile foundation for social choice” (Elster, 1986/1997, p. 6).  
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activity itself. Thus like Elizabeth Anderson, Cohen takes it that deliberative processes 
are “constitutive, not accidental features of democracy” (Anderson, 2006, p. 11).10 
So while the activity of voting, for example, is commonly perceived by the 
populous as an expression of democracy, considered as a political action in isolation from 
any kind of meaningful democratic communication (e.g., public debate, deliberation, 
etc.), it actually has no way of holding citizens accountable to form preferences on the 
basis of reasons concerning the public good rather than private, self-interested 
preferences. That this is the case means that the process could itself function to bring 
about grossly unjust results, throwing into question whether voting really is an ideal 
expression of democracy. In Young’s words, “Indeed, the aggregate outcome can just as 
easily be irrational as rational” (Young, 2000, p. 21). The normative argument here is that 
power should not be backed by force – whether in the form of a monarch, an 
authoritarian regime, or even popular vote – but rather, it should be backed by reasons 
that are publicly accessible to all for consideration and debate.  
 The reason-giving requirement inherent in deliberative democracy makes it an 
appealing alternative to aggregative models for a number of other reasons relating to 
justice. Deliberative theorists commonly source deliberation as the basis for political 
legitimacy. Developing out of consent theory and Rawls’ introduction of public reasons 
in Political Liberalism (1993), deliberative democracy idealizes deliberation as a 
normative justification for political coercion.11 Citizens consent to and submit their 
autonomy to coercive political decisions by way of deliberation. Political decisions can 
																																																								
     10 Anderson (2006) makes this point in her development of a Dewey-an epistemology of democracy. 
Here she is contrasting deliberative democracy with the preference-aggregative mechanism embodied by 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  
     11 On this, Bohman has poignantly remarked, “Consent is, after all, the main feature of democracy” 
(Bohman, 1996, p. 4). 
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be normatively defended on the basis that they are the result of public processes of 
reason-giving and deliberation among free and equal citizens. So, to return to the 
example of voting, voting is democratic not simply because it expresses the opinion of 
the majority, but because it motivates discussion about the public good as a mechanism 
for forming a majority opinion. 
Deliberative theorists also point to the epistemic value of deliberation. Joshua 
Cohen’s (1986, 1989/1997) and David Estlund’s (1997) work has been influential within 
the contemporary deliberative theory literature for introducing an epistemic account of 
the value of deliberation. Cohen’s early paper, “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy” 
(1986), is widely referenced for having initiated the reason-giving requirement (i.e., 
deliberation) to epistemic justifications for democracy. While Cohen makes no use of the 
term ‘deliberative democracy’ in this paper (recently introduced only six years prior by 
Bessette, 1980), his paper is important for the deliberative democracy literature because 
he introduces an account of voting that is deliberative in character in his introduction and 
defense of a normative account of voting, which he calls ‘epistemic populism’.  
Populism is defensible, Cohen argues, when it is conditioned on an epistemic, or 
reason-giving, conception of the voting process. A vote is reason-giving when it consists 
of three main elements, the last of which introduces the deliberative qualification for 
epistemic democracy: (1) an independent standard of correctness (e.g., the common 
good), (2) a cognitive account of voting, that is, the view that voting expresses beliefs 
about what policies will in fact realize that independent standard, and (3) an 
understanding of decision making “as a process of the adjustment of beliefs, adjustments 
that are undertaken in part in light of the evidence about the correct answer that is 
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provided by the beliefs of others” (Cohen, 1986, 34). While significant for the 
deliberative democracy project, Cohen’s deliberative, epistemic democracy makes a 
number of faulty assumptions that are an eventual subject of scrutiny in this chapter.  
Some deliberative theorists have argued that another benefit of public, reason-
giving processes is that they promote the perception of legitimacy among citizens.12 And 
drawing on Mill, some theorists point to the educative value of “the public exchange of 
arguments and reasons” (e.g., Christiano, 1997).13 On this perspective, deliberation 
makes people “better informed…more skillful participants in the arts of politics” and 
stimulates sympathies towards others (Zakaras, 2007). Drawing on the thought of John 
Stuart Mill, Alex Zakaras argues that deliberation can stimulate the kinds of intellectual 
and epistemic virtues (i.e., humility, imagination, and skepticism) that are necessary for 
maintaining individuality and avoiding conformity to tyrannical traditions and norms 
(Zakaras, 2007).  
Deliberation requires that one’s preferences be made public and explained, and 
this process requires that she appeal to reasons and that those reasons move beyond self-
interest to wider audiences, and thus make wider appeals to justice. This process requires 
that one examine her preferences and transform them into publicly accessible reasons, 
that is, reasons that are reasons for a wider, pluralist, public because they appeal to a 
																																																								
     12 It is important to point out that this political psychological justification for the legitimacy of 
deliberative democracy is descriptive and should be distinguished from normative legitimacy accounts. My 
project assumes the value of both normative and descriptive justifications and does not attempt to defend 
either or both. 
     13 Christiano’s mixed approach to the value of public deliberation does tend to emphasize the more 
epistemic justification for deliberation. He does concede to the educative justification for deliberation, 
however, writing that, “Democratic institutions and in particular institutions of discussion and deliberation 
have a large impact on whether individuals have the opportunities to reflect on and come to a better 
understanding of their interests and to arrive at a more reasoned point of view” (Christiano, 1997, p. 258).  
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common interest, a common good, or justice more generally.14 The very activity of 
politics itself (understood as involving some form of discussion or deliberation) tends to 
focus participants towards discussion about and considerations of the common good and 
through that, to generate conceptions of the common good (Elster, 1986; Cohen, 1989). 
Young explains how this transformation takes place: 
In the deliberative model political actors not only express preferences and 
interests, but they engage with one another about how to balance these under 
circumstances of inclusive equality. Because this interaction requires participants 
to be open and attentive to one another, to justify their claims and proposals in 
terms acceptable to all, the orientation of participants moves from self-regard to 
an orientation towards what is publicly assertable. (Young, 2000, p. 27) 
 
Young is drawn to the educative and preference-transformative capacity of 
deliberation. Whereas the aggregative model assumes that preferences are fixed and that 
the primary goal of politics is to aggregate them, deliberative democrats argue that one 
important goal of politics is the education of one’s preferences through, and as a result of, 
contact with others. In Estlund’s words, an aggregative model is an “incongruous means” 
for creating justice, particularly because human preferences are not, as social choice 
theorists wrongfully assume, pre-political and ‘given’, but are shaped, developed, and 
nurtured through processes of public deliberation, and I will eventually argue, democratic 
communication more broadly understood to include such things as greeting, rhetoric, 
storytelling, comedy, the arts, protest, and even questioning and exploratory speech 
(Estlund, 1997, p. 11).  
Yet this educative feature of deliberation has been underemphasized in much of 
the traditional, deliberative theory literature. Scholars fail to appreciate its significance 
for the realization of democratic norms, and overlook it as having anything to do with 
																																																								
     14 See especially Rawls (1993/1997). 
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making political legitimacy justifications altogether. Joshua Cohen (1996) has even 
expressly denied the significance of the educative capacity of deliberation. He asserts that 
preference transformation is not a proper goal of deliberative democracy, but rather, is a 
mere byproduct of it (Cohen, 1996, p. 100).  
I think this unlinking of the educative capacity of deliberation from political 
legitimacy justifications is a theoretical mistake with roots in the ontological 
individualism and veritistic social epistemology of traditional deliberative theorists. I 
revisit this point in the closing section of the chapter. It is also one reason why Young’s 
conception of communicative democracy fares much better than traditional deliberative 
models for naming the problem of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality, and 
through this, creating space for strategizing resolutions for it.  
 
3. A Youngian Critique: Beyond Deliberation-as-Argument Towards Deliberation-
Restructured-as-Public-Reasonableness 
 
 Young offers a formal critique of deliberative democracy in Inclusion and 
Democracy (2000). But her earlier work in Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) 
lays important ontological and epistemological groundwork for this critique. Here I draw 
from both of these seminal works on inclusion and democracy as well as other influential 
writings to develop a Youngian critique of traditional, deliberative theory. As I analyze 
Young’s thought, the various critiques that can be brought against deliberative theory are 
unified by their problematic foundation in an ontological individualism and veritistic 
social epistemology. And this is precisely what makes traditional constructions of 
deliberative theory inadequate for conceptualizing and naming identity-prejudiced 
communicative inequality. 
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I use ‘veritistic’ in the sense that Alvin Goldman (1999) used it, to describe a 
consequentialist epistemology concerned with knowledge outcome where knowledge is 
understood as true belief and knowledge practices are, “evaluated in relation to their 
contribution to veritistic value, to their truth-tracking potential” (Peter, 2007, p. 341). 
This chapter contrasts this epistemology with Young’s epistemology, what I am 
analyzing as a pragmatist feminist social epistemology.  
Young is critical that deliberative theorists formulate too academic and elitist a 
construction of deliberation understood as argument that enables, and in some cases even 
promotes, exclusion. Bohman comments, “Deliberation, too, seems to be elitist, more 
appropriate to university seminars and scientific communities than to the general public” 
(1996, p. 3). This particularly academic conception of public deliberation has been 
described by José Martí as, “a collective form of argumentation, where arguing consists 
in exchanging reasons, for or against certain proposals, oriented to the goal of rationally 
convincing others…and it is supposed to lead us, at least ideally, to rational consensus” 
(Martí, 2005, p. 29).  
Argument has a history of conditioning participation on meeting norms of 
dispassionate speech and articulateness. The association of argument with dispassionate 
speech has received notable scrutiny from feminist theorists and contemporary pragmatist 
thinkers, scrutiny that it is outside of the scope of this project to reiterate in great detail. I 
will mention two important conclusions from this body of literature that are relevant for 
developing my project. The first is a point about the origin of the association of argument 
with dispassionate speech and articulateness, and the second is a point about the strategic, 
identity-prejudiced use of it to enforce existing power relations. 
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First, the association of argument with dispassionate speech has complex 
historical origins in Western philosophy, where reason has been elevated over the 
emotions, and the mind elevated over the body. Joan Tronto attributes a great deal of the 
stigmatization of the affective dimensions of moral decision-making and the 
marginalization of women’s moral knowledge to social and economic changes of the 
eighteenth century during which a transformation took place, “from the more organic, 
integrated way of life of people into a way of life organized around the requirements of 
wage labor and the market” (Tronto, 2009, p. 32). Tronto identifies this time period and 
social context as influential for the introduction of the dichotomy between the private, 
domestic sphere where women’s moral sentiments were welcome and the public, political 
sphere where they were excluded in favor of more ‘impartial’ constructions of moral 
reasoning.15   
Young does not endeavor to conjecture the historical underpinnings of these 
dichotomies. Rather, she takes the attitude that such things, “quite possibly [come] about 
through a set of fateful, historical accidents” (Young, 1990, p. 127). Whereas there has 
been a positive association of reason and mind with the masculine and elite, there has 
been a negative association of the emotional life and body with the feminine and servant 
and slave classes. Regardless of its basis, it presently problematizes inclusive democratic 
practices.  
The second conclusion from this literature that is relevant for my project, is that 
under the cloak of ‘impartiality’, agents in positions of social power have historically 
enforced this reason-emotion dichotomy inconsistently, for example, through favoring 
																																																								
     15 See Fenton (2015) for a more detailed account of this dichotomy as it pertains to resistance emotions 
and corporate dismissal of activists’ moral claims on them.  
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men’s anger as ‘righteous indignation’ and women’s as ‘hysteria’.16 To be clear, this kind 
of inconsistent, identity-prejudiced enforcement of the reason-emotion dichotomy can 
arise as a result of the enforcer’s gender-socialized communicative habits and biased 
perceptions, biases that operate at a lower or more implicit level of consciousness and are 
unknown to the agent. However, individuals sometimes strategically enforce the reason-
emotion dichotomy in gendered, identity-prejudiced ways. In strategic enforcement, the 
‘enforcer’ is, on some level, aware of the communicative success of these practices for 
maintaining his dominant epistemic standing in the communicative context. In both 
implicit and strategic instances of identity-prejudiced enforcement of the reason-emotion 
dichotomy, these communicative practices function to maintain power in gender relations 
or other group-based relations of power through both diminishing the deliberative 
standing of the speaker whose speech is enforced by them, and more generally, through 
communicating this diminished deliberative standing to bystanders or third parties to the 
communicative act. 
In non-democratic institutions like classist systems and monarchies, if political 
decision-making power is based in reason, and if those in power are the only ones seen as 
possessing reason, the maintenance of the reason/emotion dichotomy through social 
norms and social enforcement and the acceptance of it by non-elites insulates the status 
quo institutions, authority-figures, and practices from being challenged. Higher-status 
social groups tend to occupy academic and elite classes that stand to benefit from the 
maintenance of these opposing categories and stigmatization of one. One’s elite status is 
																																																								
     16 See especially Rachel P. Maines’s (1999) account of the history of social and political motivations 
behind medical diagnoses of ‘hysteria’ in women during the Victorian era in her book, The Technology of 
Orgasm: “Hysteria”, the Vibrator, and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction. 
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maintained by way of contrast with the Other, “deviant and inferior” (Young, 1988, p. 
285). Again, this power dynamic can function on implicit levels or be used strategically. 
Similar to the norm of dispassionate speech, the association of argument with 
articulateness (e.g., tone, grammar, regional accent, or diction) has complex origins in 
classist systems where elites have more and better access to education, but it can also be 
used strategically by academic and political elites to maintain quiescence. Norms of 
articulateness tend to be culturally specific to the expression tendencies of the more 
socially privileged (Young, 2000, pp. 38-39). Deliberation specifically has been styled 
after Western institutions of scientific debate, modern parliaments, and courts. These 
institutions have historically been male-dominated and were formed in “class- and race-
differentiated societies” (Young, 1996, p. 123).17  
It is possible that participants in these Western deliberative institutions debated 
under relative political, economic, and social power (though this is unlikely). Even were 
this the case, it is problematic to extrapolate these norms of dispassionate speech and 
articulateness onto a contemporary conception and practice of deliberation that operates 
in a wider social context of social inequality and oppression. One should not need special 
education or training in formal argumentation or familiarity with particular jargons and 
methods of discourse for democratic participation. Borrowing from Mill, we ought not to 
assume that the generality of epistemic norms, communicative norms, or of a practice 
(i.e., deliberation-as-argument) is evidence “that it is, or at all events once was, conducive 
to laudable ends” (Mill, 1869/1988, p. 4).  
																																																								
     17 See especially Haslanger (2002) and Longino (1989, 1990, 2002). 
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The worry for Mill, echoed and enriched in Young’s own account of cultural 
imperialism, is that closed, elite communities create epistemic, communicative, and 
moral norms that are assumed as universal and are then imposed on others (Young, 1988; 
Young, 1990). Because such norms and perspectives are part of the dominant culture, 
they get assumed as universal and go unnoticed as perspectives. When at first these elite 
communities are forced to become formally inclusive under the expansion of human 
rights of participation, the norms are not questioned and get assumed as universal 
standards of knowing, communicating, and conduct. The relevant points here are that the 
communicative culture of traditional deliberative institutions – which to reiterate, 
historically conditioned membership on white, male, elite status – is assumed as a 
universally accessible and epistemically advantageous communicative culture, and it goes 
unnoticed that this communicative culture is actually one among many in a given society. 
To protect deliberation from the elitist creep of norms of dispassionate speech and 
articulateness, Young introduces a more general requirement of reasonableness. Rather 
than norms of dispassionate speech and articulateness, one need only meet a basic 
expectation of reasonableness in discussion, which Young explains as, “being open to 
listening to others and having them influence one’s own views, and expressing one’s own 
claims upon them in ways that aim to reach their assent or understanding” (Young, 2000, 
p. 38).  
Although not significantly developed in her work, we can extract some 
information about what Young has in mind for a wider and potentially inclusive 
conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public reasonableness from one of her 
intermediary publications, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative 
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Democracy” (1996).18 Here Young briefly develops a broader account of public 
reasonableness than is permitted by traditional accounts of deliberation-as-argument.  
Here Young criticizes deliberation-as-argument for its overly idealized 
deliberative procedure, which is agonistic and competitive (Young, 1996). Drawing from 
Cohen (1989), Young explains this traditional conception of deliberation as reasoned 
argument where, “participants come to a political problem with an open mind about its 
solution” and are “not bound by the authority of prior norms or requirements” (Young, 
1996, p. 122). They “put forward proposals and criticize, and each assents to a conclusion 
only because of the “force of the better argument”” (ibid.). For example, Cohen assumes 
deliberation-as-argument in his construction of an ideal deliberative procedure: “Reasons 
are offered with the aim of bringing others to accept the proposal” (Cohen, 1989/1997, p. 
74).  
Under this traditional construction of deliberation-as-argument, “parties to dispute 
aim to win the argument, not to achieve mutual understanding” (Young, 1996, p. 123). 
This restriction of political communication to ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ reintroduces a power 
dynamic to the democratic forum that is consistent with the power dynamic of force that 
deliberative theorists are themselves critical of. Speakers who tend towards more 
exploratory forms of speech are at an inherent disadvantage to participate in these types 
of argumentative exchanges. The rules of the discussion ‘game’ have already been made 
and they have not been party to this process.  
To promote formal inclusion, deliberative theorists allege that political and 
economic power is bracketed in this exchange. The faulty assumption here, however, is 
																																																								
     18 This piece is ‘intermediary’ in the sense that it was published between what I have referred to as 
Young’s two seminal works specific to inclusion and democracy, Justice and the Politics of Difference 
(1990) and Inclusion and Democracy (2000). 
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that the formal exclusion of political and economic influence in decision-making will 
fully neutralize the power of individuals. But the account, as Young is keen to point out, 
ignores the complex ways that political, economic, and social power impacts one’s 
formal access to deliberative spaces, her capacity to participate in those spaces, and also 
very importantly her deliberative standing in that space.  
But given the complexity of public problems, why not instead of adversarial, 
competitive communication, an “open reciprocal recognition of the point of view of 
everyone” (Young, 1996, p. 122)? A wider and potentially more inclusive conception of 
deliberation, restructured as public-reasonableness more broadly understood, will include 
alternative modes of speech that while not formally structured as argument, introduce 
perspectives on issues and problems that are reasonable.  
Deliberative equality requires both that each have “the equal opportunity to make 
proposals and criticize” and that “their speaking situation [is] free from domination” 
(Young, 1996, p. 122). Restricting deliberation to argument makes space for deliberative 
inequality on the basis of both elitist communicative conditions for participation, and 
contentious domination in communicative activities where academics and clever citizens 
intellectually bully less formally trained speakers. As Young explains, “Argument is not 
the only mode of political communication, and argument can be expressed in a plurality 
of ways, interspersed with or alongside other communicative forms” (Young, 1996, p. 
125). 
The fascination with formal argument is inherently elitist in more ways than one. 
Beyond the fact that it establishes a threshold for participation that tends to favor the 
communicative cultures of social elites and enables for identity-prejudiced strategic 
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enforcement, it also idealizes consensus as both a starting place and a goal for 
deliberation. There are a few reasons to worry about consensus as a starting place or goal 
for deliberation. In pluralist societies characterized by diverse social experiences and 
understandings, we cannot assume that this unification is so easy (Young, 2000, p. 41). 
Furthermore, we cannot assume that when there is some unification on premises or on the 
way a problem under consideration has been framed, that that unification is not itself a 
result of social inequality.  
Take for instance John Gaventa’s famous investigation of industrial power and 
quiescence in the Central Appalachian Valley. He observes that despite great wealth in 
the region, most Appalachian-mountaneers live in tremendous poverty yet have 
extremely low political participation rates and are relatively unorganized as labor groups. 
Common thinking in Appalachian studies at the time was that this inactivity, lack of 
upheaval or rebellion, relative social stability, and quiescence can be explained by “the 
culture or circumstance of the deprived themselves” (Gaventa, 1982, p. 40). Gaventa 
argues against this trend in thought, that the political response of an oppressed group or 
class (or lack of response) is often itself a result of a complex history of power relations 
that are difficult to observe and operate in complex ways. The Young-ian point here is 
that like quiescence, consensus must also be understood as a possible result of social 
inequality and power. Borrowing from Gutman and Thompson, “If moral differences are 
as deep and pervasive as pluralists [like Young] believe, they can be eliminated in 
politics only by repression” (Gutman and Thompson, 2004, p. 28).  
There are a variety of stages of formal argument that require some level of 
consensus for continued participation in the communicative act, and identity-prejudiced 
39 
 
communicative inequalities can impact the direction towards which the consensus 
requirement is pushed on all of those levels. We can compartmentalize argument into 
three parts in order to analyze the various stages at which the communicative practice of 
argument is vulnerable to the elitist creep of a false consensus: (1) its starting place, (2) 
its process, that is, as a style of discourse itself, and (3) its goal. First, argument begins 
with a problem or issue that has already been selected and defined. In formal argument, 
parties “cannot proceed unless there are some premises that all the discussants accept” 
(Young, 2000, p. 37). Some level of consensus is required just for argument to get 
started.  
This reduction of deliberation to argument fails to account for the communicative 
processes that generate the object of deliberation itself, that object being a problem that 
interlocutors agree is a problem and on how it has been framed. That is, formal arguments 
are constructed about problems that the parties to the argument agree are problems 
worthy of dispute. The reduction of deliberation to formal argument ignores the 
multidimensional ways that power operates in the formation of social consensus about 
public problems. How has this problem under deliberative consideration come to be seen 
as a public problem? Who has participated in defining it? How have power relations in 
society shaped this definition process? Are there, for example, alternative ways that the 
problem could be framed that go undiscovered or get dismissed because of identity-
prejudices towards the speakers who are bringing forward those framings? To borrow 
from Bohman, “Inequalities of power enter into the very definition of the problematic 
situation to be deliberated upon…in the way in which problems are defined and thus 
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“framed,” often in such a way that the participatory success of powerful groups is 
ensured” (Bohman, 1996, p. 117; citing Gamson, 1993). 
Consider the current Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement of the 2010’s. 
Activists are attempting to introduce a problem for public consideration. Judith Butler 
sheds light on the underlying moral claims in the activist chant, “Black Lives Matter”:  
It is a statement of outrage and a demand for equality, for the right to live free of 
constraint, but also a chant that links the history of slavery, of debt peonage, 
segregation, and a prison system geared towards containment, neutralization and 
degradation of black lives, but also a police system that more and more easily and 
often can take away a black life in a flash all because some officer perceives a 
threat. (Yancy and Butler, 2015)  
 
One challenge for the progress of the Black Lives Matter movement has been the 
counter-activist movement of whites chanting, holding signs, or posting signs outside 
their residences that read, “All Lives Matter”, “Blue Lives Matter”, and “We Back the 
Badge”. This public response misunderstands and even distorts and dismisses the 
problem being proposed by BLM. Butler explains: “It is true that all lives matter, but it is 
equally true that not all lives are understood to matter which is precisely why it is most 
important to name the lives that have not mattered, and are struggling to matter in the 
way they deserve” (Yancy and Butler, 2005). 
If we map a traditional deliberative paradigm and its assumption of consensus as a 
starting place for deliberation onto this example, we have problematized the possibility 
for deliberation to even get started. Parties cannot agree on whether there is a problem 
worth considering at all, and because the counter-activist party enjoys a privileged 
deliberative standing relative to social power relations with regard to race, this 
perspective dominates the discourse.  
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 All this is to say that the very process of coming to define public problems is 
itself a significant, communicative practice. Bohman (1996) has a modest appreciation 
for this point. Drawing on the political science literature on framing and agenda setting, 
he explains, “Power can be expressed in the way in which problems are defined and thus 
“framed,” often in such a way that the participatory success of powerful groups is 
ensured” (Bohman, 1996, p. 117; citing Gamson, 1993, pp. 6-8).19 Bohman concludes 
that agenda setting is itself a deliberative activity and an indicator that a “basic threshold” 
of political equality is operating in communicative space. That is, whether an individual 
or group can even bring an issue or problem forward for public consideration is a good 
empirical indicator of deliberative equality. 
Despite her critique of consensus as a starting place for deliberation, Young does 
not abandon some sense of unity in support of an utterly fractured body politic. 
Importantly, her critique is only that too strong a conception of consensus as a starting 
place problematizes deliberative equality. Young advocates a weak unity based on 
meeting three conditions, two of which are normatively substantive: (1) Citizens need 
only share in their having been ‘thrown together’ in regional proximity or through 
economic interdependence as a starting place for political communication. Beyond this 
basic condition of interdependence, such “people who live together, who are stuck with 
one another” must share two very basic, substantive values: (2) “a commitment to equal 
respect for one another” and (3) some agreement on “procedural rules of fair discussion 
and decision-making” (Young, 1996, p. 126).  
																																																								
     19 See also Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) work on agenda setting. Bureaucratic institutions can 
themselves filter out various framings of problems, particularly those framings that draw connections 
between the proposed problem and the structure of the institution itself. In such cases, Bachrach and Baratz 
explain that a “non-decision” is produced.  
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Deliberation-as-argument is vulnerable to the elitist creep of a false consensus in 
its second stage because as a process of putting forward one’s reasons, defending them, 
and interrogating the reasons of others, it assumes a consensus on an appropriate method 
of discourse. As was demonstrated in my earlier exposition of norms of dispassionate 
speech and articulateness, no such consensus among free and equal citizens in this 
communicative method was ever had. Rather, in this stage of argument, an elitist 
communicative culture is assumed as neutral and universally accessible, and non-elites 
must conform to this as a condition for their participation.  
One of the worries that motivates this critique is that in contexts of social 
inequality and oppression, social elites can dictate how problems are framed as well as 
what communicative methods and norms any discussion about those problems is 
conditioned upon. Susan Dieleman (2015) has recently argued that Young senses an 
additional injustice at work in political processes of problem-framing, definition-
formation, and deliberation-uptake, namely, a hermeneutical injustice. Drawing on the 
work of Miranda Fricker (2007), Dieleman maps Fricker’s conceptions of testimonial and 
hermeneutical justice onto Young’s critique. Dieleman explains testimonial and 
hermeneutical injustice,  
Speakers – typically members of historically disenfranchised groups – can be 
wronged [testimonially] as bearers and providers of knowledge because they 
might be subject to identity prejudices that affect how credible we think they are 
or [hermeneutically] because they might live in a society that hasn’t developed 
the concepts needed to express their experiences or the interpretive tools needed 
to understand their particular communicative style. (Dieleman, 2015, p. 794) 
 
Whereas testimonial injustice attaches to the speaker in the form of identity 
prejudices, hermeneutical injustice is structural and attaches to speech itself (Alcoff, 
2010, p. 129). Social inequality and oppression can skew the very hermeneutical 
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resources available to describe one’s social experiences to others. And whereas the elite 
rarely find themselves without words to describe their experiences since their experiences 
and expressions of those experiences have been normalized and assumed as universal, 
“the powerless, on the other hand, must make do with the social meanings available to 
them, many of which will be inadequate to the task of interpreting and communicating 
their own experiences” (Dieleman, 2015, p. 801).  
Young deepens her critique of consensus-based politics in her later work, 
“Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy” (2001). Here she anticipates Fricker’s 
conception of hermeneutical injustice perhaps most clearly in her account of a 
‘discourse’:  
A system of stories and expert knowledge diffused through the society, which 
convey the widely accepted generalizations about how society operates that are 
theorized in these terms, as well as the social norms and cultural values to which 
most of the people appeal when discussing their social and political problems and 
proposed solutions. (Young, 2001, p. 686) 
 
Even where formal conditions of deliberative inclusion are met, a discourse may 
limit the hearing that a particular person or group can get because their insights and 
claims do not assume the dominant discourse, and the dominant discourse lacks the 
hermeneutical resources to make sense of the insights and claims being expressed. What 
is more, because a dominant discourse may include “falsifications, biases, 
misunderstandings, and even contradictions” that frequently go unnoticed by those who 
assume the dominant discourse, such discourses may also produce a false consensus 
(Young, 2001, p. 685).  
Young gives the example of a dominant discourse of poverty where “there seems 
to be wide agreement that poverty should be conceptualized as a function of the failure of 
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individuals to develop various skills and capacities necessary for inclusion in modern 
labor markets” (Young, 2001, p. 686). Thus deliberative forums created to discuss ‘the 
problem of poverty’ will have already smuggled a number of normative assumptions: the 
myth that all have equal access to participate in labor markets, the assumption that justice 
is merely a matter of distribution of resources and access to jobs (and not, as Young has 
argued in much of her work, a question of participation), that labor markets are 
themselves the best structure for economically organizing a society, and importantly, an 
atomistic and individualistic ontology.  
To take this example further, consider a common tension within community-
based organizations. An activist program planner for a community-based organization is 
sensitive to the history of racial and gender inequality in the community she represents. 
She has a more relational and institutional conception of poverty and its causes. 
However, she is often compelled by board members and donors to address poverty 
merely at a distributive level (e.g., in the form of a food pantry) and in a paternalistic 
form, when she would much rather couple these relief-services with programs that aim to 
boost the participatory political power of the organization’s constituents. In such cases, 
major decision-makers for the organization assume the dominant discourse of poverty, 
one of liberal individualism and a distributive paradigm of justice. Thus, one’s 
participation in discussion about problem identification and program planning is 
conditioned on conforming to that discourse.  
Finally, deliberation-as-argument is vulnerable to the elitist creep of a false 
consensus in the assumptions it makes about the goal of deliberation. The approach 
assumes that the epistemic practice of argumentation is at it’s best, truth-conducive, and 
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at a minimum, at least consensus-producing. That is, deliberation is seen as epistemically 
valuable because at a minimum, it convinces others to consent to some remedy for a 
problem and at best, because it discovers the correct answer to a problem. This first 
alternative is problematic for the same reasons that it is as a starting place for 
deliberation. Young’s general concern about argument-towards-consensus is that too 
strong a commitment to this, “can incline some or all to advocate removing difficult 
issues from discussion for the sake of agreement and preservation of the common good” 
(2000, p. 42). When deliberative processes are framed by “longstanding and multiple 
structural inequalities”, people may arrive at agreement that “is at least party conditioned 
by unjust relations and for that reasons should not be considered a genuinely free 
consent” (Young, 2001, p. 685).  
This second purported goal for deliberation, discovery of a correct answer, is 
problematic because it assumes that correctness is a possible goal for political decision-
making. Besides rejecting the atomistic and individualistic ontology of liberal 
individualism, communicative democracy must also be skeptical of the veritistic social 
epistemology assumed in this final stage and goal of deliberation-as-argument. I develop 
this point in further detail later in this chapter.  
From the critique offered here of deliberation-as-argument we can arrive at a 
more robust conception of deliberative equality than has been enabled by deliberative 
theorists. It requires not just equal, formal access to participation in deliberation, but 
equal participation in the identification and defining of public problems and in the 
formation of the communicative cultures and norms that govern the deliberation process 
itself. Here I have shown that deliberation-as-argument actually worsens deliberative 
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inequality because it universalizes a particular mode of discourse most familiar to elites 
and establishes it as a threshold for participation.  
Here I have focused on problematic tendencies in the construction of deliberation-
as-argument related to consensus: it’s emphasis on consensus as a starting place and 
possible goal of deliberation and it’s assumption of some sort of social consensus about 
the necessity of this mode of discourse for political decision-making processes.  
Recall that I have claimed that deliberative theorists assume a faulty 
individualistic ontology and veritistic social epistemology in their constructions of 
deliberation-as-argument. In the two sections that follow, I will develop alternative 
relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social epistemology of communicative 
democracy by way of critical contrast with this individualistic framework. This 
framework struggles to identify and makes sense of communicatively structured 
deliberative inequality, and more specifically, to name identity-prejudiced 
communicative inequality. Thus, a deliberative theory that assumes this framework will 
struggle to meet the strong sense of inclusion Young idealizes for democracy.  
 
4. Young’s Relational Ontology 
 
The relational framework of communicative democracy that I develop in this and 
the following sections of this chapter will introduce and develop some important concepts 
to deliberative democracy: the concepts of (1) social identity, (2) socially situated 
standpoint and perspective, (3) epistemic standing. The pragmatist feminist conception of 
communicative democracy that I am developing in this project appreciates the complex 
ways that these three are impacted by one’s relative position in a given society where 
there are relations of power, oppression, and privilege.  
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Young develops her conception of identity from three traditions, all linked by 
their deeply relational conceptions of identity: (1) the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas, 
(2) the sociology of Stephen Epstein, and (3) the social psychology of John Turner. 
Owing to Habermas, Young sees identity “not as an origin but as a product of linguistic 
and practical interaction” (Young, 1990, p. 45; citing Habermas, 1987, pp. 3-40). One’s 
social identity results from “an internal organization of self-perception concerning one’s 
relationship to social categories, that also incorporates views of the self perceived to be 
held by others” (Young, 1990, p. 45; citing Epstein, 1987, p. 29).  
Young eventually turns to Turner’s social psychology to establish an account of 
the social group because of their shared belief that “neither social theory nor philosophy 
has a clear and developed concept of the social group (Young, 1990, p. 43; citing Turner 
et. al., 1987). Borrowing from Turner, she explains, “Group categorization and norms are 
major constituents of individual identity” (Young, 1990, p. 45; citing Turner et. al., 
1987).  
It is worth noting that Turner’s research and thought eventually develops into the 
social identity approach that is under consideration in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
Turner studied under, and eventually researched and published with, Henri Tajfel, 
pioneer of the approach. Tajfel introduces the concept of social identity in his research on 
intergroup relations: it is “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from 
their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value 
and emotional significance of that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255).  
Young points out that on the classical liberal framework, social groups are 
primarily thought of as either aggregates or associations of individuals. Both of these 
48 
 
perspectives assume that identity is ontologically prior to one’s membership in a group. 
Whereas the associative model thinks of individuals as individuals coming together with 
the purpose of pursuing a shared goal that has been formed in isolation from one another 
prior to their association, the aggregative model assumes an attributional account of 
social groups as combinations of individuals based on similar and categorically essential 
attributes (Young, 1990, pp. 43-44).  
For example, the American legal system and political discourse around it uses the 
language of ‘discrimination’ to talk of group-based exclusions, by which is meant, 
“conscious actions or policies by which members of a group are excluded from 
institutions or confined to inferior positions” (Young, 1988, p. 272).20 Young draws 
attention to the roots of this narrow linguistic framework of ‘discrimination’: a faulty 
conception of social groups as aggregates or associations. The language that dominates 
political discourse in the U.S. does not have the ontological tools to conceptualize the 
discourse of oppression as used by new social movements, a structural phenomenon that 
results from power relations (Young, 1988, p. 270). Discrimination, aggregates, and 
associations are all “methodologically individualist concepts” that fail to identify the 
complexity of group identifications (Young, 1988, pp. 272-3).  
																																																								
     20 For an excellent example of the limitations of concepts of ‘discrimination’ and ‘disparate impact’ in 
the American judicial system, see King, et. al., 2011. Their research sampled 219 cases from over 1,000 
cases in employment law in (non-appellate, non-jury) federal district court cases between 2000 and 2008 
where charges of discrimination were brought against employers or workplaces on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, or gender. They found that while “scientists agree that contemporary discrimination is manifested 
in [various forms of microaggressions]”, and that while “both targets and outsiders are aware of and 
recognize contemporary forms of discrimination”, this was not reflected in case decisions (pp. 55, 70). 
“Only behaviors that were clearly intended to cause harm to racial minorities or women (i.e., microassaults) 
were consistently correlated with decisions in favor of plaintiffs” (p. 69). The authors also point to case law 
the offers judges more discretion in assessing intent (e.g., McDaniel v. EagleCare, Inc., 2002) and hostile 
work environment (e.g., Curry v. District of Columbia, 1999) as evidence that judges’ perceptions and 
interpretations themselves may be limited by outdated conceptions of identity-prejudiced harms.  
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Similar to the concept of ‘discrimination’, ‘oppression’ has historically been 
conceptualized through the lens of liberal individualism as “the exercise of tyranny by a 
ruling group”. Talk of oppressed groups commonly assumes an attributional account of 
the social group where individuals are assumed as having chosen membership in the 
group of say, African Americans, because of self-identified “essential attributes” (Young, 
1990, p. 40). But this is actually backwards since unlike associations, social groups 
“emerge from the way people interact” and relations of power that are outside of an 
individual’s own processes of self-definition (Young, 2000, p. 90).  
To borrow Young’s language, there is a certain “thrown-ness” about social group 
membership. “One finds oneself as a member of a group, which one experiences as 
always already having been” (Young, 1990, p. 46). And because sometimes these groups 
emerge from relations of domination, “because one group excludes and labels a category 
of persons”, one finds oneself thrown into a social group that is already “associated with 
specific attributes, stereotypes, and norms” (Young, 1990, p. 46).  
A problematic conclusion is sometimes drawn from the attributional account of 
the social group: because many stereotypes and prejudices target (and identify and 
define) group attributes, the thinking is that the elimination of groups through some kind 
of “colorblindness” to individuals’ group membership can resolve problems of 
discrimination and exclusion (Young, 1990, p. 46). But thinking about justice for social 
groups in this way – by way of discrimination and the denial of difference – ignores the 
socio-political histories of social groups, social statuses that such groups inherit, social-
political processes of being grouped and related patterns of domination, as well as the 
ontological significance and meaning of one’s self-identification process with a group 
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itself. By denying difference, this attributional approach denies the reality of group-based 
sociopolitical, economic, and epistemic disadvantages or privileges that accompany 
social group membership.21  
Importantly, Young is concerned that even a progressive, politics of identity 
assumes the faulty, individualist associative and attributional conceptions of the social 
group.22 By contrast, the politics of difference that Young advocates understands group 
differentiation, “as a function of structural relations rather than constituted from some 
common attributes or dispositions of group members” (Young, 1997, p. 385). The basis 
for affinity with a social group is not common attributes – indeed, such a perspective 
permits the reification of attributional over-generalizations and the perpetuation of group 
stereotypes – but rather, the basis for affinity with a social group is the fact that 
individuals in a particular social group have some shared social perspectives of their 
social reality as a result of their membership in the group.23  
 The strengths of this non-attributional approach to the social group is that it both 
allows individuals to understand themselves in terms of their membership in a group (i.e., 
it does not deny difference), and leaves ontological space for individuals to redefine 
themselves within those social groups (i.e., fluidity). The approach acknowledges the 
underlying socioeconomic and political patterns of social relations between groups, as 
																																																								
    21 To reiterate my earlier point, I do not here have in mind one’s epistemic capacities to know as much as 
one’s epistemic standing in a discourse to be received as a knower. That is not to say that the former is not 
a concern for social justice theorists. It is simply not the focus of the dissertation.  
     22 Young develops this critique in fuller detail in her later work, where she considers the implications of 
attributional constructions of the social group in the context of inclusion and democracy (Young, 2000). 
Because the American political climate is one where interest-group pluralism and preference-aggregative 
conceptions of democracy are assumed, justice claims by social groups for recognition (e.g., LGBTQ 
rights) often get distorted as competitive and divisive claims for cultural domination. But Young clarifies, 
“Most group-conscious political claims, however, are not claims to the recognition of identity as such, but 
rather claims for fairness, equal opportunity, and political inclusion” (Young, 2000, p. 107). For Young’s 
early examination of interest-group pluralism see also Young, 1990, Chapter 3 “Insurgency and Welfare 
Capitalism.  
     23 See also Young, 1994, “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective”. 
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well as group member’s privileges and disadvantages relative to their membership and 
those social relations. Thus it makes space for affirming, rather than denying, difference.  
Young conceives of social groups as both relational and fluid. Groups are the 
result of social processes, both between one another as well as within the groups 
themselves among the individuals who identity with the group. And importantly, these 
social processes of social identification and intergroup relations can evolve. Young’s 
point of clarification is that “one first finds a group identity as given, and then takes it up 
in a certain way… Those who identify with a group can redefine the meaning and norms 
of group identity” (Young, 1990, p. 46).  
Young’s introduction of an intersectional account of oppression in “Five Faces of 
Oppression” (1988) – which eventually gets republished as Chapter 2 of Justice and the 
Politics of Difference (1990) – is situated in this critique of liberal individualism and 
account of social identity and the social group. Young points out in her later work, 
“Considered relationally, a social group is a collective of persons differentiated from 
others by cultural norms, practices, special needs or capacities, structures of power or 
privilege” (Young, 2000, p. 90). This cultural feature of the social group, and the notion 
that one has a unique social perspective and epistemic standing based in her cultural 
affinity with a social group, is lost in aggregative and associative models of social groups.  
On a relational ontology, oppression refers to structural phenomena that 
immobilize or diminish[es] a group” (Young, 1990, p. 42). It often results from, 
“unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, 
media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and 
market mechanisms – in short, the normal processes of everyday life” (Young, 1990, p. 
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41). It is systematic in that its success relies on institutional processes, “which prevent 
some people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially 
recognized settings, or … inhibit[s] people’s ability to play and communicate with others 
or to express their feelings and perspective on social life in contexts where others can 
listen” (Young, 1990, p. 38). 
 Young’s relational ontology of the social group gives her the framework she 
needs to define oppression a such, not the result of intentional and coercive tyrannical 
power, but rather as the result of intergroup relations themselves. Young is careful to 
clarify that this structural account does not deny the fact that “within a system of 
oppression individual persons…[can] intentionally harm others in oppressed groups” or 
deny that “specific groups are beneficiaries of the oppression of other people, and thus 
have an interest in their continued oppression” (Young, 1990, p. 42). One’s oppression 
does not necessarily correlate with a tyrant, domination (“that is, constraints upon 
oppressed people to follow rules set by others”), or an oppressing group (Young, 1990, p. 
38). But one’s oppression does often correlate with a social group that is privileged in 
relation to one’s oppressed social group.  
A problem arises for this structural and systematic account of oppression that 
Young must tackle, however. Namely, how can such a theory identify oppressed people if 
it resists attributional analyses of social groups? That is, the task is “to compare 
oppressions without reducing them to a common essence or claiming that one is more 
fundamental than another [and] one can compare the ways in which a particular form of 
oppression appears in different groups” (Young, 1990, p. 64). To meet this burden, she 
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introduces “five faces” of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism, and violence.  
Young’s treatment of exploitation has roots in a Marxist critique of the labor 
market where, “some people exercise their capacities under the control, according to the 
purposes, and for the benefit of other people” (Young, 1990, p. 49). This results in more 
than mere material deprivation, but in deprivation of self-worth. Within that market 
system, people are marginalized if, “the [assumed] system of labor cannot or will not use 
them”, for example, the elderly, mentally ill, disabled, or formerly-incarcerated (Young, 
1990, p. 53). Young explains eloquently, here “a whole category of people is expelled 
from useful participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material 
deprivation and even extermination” (Young, 1990, p. 53).  
Young’s account of powerlessness reveals the implications of material conditions 
on individuals’ social standing. Young defines powerlessness in terms of 
“nonprofessionals”, “blue collar”, “manual labor”, and “working class”. By contrast, 
those who occupy professional “white collar” jobs enjoy opportunities for the progressive 
development of their capacities, some supervisory authority over others and themselves, 
and respectability in broader social life (Young, 1990, p. 57). Powerlessness arises as a 
result of various relations in the labor market, but it is more far reaching than one’s 
professional life. Within bureaucratic organizations, most people “do not regularly 
participate in making decisions that affect the conditions of their lives and actions” 
(Young, 1990, p. 56). However, within those same organizations, power is dispersed 
widely among many agents, and “the powerless are those who lack authority or power 
even in this mediated sense” (ibid.).  
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This last point about respectability in broader social life speaks to one’s epistemic 
standing and is significant in application to one’s deliberative standing. To borrow from 
Young, 
In daily interchange women and men of color must prove their respectability. At 
first they are often not treated by strangers with respectful distance or deference. 
Once people discover that this woman or that Puerto Rican man is a college 
teacher or a business executive, however, they often behave more respectfully 
toward her or him. Working-class white men, on the other hand, are often treated 
with respect until their working-class status is revealed. (Young, 1990, p. 58) 
 
I have developed the fourth face of oppression, cultural imperialism, in my 
exposition of deliberation-as-argument. People who experience cultural imperialism 
frequently encounter “dominant meanings of a society” and as I have argued, dominant 
discourses themselves, in ways where those norms are assumed as objective and impartial 
(Young, 1990, pp. 58). This can, “render the particular perspective of one’s own group 
invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other” 
(Young, 1990, p. 58-9). The fifth face of oppression, violence, is a face of oppression 
because it, or the threat of it, is framed by a social context that systematically targets 
members of a group on the basis of their membership in that group (Young, 1990, p. 62). 
Young admits that distributive injustice may be a contributor to each of these 
faces of oppression, but she clarifies that “none is reducible to distribution and all involve 
social structures and relations beyond distribution” (Young, 1990, p. 9). In fact, 
distributive explanations for oppression frequently “ignore the social structure and 
institutional context that often help determine distributive patterns” – structures and 
institutional contexts such as “issues of decision-making power and procedures, division 
of labor, and culture” (Young, 1990, p. 15).  
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Each of the faces of oppression share at least one common characteristic: they all 
block individuals from full social or political participation by sustaining the institutional 
and relational conditions for the deterioration of self-worth and ultimately, political 
agency. We get a sense of Young’s account of political agency in this discussion of 
oppression and domination. It consists of the capacities for (1) self-development, that is, 
exercising and developing one’s capacities and expressing their experiences and (2) self-
determination, that is, “participating in one’s action and the conditions of one’s action” 
(Young, 1990, p. 37; citing Young, 1979). Assuming democracy, oppression ultimately 
comes down to a question of participation. Each face of oppression blocks individuals in 
some way from full social or political participation because the deterioration of self-
worth and self-development of capacities limits the formation and exercise of one’s 
political agency. 
When Young turns towards deliberative theory in her later work (2000), she 
worries that the individualistic ontology explored here is assumed within deliberative 
theory itself. Thus the concepts of social identity, socially situated standpoint and 
perspective, and epistemic standing never make it into the theory. As a result, traditional 
deliberative theory cannot appreciate how these are impacted by one’s relative position in 
a given society where there are relations of power, oppression, and privilege.  
Within deliberative theory, the power relations that frame oppression and 
privilege get reified by the democratic norm of impartiality. Perhaps owing to Rawls’ 
propensity for ideal theory and political thought experiments, some deliberative theorists 
speak of deliberation as an activity that can be had in isolation from any actual 
interlocutors. If one is impartial, she can merely imagine the possible arguments, consider 
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them, and arrive at a solution for the problem. For example, Cohen commits his ideal 
deliberative procedure to this in writing that, “Outcomes [of deliberation] are 
democratically legitimate if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement 
among equals” (Cohen, 1996, p. 73, the emphasis is mine). I take it by his use of ‘could 
be’ that he has in mind some kind of armchair, deliberative thought experiment where 
one imagines and considers the arguments of her interlocutor(s).   
This norm of impartiality is especially prevalent in Estlund’s construction of 
deliberation. In an attempt to avoid a veritistic social epistemology of democracy, Estlund 
introduces what he calls a “moderate epistemic proceduralism” (Estlund, 1997, 2008). 
Estlund worries that a veritistic social epistemology must eventually invoke “logically 
prior” and procedurally-independent standards to evaluate the correctness of the results of 
deliberation processes (Estlund, 1997, p. 180).24 Besides the fact that Estlund never seem 
to escape the veritistic language of “getting it right” in his critique of a “correctness 
theory of legitimacy”, many of the seven (7) “moderate needs” he sets out for 
proceduralism are far from moderate.  
For example, participants must, “accept and address a shared conception of 
justice”, “evaluate arguments fairly”, and they must do so “irrespective of [their] 
identit[ies]” (Estlund, 1997, pp. 190-1). Estlund fails to appreciate the fact that an 
individual’s “personal, educational, and cultural variety of life experiences”, allotted for 
in Requirement 6, sometimes make shared conceptions of justice difficult, particularly in 
contexts of social inequality and oppression where marginalized participants may be 
putting forward an alternative conceptions of justice itself for public consideration. When 
one is blocked from full participation in social life and democratic processes because of 
																																																								
     24 Estlund has Joshua Cohen’s (1986; 1989/1997) account in mind.  
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oppression as I have developed it, her identity in that dominant system is a relevant 
subject for public consideration. Moreover, the inclusion of identity-based experiences is 
a necessary feature of challenging assumptions and forming wider social knowledge 
about that dominant system. Finally, Estlund seems to theorize the possibility of social 
inequality and oppression right out of his moderate needs for an epistemic proceduralism 
since his final and seventh requirement is that, “participants’ needs for health and safety 
are sufficiently well met that it is possible for them to devote some time and energy to 
public political deliberations, and in general all are literate” (Estlund, 1997, p. 191).  
Young’s communicative democracy breaks from this speculative tradition. For 
Young, impartiality is the communicative space where powerful perspectives and 
experiences get universalized and biases go unchecked. Whereas an individualistic 
ontology requires impartiality and the stripping away of difference for political 
knowledge and decision-making, a relational ontology looks towards inclusion as a 
morally significant practice that results from the social fact of our relationality and 
unique socially situated standpoint and perspective. And it looks towards difference as an 
epistemic resource for the production of social knowledge in light of that relationality. 
Young explains,  
Do[ing] justice through public processes…entails at least two things. (1) First, 
democratic discussion and decision-making must include all social perspectives. 
(2) Second, participants in the discussion must develop a more comprehensive 
and objective account of the social relations, consequences of action, and relative 
advantage and disadvantage, than each begins with from their partial social 
perspective. (Young, 1996, p. 385) 
 
In this passage, Young’s advocates for the importance of both (1) developing an 
understanding of individuals as socially situated and an appreciation for the inclusion of 
diversely socially situated standpoints and (2) developing an appreciation for the 
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structural relations that frame that socially situated standpoint. That we are constituted 
relationally and occupy different socially situated standpoints within those relations 
necessitates a need for more inclusive social inquiry processes. But those inquiry 
processes must go beyond merely formal inclusion. They must be based in an 
appreciation for the structural inequalities that frame individuals’ communicative 
standing in those formally inclusive deliberative processes. 
Young’s critique of concepts like discrimination is important to recall here 
because it not only serves as the foundation for a relational account of the social group 
and robust account of oppression, but it makes a further point about the communicative 
dimensions of oppression. Within the language of liberal individualism, language that 
dominates political discourse, there is a hermeneutical deficit, that is, a limited 
vocabulary for people in oppressed social groups to make sense of their experiences or 
get traction in having them heard.  
Young anticipates Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical injustice here, explaining 
that the very concept of oppression itself – understood not in terms of domination but as 
new social groups understand it, namely, “systemic and structural phenomena that are not 
necessarily the result of the intentions of a tyrant” – is one that struggles to get uptake 
because the “political discourse [of liberal individualism] does not have a place in this 
social ontology for structuration and social groups” (Young, 1988, p. 272). With Nancy 
Fraser, Young is critical that some groups have “exclusive or primary access to …the 
means of interpretation and communication in a society” (Young, 1988, p. 285; Citing 
Fraser, 1987).  
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This point is one that will resonate strongly with survivors of domestic violence 
or victims of sexual harassment who were harmed before the 1970s when the very terms 
used in the courts now to describe their experiences were not available.25 A more 
contemporary example is found in the recent introduction of the term ‘mansplaining’ 
throughout feminist social media outlets. 
 
5. Towards a Pragmatist Feminist Social Epistemology  
  
The relationally based account of oppression in communicative democracy is the 
foundation of a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. I develop this epistemology here 
by way of critical contrast with some patterns of thought in traditional epistemic, 
deliberative theory. Socially situated standpoint, or diversely socially situated 
perspective, is the unique perspective an individual has as a result of her social reality and 
social identity. An epistemology that is sensitive to the existence of a diversity of socially 
situated perspectives within any given society idealizes inclusive deliberation processes 
among those differently situated social perspectives as an epistemic resource. Rather than 
idealizing “the melting away of difference”, such an epistemology will look to difference 
as an epistemic resource (Young, 1990, p. 47). And it will also be sensitive to the ways 
that social identity and oppression impact one’s epistemic standing in political 
communication. As Elizabeth Anderson has explained, 
Most of the problems democracies are asked to solve are complex, have 
asymmetrically distributed effects on individuals according to their geographic 
location, social class, occupation, education, gender, age, race, and so forth…We 
therefore need a model of democracy in which its epistemic success is a product 
of its ability to take advantage of the epistemic diversity of individuals. 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 11) 
 
																																																								
     25 See Fricker, 2007, pp. 150-152 who provides an exploration of this example as a kind of 
hermeneutical injustice.  
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A pragmatist feminist social epistemology should be contrasted with the veritistic 
social epistemology assumed by traditional deliberative theorists. I use ‘veritistic’ in the 
sense that Alvin Goldman (1999) introduces the term, as denoting a consequentialist, 
truth-tracking epistemology. A veritistic social epistemology understands knowledge in 
the traditional sense of ‘true belief’. It will be concerned with evaluating social practices 
on the basis of their knowledge-producing results, that is, whether they “have a 
comparatively favorable impact on knowledge as contrasted with error and ignorance” 
(Goldman, 1999, p. 5).  
The focus of the deliberative, epistemic democracy project has tended to be the 
enhancement of political legitimacy justifications. The argument goes that democratically 
formed decisions, particularly those conditioned on deliberation, tend towards higher 
epistemic accuracy and reliability than those made by alternative authoritarian political 
institutions. José Martí explains the epistemic conception of deliberative democracy that 
comes about as a result of this work:  
Deliberative democracy is justified, and the political decisions made through a 
deliberative procedure are legitimate, because democratic deliberative procedures 
have more epistemic value than the other democratic alternatives. And this means 
that decisions made by such procedures are more likely to be right in general –
where rightness must be some process-independent and intersubjectively valid 
standard-, than decisions made by other democratic procedures. (Martí, 2005, p. 
33) 
 
Fabienne Peter (2007) has pointed out that much of traditional deliberative theory 
tends to assume the correspondence theory of truth that underlies Goldman’s veritistic 
social epistemology, that “what makes sentences or propositions true are real-world 
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truthmakers” (Goldman, 1999, p. 68).26 Goldman himself points to the similarities 
between his account and deliberative theory in a chapter on epistemic democracy. Citing 
Estlund’s (1990) and Cohen’s (1986) cognitive accounts of voting:  
The rough idea [of epistemic democracy] is that the aggregate of votes by a large 
body of voters has a strong propensity to be accurate, or correct, if each voter has 
even a slight propensity toward correctness. This entire approach is predicated on 
the idea that voting involves a judgment that can be accurate, or true, an 
approach that would be congenial to the epistemic project before us. (Goldman, 
1999, p. 316) 
 
Goldman’s epistemic democracy is primarily interested in investigating those 
institutions and social practices that harm or enhance voters’ accuracy, what he calls 
“voter core knowledge” (VCK). He characterizes VKC as, “the main type of knowledge 
that is critical to the task of voters”. Voter core knowledge is “correct” if the voter 
answers the voter’s “core voter question” (CVQ) accurately: “Which of the two 
candidates, C or C’, would, if elected, produce a better outcome set from my point of 
view?” (Goldman, 1999, p. 323).  Goldman defines “outcome set” as the “complex 
combination of outcomes” that may result from a particular candidate who is elected. 
Such outcomes might include the cost of living, the crime rate, the cost of healthcare, etc. 
There are any number of combinations of outcome sets and the actual outcome set is one 
among them. Each voter is assumed to have some “intrinsically valued outcomes”, and “a 
preference ordering over the outcome sets” (Goldman, 1999, p. 322). Goldman specifies 
that in an “optimally functioning democracy”, voters will answer the CVQ correctly, that 
is, each individual voter will vote for the candidate whose actual resulting outcome set 
correctly correlates with her intrinsically valued outcome set (Goldman, 1999, p. 320). 
																																																								
     26 To be fair, Goldman seems to endorse a correspondence theory of truth in a qualified sense that 
requires “metaphysical clarification” and is a last resort on the basis of his view that rival theories “are 
subject to crippling objections” (Goldman, 1999, p. 68). 
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Ultimately, Goldman’s worry is that political science research in the past fifty 
years has quite consistently found that “ordinary American citizens have minimal, even 
abysmal, knowledge of textbook facts about the structure of American government, the 
identity of their elected officials, and fundamental facts about contemporaneous foreign 
policy” (Goldman, 1999, p. 317). The thrust of the concern is that voters frequently vote 
in ways that are not consistent with their own self-interest. Thus Goldman’s primary 
concern is advancing institutions and social practices that improve core information for 
voters so that they may more accurately and reliably (epistemically speaking) advance 
their self-interest. One example he provides for this is the journalistic use of “Ad Watch” 
during campaigns to remedy the spread of mistruths and slanting by candidates 
(Goldman, 1999, p. 337-8). Goldman suggests that “the press should comprise a set of 
experts who would report, interpret, and explain political events in a way that serves the 
veritistic interests of voters, especially their interest in core voter knowledge” (Goldman, 
1999, p. 340). In such practices “reporters [would] examine campaign ads for truthfulness 
and realism, trying to expose smears and misrepresentations” (Goldman, 1999, pp. 337-
8).27  
Goldman defines the goal of democracy primarily on a social choice framework: 
“A plausible interpretation of the idea that democracy is for the people is that democracy 
aims to effect outcome sets that are relatively preferred by a majority of the electorate (or 
as large a plurality as possible)” (Goldman, 1999, p. 326). That is, for Goldman, 
deliberation gets entirely submerged into a social choice theory. As David Copp has 
explained this, [Goldman] thinks that “the realization of democratic ends” requires that 
																																																								
     27 It is worth noting that such organizations do presently exist in service to American voters, and that 
they were actively operating to fact-check condidates during the 2016 Presidential campaign. 
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most voters get their relatively most preferred outcome set. He concludes that the success 
of democracy in its own terms depends on voters’ having core knowledge” (Copp, 2002, 
pp. 208-209; citing Goldman, 1999, pp. 326, 329). Against this, Copp (2002) has 
poignantly argued, “that the goal of democracy is not to produce outcome sets that are 
preferred by a majority. The goal is, rather, to equalize political power and authority” 
(Copp, 2002, p. 212).  
 To build from Copp’s analysis, Goldman understands ‘correctness’ relative to a 
voter’s preferred outcomes and outcome sets. That is, he thinks that the primary 
epistemic problem for democracy is the frequency with which voters mistakenly vote for 
candidates who do not actually cohere with their preferences. Certainly this is a problem 
for modern democracies, but it is not the primary problem democracy attempts to 
address. 
Democracy is primarily concerned with checks and balances on power, and this is 
preserved through the preservation of epistemic and moral norms of reasonableness, 
political equality, publicity, and inclusion. Where the preferred outcome set of the 
majority is some leader or policy that conflicts with democratic norms themselves, “the 
failure of an election to produce an outcome set that is preferred by a majority is not 
necessarily any failure of democracy” (Copp, 2002, p. 210). Thus a primary epistemic 
problem for evaluating the epistemic success of a democracy will be how well it’s 
institutions and practices prevent citizens from holding preferences that themselves 
interfere with the realization of those norms. What Goldman – and all social choice 
theorists, for that matter – misses is that the content of, and basis for, voter’s preferences 
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is itself an important subject of inquiry for a social epistemology of democracy. Call this 
the Relativistic Preferences Critique (RP Critique). 
One worry with conceptualizing democracy on this kind of veritistic social 
epistemology is that the account limits the epistemic value of democracy to the epistemic 
accuracy of voting, that is, the ability to “recognize those nominees who are best in terms 
of [voters’] preference orderings” (Goldman, 1999, p. 346). To be clear, Goldman points 
to deliberation as an important feature for enhancing VCK (Goldman, 2000). He explains 
“debates and other deliberative events” as one of many “players and institutional 
structures that figure prominently in the flow of political information” (Goldman, 1999, 
p. 334). A veritistic social epistemology of democracy ultimately assumes “that the 
success of democracy depends on its producing outcomes that are preferred by the 
majority of voters” (Copp, 2002, p. 208). But here Goldman understands deliberation 
primarily as a mechanism for enhancing VCK and not at all in terms of the voters’ 
preferences and preference orderings themselves. Thus he instrumentalizes deliberation 
to VCK because he never escapes a preference-aggregative conception of democracy. 
Goldman misses the important point that deliberation has epistemic value far beyond the 
enhancement of VCK. This is a risk for any correctness-oriented epistemology of 
deliberative democracy. 
Besides the RP Critique, a second worry for conceptualizing democracy on this 
kind of veritistic social epistemology is that this emphasis on correctness in democratic 
decision-making assumes a particularly naïve account of the nature of a public problem.28 
																																																								
    28 It is important to point out, as Copp has, that Goldman does not deny the significance of evaluating 
social institutions and practices on grounds other than knowledge consequences, that is, true belief: “His 
idea is simply that since true belief is valuable, “the knowledge impact of various policies is worth 
determining even if that impact is trumped, in certain spheres, by other values”” (Copp, 2002, p. 207; citing 
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While Cohen’s and Estlund’s epistemologies of democracy escape the RP Critique 
through conditioning the epistemic accuracy of democratic political decisions on some 
form of deliberation, because they assume some version of deliberation-as-argument, 
they both fail to fully escape a veritistic social epistemology.29  
By contrast, Elizabeth Anderson (2006) explains the significance of a free press 
and deliberation in terms of enhancing voter preferences and outcome sets themselves: 
“A free press, public discussion and hence mutual influence prior to voting are 
constitutive, not accidental feature of democracy…Discussion is needed prior to voting in 
part to help voters determine what problems are genuinely of public concern. Without 
such discussion, they have little to go on but their private preferences” (Anderson, 2006, 
p. 11). Anderson has rejected a veritistic social epistemology of democracy in favor of 
what I would call a pragmatist feminist one. She looks to Dewey’s experimentalist model 
as the appropriate basis for an epistemology of democracy for its ability to address three 
essential features of democracy: “the epistemic diversity of participants, the interaction of 
voting with discussion, and feedback mechanisms such as periodic elections and protests” 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 8).  
																																																																																																																																																																					
Goldman, 1999, p. 6). However, this point does not remedy the fact that on the whole, Goldman’s 
epistemology of democracy is inadequate for assessing what I have identified as the primary epistemic 
problem for evaluating the epistemic success of a democracy, namely, how well it’s institutions and 
practices prevent citizens from holding preferences that themselves interfere with the realization of those 
norms. My project is concerned with preferences based in identity-prejudices and their communicative 
dimensions (i.e., identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities). Thus while Goldman’s approach offers 
some important resources for the epistemology of democracy, it is an incomplete epistemology for both 
capturing the complexity of public problem and the kinds of political decision-making processes we need in 
that context, and for conceptualizing deliberative inequality, and particularly, for naming the problem of 
identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. As a result of this, it is inadequate then for justifying the 
political legitimacy of democracy on epistemic grounds.  
     29 For example, Cohen explains that deliberation both increases “the likelihood of a sincere 
representation of preferences and convictions” and “shape[s] the content of preferences and convictions as 
well” (Cohen, 1989/1997, pp. 76-77). 
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The earlier discussion of deliberation-as-argument emphasized the problematic 
value of consensus and impartiality for the approach. Deliberation-as-argument also tends 
to emphasize correctness as a possible and desirable goal for deliberation where “parties 
to dispute aim to win the argument” (Young, 1996, p. 123). Deliberation-as-argument 
assumes that correctness – “the existence of rightness in political decisions” – is a 
possible and desirable goal for deliberation and that impartiality – “the possibility of 
knowing which is the right (or impartial) decision” – is an indicator that such a ‘correct’ 
decision has been arrived at fairly (Martí, 2005, p. 29).30 For Cohen, “voting expresses 
beliefs about what the correct policies are…not personal preferences for policies” 
(Cohen, 1986, p. 351).  
While this clarification gets Cohen out of the RP Critique, he must eventually 
invoke procedure-independent standards on which to evaluate the “correctness” of chosen 
policies (Estlund, 1997). Recall that Cohen assumes deliberation-as-argument in his 
construction of an ideal deliberative procedure: “Reasons are offered with the aim of 
bringing others to accept the proposal” (Cohen, 1989/1997, p. 74). Cohen’s assumption 
here is that under some ideal deliberative conditions, voters will either accept the 
proposal as correct or the deliberation processes will go to a vote.31 By contrast, Young’s 
restructuring of deliberation-as-public-reasonableness looks towards achieving “mutual 
understanding” and can be understood as a form of cooperative problem-solving (Young, 
1996, p. 123).  
																																																								
     30 This emphasis on consensus in conceptions of the common good and in justice is pervasive in Cohen 
(1986, 1989/1997) and Estlund (1997).  
     31 Cohen does clarify, “The fact that [deliberation] may so conclude [with a vote rather than an agreed-
upon proposal] does not, however, eliminate the distinction between deliberative forms of collective choice 
and forms that aggregate nondeliberative preferences” (Cohen, 1989/1997, p. 75).  
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I want to briefly turn to the literature in applied ethics in public service to develop 
this alternative conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness. 
Caroline Whitbeck (1996) and Terry Cooper (2016) have argued that it is more 
appropriate to think of ethical problems in public service less in terms of moral dilemmas 
and more in terms of an engineering design problem. Unlike theoretical moral dilemmas, 
real world ethical issues rarely occur in the form of either-or, but rather, are filled with a 
multitude of ambiguities. There are any given number of resolutions for an ethical 
problem, any given number of ways of defining an ethical problem, and competing roles 
and obligations to consider. These problems are situated in organizational structures and 
cultures that may be more or less toxic and may require serious revisions to be more 
supportive of responsible professional conduct. Unlike modern moral philosophers 
solving riddles in arm-chairs, professionals must also make decisions within time-
constraints and take into consideration practical consequences.  
The analogy here is between this description of real world ethical issues in terms 
of an engineering design problem to how we ought to think of public problems and 
democratic deliberations around them. As in design, citizens must first identify the 
various stakeholders to a problem and consult them as epistemic resources for identifying 
and articulating it’s various dimensions. Much like deliberations in engineering design 
problems, this inclusive participation is instrumental to citizens’ self-development 
because it creates space for the expression of one’s political autonomy and it fosters the 
social conditions for citizens to nurture their political autonomy through discourse with 
others.    
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As in design where there are limited resources, time constraints, and competing 
obligations to stakeholders, deliberations must be inclusive of the various stakeholders to 
the problem, and those stakeholders must be seen as both epistemic resources and moral 
authorities for designing and evaluating possible resolutions for the problem. This is 
because as in design, the uniquely correct solution or remedy rarely just presents itself.  
When the problem-solving communicative exercise is framed as a cooperative 
rather than an antagonistic one (as it is in the design approach), this can motivate people 
to consider the perspectives of others and be open to reconsidering their own perspectives 
in light of that hearing. If it comes down to deciding between two possible remedies, 
deliberators determine which alternative is better than the other. Group process of 
defining the “better” and “worse” alternatives will inevitably bring to the forefront values 
and assumptions that themselves can become subject to deliberations in the decision-
making process. The language of “correctness” in such group processes is out of place.  
In assuming a veritistic social epistemology, deliberation-as-argument 
fundamentally misidentifies the goal and epistemic value of inclusive, participatory 
political processes: to widen epistemic resources for engaging in the design approach. 
Understood non-aggregatively, politics is not a process of working together (or quite 
often, against one another) to discover the correct answer, but rather, it is a process of 
working together to agree on a good answer. Deliberation-restructured-as-public-
reasonableness is a cooperative process of identifying problems and imagining and 
creating better and worse alternatives to those problems. In this process, the inclusion of 
diversely situated social perspective and an awareness and appreciation for 
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communicatively structured inequalities among participants, are epistemically significant 
practices. 
In contrast to a veritistic social epistemology, this proceduralist social 
epistemology emphasizes “the intrinsic merits of intellectual practices” (Peter, 2007, p. 
341). It defines knowledge as the result of an appropriately designed process of inquiry 
and emphasizes the epistemic value of fair deliberative processes themselves and does 
not instrumentalize the value of these processes on the basis of their epistemic production 
(ibid., the emphasis is mine; citing Goldman, 1999). This view “dispenses with the idea 
that a procedure-independent standard is necessary to assess the quality of the 
knowledge-producing practices” (Peter, 2007, p. 341).  
Peter captures the distinction between a veritistic and a proceduralist social 
epistemology nicely through drawing on the feminist standpoint epistemology of Sandra 
Harding and the philosophy of science of Helen Longino. Longino draws a distinction 
between three senses of knowledge: (1) knowledge-producing practices; (2) knowing; 
and (3) the content of knowledge, or outcome of knowledge-producing practices (Peter, 
342; citing Longino, 2002). Traditional epistemologists view knowledge-producing 
practices as a process of belief acquisition and define knowing and the outcome of 
knowledge-producing practices independently of these processes of belief acquisition.  
Against this traditional view, feminist standpoint epistemologists, feminist 
philosophers of science, and pragmatist feminists hold that knowledge is situated in 
various social constructs and institutions (e.g., cognitive styles, background beliefs, 
relations to other inquirers). That is, what a person knows and how it is known is 
uniquely framed by the perspective, or standpoint, of the knower. His or her socially 
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situated standpoint significantly influences these varied epistemic perspectives. On this 
framework, knowing and the outcome of knowledge-producing practices cannot be 
evaluated independently of knowledge-producing practices themselves, because knowers 
play an active role in constituting the object of knowledge.  
While [on some level] it makes sense to think of VCK in veritistic terms as Cohen 
does in his cognitive account of voting, deliberative epistemic democracy invokes a 
category mistake in assuming this kind of veritism in its construction of deliberation. 
This is because once deliberation becomes the primary epistemic feature of democracy on 
the whole, rather than merely being considered instrumental to the voting act itself, we 
are no longer in the business of evaluating ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ voter decisions. 
Rather, the task before us is much more epistemically complex: identifying and analyzing 
complex political problems, making complex public policy decisions, and analyzing voter 
preferences themselves for their consistency with norms that maintain democratic 
processes and participation (i.e., political equality, reasonableness – or reason-giving –, 
publicity, and inclusion).  
To return to a prior example, the social phenomenon of mansplaining reveals the 
complex relationship between one’s social identity, socially situated standpoint, and her 
epistemic standing in communicative practices. One’s socially situated standpoint as a 
woman can shape her appreciation for social issues like gendered assumptions about 
epistemic authority. Sometimes one’s socially situated standpoint has unique insights into 
social realities (e.g., that mansplaining is an epistemic problem); sometimes it creates 
‘blind spots’ to social realities (e.g., the existence of mansplaining itself).  
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Such perspectives are deeply rooted in our social identities, which arise out of 
social relations and historical patterns of domination and oppression. One’s epistemic 
standing is her social authority to bring forward her socially situated standpoint in this 
process and be heard in the social knowledge processes of identification and presentation 
of social problems and in formulations of potential solutions for such problems. If one 
has strong epistemic standing, her socially situated knowledge is generally trusted and 
respected; if one has weak epistemic standing, her socially situated knowledge is 
generally distrusted and disrespected through practices such as non-inclusion, dismissal, 
or distortion. The strength of one’s epistemic standing may be relatively stable across 
contexts, or it may vary depending on the social context and on what social identities are 
more or less salient in that context.  
The design approach discussed above embodies a pragmatist feminist social 
epistemology. Building from the analysis of this chapter, we are now in a position to 
define a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. (1) It will reject norms of consensus 
and impartiality through situating itself in a relational ontology that is aware of the 
unique socially situated perspectives of individuals as a result of their social locations 
and social positions among social, political, and economic relations of power. (2) It will 
emphasize the significance of the inclusion of these diverse perspectives, and it will do so 
on both epistemic and moral grounds. Epistemically, inclusion enhances processes of 
identifying problems and processes of designing political responses to them. And 
morally, inclusion enhances individuals’ abilities to both practice and nurture their 
political agency. (3) Flowing out of 1 and 2, a pragmatist feminist social epistemology 
will construct democratic communication in broad ways that include rhetoric, activism, 
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exploratory speech, and even dissent.32 (4) It will reject a veritistic social epistemology in 
favor of a proceduralist one that emphasizes knowledge practices rather than knowledge 
results. In so doing it will invoke pragmatist notions of experimentalism and “democratic 
fallibility” (Medina, 2013, p. 5).  
 
6. Conclusion: Communicative Democracy’s Wider Reach, Communicatively Structured 
Deliberative Inequalities 
 
We have seen that democracy theorists originally introduced deliberation as a 
condition for democratic processes in order to protect democratic theory from the critique 
that democracy is inevitably doomed to collapse into elitism or populism. This has been 
part of a larger project aiming to defend democracy, understood and refined as 
deliberative democracy, against alternative forms of government (e.g., monarchy, 
authoritarianism, oligarchy, populism, etc.). Thus deliberative theorists have focused a 
great deal of attention to specifying the ways that deliberation promotes the legitimacy of 
democracy against alternative forms of government.  
Deliberative theory has tended to underemphasize the value of the educative and 
preference-transformative capacity of deliberation for making these justifications. Cohen 
asserts that a deliberative conception is not “marked by the assumption that political 
discussion aims to change the preferences of other citizens” (Cohen, 1996, p. 100). He 
continues, “Though a deliberative view must assume that citizens are prepared to be 
moved by reasons that may conflict with their antecedent preferences and interests, and 
that being so moved may change those antecedent preference and interests, it does not 
suppose that political deliberation takes as its goal the alteration of preferences” (ibid).  
																																																								
     32 See especially Anderson (2006) for a development of the epistemic value of dissent in Dewey’s 
philosophy of democracy. 
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Cohen’s denial of a link between preference transformation and justifications for 
deliberative democracy is admittedly confusing, particularly because he also emphasizes 
that “democratic politics should… shape the ways in which the members of the society 
understand themselves and their own legitimate interests” (Cohen, 1989, 69). So too, Jon 
Elster calls the educative function of deliberation a by-product of political activity, an 
essential byproduct that we should not turn into the main purpose of political activity 
(Elster, 1986, pp. 19-20). As we have also seen, a veritistic and correctness-oriented, non-
deliberative social epistemology of democracy like Goldman’s never tackles the central 
problem for preference-aggregative constructions of democracy: the arbitrary nature of 
voter’s preferences and their orderings.  
From a social justice approach, however, the communicative processes of publicly 
considering preferences, is itself the source of democracy’s epistemic value. On the 
traditional deliberative epistemic model, how citizens’ preferences are formed, ordered, 
changed, and evaluated is not a subject of consideration. But preferences are the result of 
values, and values (e.g., racism) have epistemic dimensions. We expect people to have 
good reasons for their values, so a deliberative epistemology of democracy must have the 
resources for evaluating the epistemic origins of held preferences and preference 
orderings themselves, so that it can confront preferences that conflict with democratic 
norms (e.g., racism, epistemologies of ignorance).  
 Thus democracy must be interested in doing more than creating institutions and 
social contexts that equip people with the ability to vote in a way that is consistent with 
realizing their goals (i.e., outcome sets), it must also have the theoretical space to advance 
institutions and social contexts that equip people with epistemic resources for 
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interrogating preferences themselves to see that those are consistent with the maintenance 
of democracy. Surely racism is not such a preference. 
Recall that I have claimed that communicative democracy fares much better than 
traditional deliberative models for both naming and making space to address 
communicative inequalities, specifically identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities. 
I have also claimed that this is because, unlike traditional deliberative theory. 
Communicative democracy bases its conception of political agency in a relational 
ontology and bases democratic communication in a pragmatist feminist social 
epistemology. An account of deliberative democracy that takes communicatively 
structured deliberative inequalities seriously will attend to the epistemic and normative 
significance of the educative and preference-transformative potential of deliberation.  
Here I want to briefly emphasize the epistemological significance for 
participatory democracy theory of a minor point Young makes. One further criticism of 
the emphasis on consensus within traditional deliberative theory I have not yet discussed 
is important to bring up here. The assumption of a common good or shared understanding 
as a starting place for deliberation “obviates the need” for the move from self-regarding 
thought to enlarged thought and wider appeals to justice that democratic communication 
requires (Young, 2000, p. 42). Practically speaking, the educative and preference-
transformative capacity of democratic communication may be precisely what democracy 
needs for reducing deliberative inequality.  
There is an important theoretical point to be made here also, a point that has gone 
overlooked by traditional deliberative theorists: Once the problem of identity-prejudiced 
communicative inequalities is acknowledged, the educative and preference-
75 
 
transformative capacity of deliberation becomes an integral aspect of reinforcing both (1) 
justifications for democracy that appeal to the epistemic results of deliberation and (2) 
justifications for democracy that appeal to the protection of citizens’ political autonomy.  
This is because the value of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness as 
an ideal communicative practice is that it creates space for the expression of one’s 
political autonomy and it fosters the social conditions for citizens to nurture their political 
autonomy through discourse with others. In doing so, it both protects and enhances 
citizens’ political agency and their epistemic powers. Thus communicative democracy 
marries two commonly detached justifications for democracy through its emphasis on the 
epistemic value of the educative and preference-transformative capacity of deliberation 
and democratic communication.   
Whereas a veritistic social epistemology evaluates democratic institutions and 
processes on the basis of their truth-tracking potential, a pragmatist feminist social 
epistemology will evaluate democratic institutions and processes on the basis of a variety 
of epistemic goods that are intrinsic to knowledge-producing practices themselves. 
Young realizes that the strategic, identity-prejudiced enforcement of norms of 
dispassionate speech and articulateness remains a worry for deliberative equality whether 
the standard for deliberation is academic argument or broader constraints of 
reasonableness. Thus she also argues throughout her work that deliberation is one among 
a range of communicative activities with social value. So besides restructuring 
deliberation-as-public-reasonableness, she also defends the epistemic significance of 
alternative modes of democratic communication, namely, communicative activities such 
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as greeting, rhetoric, narrative, and even questioning and protest (Young, 1997, 2000, and 
2001) 
Indeed the introduction of new language by social movement is one example of 
an epistemic benefit of Youngs’ communicative democracy, one that traditional 
deliberative theorists miss. Interestingly, Merriam-Webster provided a description of 
“mansplaining” in their “Words We’re Watching” forum and have since March of 2018, 
added it to their dictionary. They explain it as, “what occurs when a man talks 
condescendingly to someone (especially a woman) about something he has incomplete 
knowledge of, with the mistaken assumption that he knows more about it than the person 
he’s talking to does” (Meriam-Webster, n.d.). 
Such terms are often not introduced in formal deliberation processes, but rather, 
are introduced by activists demanding for a hearing in deliberation processes that make 
no space for their participation or lack the hermeneutical resources to make sense of or 
give the charges political uptake. Such terms prompt and motivate the debate and public 
deliberations that conceptually fill the terms out themselves. For example, during the 
2012 presidential campaign, candidates commonly invoked language of “the 1%” and 
“the 99%” that was popularized in the Occupy Wall Street protests of 2011 (Fenton, 
2015).33  
In this introductory chapter to the dissertation I hope to have established that 
communicative democracy can more fruitfully envision deliberative equality by making 
theoretical space to name the problem of communicatively structured deliberative 
inequalities. As a theory of social justice, the strength of communicative democracy lies 
																																																								
     33 Like his contemporaries, deliberative theorist Jon Elster misses this communicative potential for 
activism because he pulls political theory apart from political activism far more than Young (Elster 
1986/1997; Young, 2001). 
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in the fact that it rests on a relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social 
epistemology that makes room for concepts of social identity, socially situated 
standpoint, and epistemic standing and appreciates how these are impacted by one’s 
relative position in a given society where there are relations of power, oppression, and 
privilege. This argument also introduces the theoretical framework for defending 
communicative democracy as itself a theory of democratic legitimacy. 
The pervasive and surreptitious nature of communicative inequalities brings to 
light the fact that everyday communicative practices and norms have significant 
implications for deliberative equality and social justice. The realization of communicative 
democracy requires a shift in public consciousness about the very nature of democracy: 
far from a mere political institution, democracy is an ethical and epistemological ideal. 
In what remains of the dissertation, I attempt to “fill out” communicative democracy as 
such. Chapter 2 of the dissertation does this by providing a more detailed account of 
identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
IDENTITY-PREJUDICED COMMUNICATIVE INEQUALITY 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1 I developed a critique of traditional deliberative theory on the basis 
of it’s assumed individualistic ontology and veritistic social epistemology, a framework 
that emphasizes problematic norms of consensus, impartiality, and correctness. As a 
result of this individualistic framework, traditional deliberative theorizing has often failed 
to appreciate some important concepts that are significant for an account of deliberative 
equality, namely, ‘social identity’, ‘diversely situated social perspective’, and ‘epistemic 
standing’. Owing to this, deliberative theory has struggled to appreciate how these 
phenomena are impacted by one’s relative position in a given society where there are 
relations of power, oppression, and privilege. Thus on the whole traditional deliberative 
theory misses the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality, as well as how 
these relations impact one’s standing in deliberative spaces, that is, one’s deliberative 
standing. 
This chapter provides an account of communicative inequality. Here I am 
interested in investigating how people are communicatively situated, on the basis of their 
social identities. I am particularly concerned that in contexts of social inequality, 
oppression, and privilege, some peoples’ marginalized social identities serve as a basis 
for their diminished deliberative standing (and some peoples’ privileged social identities 
serve as a basis for their inflated deliberative standing). I am especially interested in 
exposing some of the more implicit dimensions of communicative inequality since those 
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have largely been underappreciated in deliberative theory and often go undetected in 
deliberative spaces. I draw on literatures in feminist epistemology, resistance 
epistemology, and social psychology to develop this account of communicatively 
structured deliberative inequality.  
 Before moving on I want to make a few clarifications about how I will use some 
important terms in this project. These terms denote concepts that are presently under 
investigation, so my purpose here is not so much to offer a developed explanation of 
them, as it is to provide a general framework of their relations with one another.  
 Communicative inequality denotes the communicatively structured dimensions of 
deliberative inequality that are under consideration in this project. Communicative 
inequality arises as a result of a wide range of communicative and epistemic practices 
and habits that are situated in intergroup social relations of power where there is 
oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality.  
By ‘communicative’ I mean nothing out of the ordinary, only any activity (verbal 
or non-verbal) among two or more individuals where at least one individual attempts to 
convey information to another individual. As we will see in cases of being ignored, 
silenced, or dismissed, only one individual is initiating a transfer or exchange of 
information, but this does not entail that the silencing or dismissing interlocutor is not, 
through his silencing and dismissal, engaged in some sort of communicative practice. 
Thus in this type of context, only one individual is necessary for the interaction to be 
analyzed as communicative. On my account, communicative interactions themselves can 
function to communicate as well. To clarify, an individual’s communicative interactions 
with another person can function to communicate information to bystanders, information 
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that is particular to the relations of power and relative epistemic and deliberative standing 
of participants in the original, communicative interaction.  
One task for this chapter is to introduce examples of communicative and 
epistemic practices and habits that sustain communicative inequality through looking to 
empirical research as well as through drawing on the experiences of members of 
stigmatized groups. Another goal of this chapter is to situate our theorizing about these 
practices and habits and about deliberative standing in a relational ontology of prejudice. 
I borrow some of the terms I use in this discussion from Miranda Fricker, specifically 
‘identity-prejudicial’ and ‘collective social imagination’, but I develop them beyond her 
usage (Fricker, 2007).  
Communicative and epistemic practices and habits are identity-prejudiced when 
they are (either explicitly or implicitly) informed by identity-prejudiced stereotypes. 
Fricker defines an identity-prejudicial stereotype as, “a widely held disparaging 
association between a social group and one or more attribute, where this association 
embodies a generalization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable) 
resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment” (Fricker, 
2007, p. 35). Identity-prejudiced stereotypes have origins in the universal cognitive 
tendency towards ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
prejudice), but they should be clarified from these intergroup processes in two senses: (1) 
they operate in a specific social context of social inequality between two or more social 
groups, and (2) they function in those intergroup relations to sustain the dominance or 
elite status of one group over the other(s). 
81 
 
On my framework, identity-prejudiced stereotypes are housed in the collective 
social imagination, a concept Fricker leaves largely undeveloped. As I develop the 
concept, the collective social imagination refers to what some social psychologists have 
explained as, “a socially structured field within the individual mind” that consists of 
stereotypes, categorical associations, and archetypes that support images of various social 
identities, of one’s own social identity and perceived ingroup, the social identity of 
perceived outgroups, as well as perceptions of the power relations between those groups 
(Turner and Oakes, 1986, p. 250). This content of the collective social imagination is 
socially informed and sustained through social interaction – a wide range of 
communicative and epistemic practices and habits – and is neither exclusively cognitive 
nor exclusively affective. This content has epistemic dimensions and implications in the 
broad sense that it influences perceptions of the social world and knowledge practices 
and formation, and it has ethical dimensions and implications in the broad sense that it 
concerns social life, interaction, and communication. Thus in social contexts where there 
are intergroup social relations of power, oppression, privilege, and group-based social 
inequality, the collective social imagination is both informed by and sustains these 
relations.  
I want to clarify my use of the phrase “identity-prejudiced communicative and 
epistemic practices and habits” a bit further. In this project I avoid making a categorical 
distinction between practices and habits because I want to refer to a collection of 
communicative and epistemic activities as a whole that may range on a spectrum between 
volitional activity and ‘attention to’ on one end of a spectrum, and non-volitional activity, 
habitual compulsion, and even more primal “modalities of body comportment” on 
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another end of a spectrum (Young, 1980/2005, p. 32).34 I want to resist the dualisms 
assumed in much of social psychology, between cognitive and affective processes in 
attitudes like prejudice, and between explicit and implicit levels of conscious awareness 
of such attitudes. Rather, attention and compulsory habituation are extremes on a 
spectrum within the varied and the wide range of activities that diminish deliberative 
standing and exacerbate communicative inequality.35  
Suffice it to say for now that: (1) The collective social imagination consists of 
identity-prejudiced stereotypes (among other things) that inform a wide range of 
communicative and epistemic practices and habits; (2) Conscious awareness of the 
identity-prejudiced stereotypes that inform these various communicative and epistemic 
practices and habits varies among practices and habits and among individuals; (3) 
Although philosophically interesting, whether identity-prejudiced stereotypes are held at 
implicit or explicit attitudinal levels does not really matter for my purposes in this 
particular project, since I am presently only examining the sociopolitical impact of them 
on deliberative standing and am not constructing an account of ethical responsibility for 
																																																								
     34 In this paper, “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Modality, 
and Spatiality”, Young provides a feminist phenomenological analysis or women’s more inhibited uses of 
their bodies and physical space. Young’s discussion of the phenomenology of gendered body 
comportments here anticipates her later introduction of the “body aesthetic dimensions of oppression” in 
Justice and the Politics of Difference (Young, 1990, p. 148).  
     35 Tamar Gendler’s (2008; 2011) work may be useful for challenging these dichotomies assumed within 
social psychology between implicit and explicit attitudes, and between cognitive and affective conceptions 
of these attitudes. Gendler introduces the concept of alief as a mental state that involves, “the activation of 
an associative chain…that can happen regardless of the [explicit] attitude that one bears to the content 
activating the associations” (Gendler, 2008, p. 650). It is, “associative, action-generating, affect-laden, 
arational, automatic, agnostic with respect to its content, shared with animals, and developmentally and 
conceptually antecedent to other cognitive attitudes” (Gendler, 2008, p. 641). But alief is neither like belief 
nor like imagination, cognitive states which are both propositional, and Gendler makes the strong case that 
it can persist in spite of our reflective beliefs. She also suggests that we “leave room for an analogous 
notion that bears the relation to desire that alief bears to belief”, a type of presire (which she leaves to be 
developed by others) (Gendler, 2008, p. 642). I suspect that much of this work might be incredibly fruitful 
for challenging some of the dichotomies I am concerned with in the social psychology of prejudice, but 
indulging this fascinating line of inquiry further is outside of the scope of the present project.  
83 
 
such biases36; (4) Therefore, it would be better to refer to this wide range of 
communicative and epistemic practices and habits as something like prabits for ease of 
reference and to contest the dichotomies I have expressed concerns about.  
To review, an identity-prejudiced prabit is any communicative or epistemic 
practice, habit, or modality of body comportment that is based in identity-prejudiced 
stereotypes. Identity-prejudiced prabits contribute to communicative inequality through 
impacting the deliberative standing of interlocutors in deliberative spaces. They do this 
through either [or both] depreciating the standing of some or inflating the standing of 
others in ways that are uniquely connected to intergroup social relations of power where 
there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality, and this connection is 
had through, or by way of, identity-prejudiced stereotypes, which are sustained in the 
collective social imagination.  
The following section of the chapter (Section 2) situates my account in James 
Bohman’s work on communicative inequality. While Bohman’s account is important 
within deliberative theory for initiating a turn towards the communicative dimensions of 
deliberative inequality, his treatment of communicative inequality is underdeveloped in 
terms of some of the more recent work in epistemology and social psychology that 
examines the relationships between oppression, knowing, and epistemic standing. 
Thus in Section 3 of the chapter I turn to Miranda Fricker’s work on testimonial 
injustice as a model for the basic structure of communicative inequality. Here I argue that 
one’s testimonial standing (what Fricker has characterized in terms of ‘testimonial 
excess’ or ‘testimonial deficit’), results from a wide range of identity-prejudiced 
																																																								
     36 Although, very interesting attempts to examine responsibility for implicit biases have been recently 
made. See especially Daniel Kelly and Erica Roeddert’s (2008) paper, “Racial Cognition and the Ethics of 
Implicit Bias” and Jules Holroyd’s (2012) paper, “Responsibility for Implicit Bias”. 
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communicative and epistemic practices and habits. I incorporate social psychology 
empirical research and literatures in prejudiced communication to provide some examples 
of these identity-prejudiced prabits.  
In Section 4 of the chapter I raise concerns about individualistic constructions of 
the collective social imagination and of prejudice. I worry that Fricker commits her 
account to this and that contemporary empirical research often assumes it as well. Section 
5 of the chapter responds to these concerns by making the case that the collective social 
imagination must be understood in terms of a relational account of oppression that 
understands prejudice beyond the universal cognitive tendency towards ingroup and 
outgroup biases and in terms of the relations of power that inform what I have called 
identity-prejudiced stereotypes. I look to the social identity approach within social 
psychology as a mechanism for introducing this foundational relational ontology of 
prejudice.  
As was demonstrated in Chapter 1, Young relies on some of the thought that 
eventually becomes the social identity approach in her development of the social group, 
and Addams and Dewey anticipate some of this thought. Thus this chapter both offers an 
account of communicative inequality and serves as a bridge between Young’s thought 
and Addams’s and Dewey’s contributions.  
 
2. Situating Identity-Prejudiced Communicative Inequality 
 
In Chapter 1 I pointed to James Bohman’s work on deliberative democracy as an 
exception to the individualistic limitations I assigned to traditional deliberative theory, 
specifically because of his appreciation for the influence of oppression on one’s 
deliberative standing. He explains,  
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Cultural pluralism heightens the uncertainty of achieving deliberative uptake, as 
well as the problems of gaining mutual recognition and respect…some groups can 
make the case that such failure to convince others with their public reasons is part 
of a larger pattern. (Bohman, 1996, p. 107) 
 
Thus Bohman concludes rightly, “deliberative theorists must distinguish between 
merely formal “opportunities” to deliberate and the capacity to make “fair use” of one’s 
public reason” (Bohman, 1996, p. 122). He defines deliberative inequality as 
“asymmetries of public capabilities and functioning that persist in most public spheres” 
(Bohman, 1996, p. 110, the emphasis is mine). Bohman introduces a typology of 
deliberative inequality consisting of three basic types: (1) power asymmetries, (2) 
communicative inequalities, and (3) “political poverty” (Bohman, 1996, p. 110, the 
emphasis is mine). 
Like Young, Bohman worries that without particular protections, deliberation can 
become elitist because some individuals “have greater cultural resources (such as 
knowledge and information)” and are thereby “more capable of imposing their own 
interests and values on others in the public arena” (Bohmna, 1996, pp. 112-3). And also 
like Young, he sees a potential tendency towards elitism within deliberative democracy 
that many traditional deliberative theorists miss, namely, that deliberation can itself 
become the stage for unequal influences of social and economic power in a society.  
In his account of communicatively structured deliberative inequality Bohman 
seems to have in mind Young’s fourth face of oppression, cultural imperialism. For 
example, he points out that the official language of political deliberation, or even a 
dominantly accepted style of discourse (e.g., deliberation-as-argument) may favor 
particular groups (Bohman 1996, p. 116). Bohman provides a contemporary example 
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where a non-public discourse gets assumed as universal. Contrasting the civil rights 
movement with the contemporary prolife movement he explains,  
However, as opposed to the civic rights movement, [the prolife movement] has 
not found public resonance and forms of expression outside of the churches from 
which it originated. It has not succeeded in translating the movement’s reasons 
into the public sphere; they remain non-public, however widely convincing and 
widely shared among citizens. (Bohman, 1996, p. 137) 
 
In such narrowly defined discourses, what counts as ‘public reasons’ and modes 
of justification becomes restricted through the ideologies and interpretive frameworks of 
the dominant group, and these are assumed as objective standards for justification in 
political discourse (Bohman, 1996, p. 117). So to build on Bohman’s example, women 
who wish to challenge some or all of the teachings or positions held within these 
Christian communities, often have their speech constrained by a dominant discourse of 
Christian fundamentalism, a discourse that restricts justifications for conduct to biblical 
literalism (and problematically assumes the possibility for an impartial and infallible 
reading of the text).  
Recall my treatment of deliberation-as-argument in Chapter 1. Here I introduced 
this as a type of cultural imperialism where one’s participation in a deliberative forum is 
conditioned on meeting norms of detachment and assertive speech that are already 
operative in the social context. However, when deliberation-as-argument is assumed as 
the only appropriate discourse for a particular deliberative forum, it can function in this 
space to harm one’s deliberative standing in a way that disproportionately impacts her 
particular social group. In the case of deliberation-as-argument, one’s deliberative 
standing is diminished by communicative and epistemic practices and habits that are not 
directly the result of identity-prejudiced stereotypes, but that disproportionately harm her 
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as a result of her oppressed social identity. I will call the communicative and epistemic 
practices and habits that function towards this type of group-based disproportionate harm, 
disparate impact prabits. 
Disparate impact communicative inequality arises because of communicative 
forms of cultural imperialism where discourses (e.g., deliberation-as-argument) are 
assumed as the only appropriate mode of discourse. In disparate impact communicative 
inequality, one’s social identity is a salient feature of why her deliberative standing is 
harmed (Bohman, 1996, p. 117). Disparate impact prabits get their force (to contribute to 
communicative inequality) from functioning within a social space of intergroup relations 
of power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality. 
An account of communicative inequality should not be limited to communicative 
forms of cultural imperialism, however, since this does not capture the identity-
prejudiced nature of some individuals’ deliberative standing. Argument is not itself 
identity-prejudiced, nor is it the type of discourse that is prompted by identity-prejudiced 
stereotypes. But many of the communicative and epistemic prabits that contribute to 
communicative inequality are directly informed by identity-prejudiced stereotypes and in 
such cases I will refer to them in terms of being identity-prejudiced prabits.  
This is an important distinction that Bohman does not articulate clearly enough. 
While his account of deliberative inequality identifies three forms, one of which is 
communicative inequality (i.e., power asymmetries, communicative inequality, and 
political poverty), Bohman’s introduction of a ‘capacity-based conception of deliberative 
equality’ largely emphasizes the need to introduce institutional remedies for the third 
form of deliberative inequality, political poverty. Political poverty is “a group-related 
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inability to make effective use of opportunities to influence the deliberative process” 
(Bohman, 1996, p. 125). Thus his attention to remedying the impoverished capacities of 
marginalized individuals overshadows any consideration of the identity-prejudiced 
dimensions of deliberative inequality.37  
Bohman measures effectiveness in deliberation as the ability “to initiate a public 
dialogue about an issue or a theme – a dialogue in which the deliberator’s reasons may 
receive deliberative uptake” (Bohman, 1996, p. 125). He provides minimal examples to 
clarify, but he seems to take it that deliberative equality largely rests on a society having 
“the presumption of a set of minimum, shared public capacities” (Bohman, 1996, p. 127). 
Here he appears to have in mind capacities that are both agential (e.g., personal skills and 
abilities) and structural (e.g., participation costs). Thus on this capacity-based account, 
deliberative equality can be enabled through introducing institutions and forums that 
“eliminate inadequate functioning among their citizens” (Bohman, 1996, p. 128). 
Bohman describes communicative inequality in terms of a restricted hermeneutics 
where public conversation around problems is constrained for some social groups 
because limited cultural resources exist in the dominant discourse for those problems to 
receive uptake and be effective. But he concludes that the primary reason such 
participants’ voices cannot be converted into influence in public dialogue is because, 
“they lack a vocabulary in which to express their needs and perspectives publicly” 
																																																								
     37 Some context is important here. Bohman uses this capacity-based conception of deliberative 
equality as a way to mitigate a concern that policies that are intended to be correctives of social 
inequality often miss the deliberative sources of social inequality. To borrow his example, we 
ought to be suspicious of correctives for deliberative inequality like granting automatic veto power 
to minority groups or representatives. Not only do these types of consequentialist correctives 
conflict with basic norms of political equality, but more than this, they also fail to address the 
underlying deliberative inequalities that have resulted in the need for such correctives altogether, 
namely, exclusion of the minority group in question from full participation in the deliberative 
processes leading up to the vote for which they have veto power (Bohman, 1996, p. 109). This 
feature of Bohman’s account of deliberative equality is not a point of disagreement for me.  
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(Bohman, 1996, p. 121). This is why later when he develops his capacity-based account 
of deliberative equality he points to the significance of liberal institutions that protect free 
speech as a place through which “emerging publics” can introduce new dialogues and 
terms (Bohman, 1996, p. 136). 
But Bohman’s capacity-based account reduces communicative inequality to what 
I have called ‘disparate impact communicative inequality’. Recall that disparate impact 
prabits are not directly informed by identity-prejudiced stereotypes but disproportionality 
harm groups because of the force they get in social spaces of intergroup relations of 
power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality. 
Generally, they are neutral communicative and epistemic prabits that are, “interacting 
with group-based power relations and norms that are already operative in the social 
context” in ways that disproportionately impact an individual’s deliberative standing 
because of her social identity.38  
Bohman rightly shifts the focus in deliberative inequality theory from one’s 
available material resources to access deliberative spaces, to their social and epistemic 
power in those deliberative spaces. My worry for Bohman’s account, however, is that it’s 
focus on deliberative capacities and functionings overshadows another significant 
dimension of deliberative inequality that oppressed people must grapple with on a daily 
basis, that is, the presence of identity prejudices on the part of their interlocutors in their 
communicative and epistemic exchanges. On a capacity-based conception of deliberative 
inequality, any corrective measures to address political poverty are vulnerable to 
conditioning participation on assimilation to dominant constructions of deliberation. 
Moreover, it will ignore the problem of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality, 
																																																								
     38 I credit Theresa W. Tobin for articulating this point. 
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that even when oppressed people assimilate their speech to the dominant discourse, they 
are often vulnerable to identity-prejudiced prabits that marginalize their deliberative 
standing.39 But as I have already pointed out, identity-prejudiced communicative 
inequality is not resolved through attention to oppressed peoples’ capacities, but to 
attending to the identity-prejudiced prabits that produce them! 
My aim is to shift the focus in theorizing about deliberative inequality from 
oppressed persons’ deliberative capacities for participation, to their deliberative uptake 
by fellow deliberators, that is, from political poverty to identity-prejudiced 
communicative practices, and ultimately, from what oppressed people can and should do 
to be included, to what people with identity-prejudiced inflated deliberative standing can 
and should do to include. 
While Bohman’s account is important within deliberative theory for initiating a 
turn towards the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality, his treatment of 
communicative inequality is underdeveloped in terms of some of the more recent work in 
epistemology and social psychology that examines the relationships between prejudice, 
knowing, and epistemic standing (e.g. Miranda Fricker). Here is where it is important to 
turn to Miranda Fricker’s useful conception of testimonial injustice for support in 
developing my account.  
 
3. Contributions from Feminist and Resistance Epistemologies and Social Psychology 
Empirical Research 
 
Recall that Miranda Fricker introduces the label ‘identity prejudicial’ to denote 
“prejudices against people qua social type” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Identity prejudices arise 
																																																								
     39 I should note that I do not think that Bohman’s deliberative theory necessarily lacks the 
conceptual tools to make this distinction, only that the distinction is underdeveloped in his 
account.  
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within relations of social power, and importantly, social power is exercised through both 
practical social co-ordination and imaginative social co-ordination. Fricker explains, 
“There can be operations of power which are dependent upon agents having…shared 
imaginative conceptions of social identity” (Fricker, 2007, p. 14). For example, in the 
case of the exercise of gendered identity power, “both parties must share in the relevant 
collective conceptions of what it is to be a man and what it is to be a woman” (Fricker, 
2007, p. 15).40 Fricker roots identity prejudices in “the collective social imagination 
[which] inevitably contains all manner of stereotypes and … is the social atmosphere in 
which hearers must confront their interlocutors” (Fricker, 2007, p. 38). In such contexts, 
speakers from oppressed groups can suffer an injustice that is epistemic in nature because 
they receive “deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the 
hearer’s part” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). 
Recall also that Bohman acknowledges that political participation “depend[s] in 
crucial ways on the uncertain cooperation of others” (Bohman, 1996, p. 128). Fricker’s 
account brings to light an important feature of communicative inequality, namely, the 
persistence of identity prejudices in the cooperative context on which deliberative uptake 
is dependent. 
Fricker takes as the central case of testimonial injustice “identity-prejudicial 
credibility deficits”. Such credibility deficits harm one primarily “in her capacity as a 
knower” and because of the centrality of knowing to human functioning, she is 
																																																								
     40 For an excellent example of this in racialized identity power, see Devine and Elliott (1995), whose 
research at the University of Wisconsin seems to have revealed this collective social imagination about 
blacks. Gendler summarizes, “The traits most frequently cited were: lazy, ignorant, musical, stupid, 
unreliable, loud, aggressive, athletic, rhythmic, low in intelligence, sexually perverse, uneducated, poor, 
hostile, and criminal (Devine and Elliott 1995, pp. 1144-1146; cited in Gendler, 2011, p. 43). Importantly, 
even subjects who expressly rejected the accuracy of these stereotypic traits were aware of them, 
demonstrating the persistence of the collective social imagination even in spite of explicitly held beliefs.  
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“symbolically degraded qua human” (Fricker, 2007, p. 44). Identity-prejudiced 
credibility deficits have a secondary harm for individuals, a potentially “ongoing process 
of erosion” of one’s epistemic abilities, epistemic confidence, and even may hinder her 
development of certain epistemic virtues like intellectual courage and perseverance 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 50).  
There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the primary and secondary 
harms of identity-prejudiced credibility deficits because the subject is “exclude[d] from 
trustful conversation” and through this, is marginalized in the kind of participatory 
practices that are essential for self-development (Fricker, 2007, p. 53). Linda Alcoff has 
explained this poignantly, “Such exclusions have cumulative effects: being denied 
credibility means that one is precluded from developing one’s intellectual abilities. Doubt 
from others often leads to self-doubt, hesitation, reticence to speak, and thus an inability 
to formulate clearly one’s thoughts” (Alcoff, 2010, p. 131). In this process of erosion, 
“the subject of the injustice is socially constituted just as the stereotype depicts her”, and 
it may even come to be “a causal force towards its own fulfillment” (Fricker, 2007, pp. 
55, 57).  
We should extend this account of harm onto identity-prejudiced communicative 
inequality: (1) one is harmed primarily as a knower and political agent (and symbolically 
qua human) and (2) one is harmed secondarily because she is deprived of the kinds of 
safe epistemic and communicative spaces that are conducive to nurturing her political 
capacities and agency.41  
																																																								
     41 Indeed even the marginalize-ing interlocutor is harmed in this sense since through his marginalization 
of the Other, he imposes restrictions on the epistemic potential of the communicative act.  
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There is convincing empirical evidence for Fricker’s claim that identity-
prejudiced stereotypes can impact an individual’s assessment of another’s credibility and 
competency.42 Perhaps where this has been most clearly evidenced is in literatures 
examining credibility and persuasion in communications, marketing and advertising, and 
criminal justice.43 Tess Neal found that in trial proceedings, perceptions of female 
experts’ credibility was particularly low when female experts were not perceived as 
likeable, but that likeability was not a significant factor for credibility for male experts 
(Neal et al., 2012).44 In a later review of the literature, Neil explained that while expert 
gender typically does not appear to influence ultimate decisions in criminal cases, it does 
sometimes seem to influence damage awards in civil cases (Neil, 2014). In journalism 
and media studies, Maria Brann and Kimberly Himes found that, after controlling for 
physical attractiveness, televised male weather newscasters were perceived to be higher 
in competence, composure, and extroversion than their female counterparts (Brann and 
Himes, 2010).  
																																																								
     42 This research has origins in work on social cognition and attitudes that investigated the breadth of the 
halo effect, a cognitive bias in which, “the tendency for judgment of a novel attribute (A) of a person [is] 
influenced by the value of an already known, but objectively irrelevant attribute (B)” (Greenwald and 
Banagi, 1995, p. 9). Early studies on the halo effect demonstrated a cognitive bias to favor someone or 
something on the basis of an association with attractiveness, height, fancy gift-wrapping, or even 
association with a more prestigious institution. Anthony Greenfield and Mahzarin Banaji were among the 
first to examine similar implicit attitude associations in application to socially stigmatized groups in their 
(1995) groundwork publication, “Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes”. Prior 
to this much of the research on social cognition and attitudes focused on examining consumer attitudes, 
self-esteem, and political ideologies. 
     43 For an excellent review of this literature, see Zhu et. al., 2016. They point to a number of 
studies that evidence the persistence of the halo effect where “characteristics which should have 
little or no bearing on whether a researcher is judged as credible” impact perceptions of credibility 
and competence evaluations. Such factors include but are not limited to physical attraction, age, 
demographic similarity to the perceiver, race and gender (p. 863). Indeed the presence of such 
biases among jurors and judges is a major shared assumption of trial advocacy courses that 
instruct law students in Voir Dire.  
     44 See also, Neal, 2014. For an additional, but more dated, investigation of race-motivated assessments 
of credibility in the judicial system, see Sheri Lynn Johnson’s (1996) “The Color of Truth: Race and the 
Assessment of Credibility”.  
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Some more recent research has demonstrated gender disparities in perceptions of 
competency within the STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and math), fields 
historically dominated by men. STEM faculty members were randomly assigned resumes 
to evaluate. Corinne Moss-Racusin and fellow researchers found that despite having the 
exact same qualifications, Jennifer’s were perceived as less competent than John’s and 
were less likely to be offered jobs or mentoring opportunities as a result. When they were 
offered jobs, Jennifer’s were hypothetically offered an average of 13% less than John’s 
(Moss-Racusin, et. al., 2012).45  
Identity-prejudiced stereotypes seem to be predictive of more general assessments 
of character as well. Jason A. Okonofua and Jennifer L. Eberhardt (2015) conducted a 
study at Stanford University on K-12 teachers’ perceptions of student infractions, and 
importantly, teacher-perceptions of student behavioral patterns over time. Eberhardt and 
Okonofua found that there was no racial disparity in recommended discipline for 
students’ first infractions. However, there was a disciplinary racial disparity in 
recommended discipline and faculty perceptions of students after a second infraction. At 
this second-infraction level, teachers were more disturbed by the behavior of black 
students, more likely to recommend severe punishment, and more likely to label the 
student a “troublemaker”.  
Fricker’s work focuses on testimonial exchanges and perceptions of credibility. I 
do not think that deliberative standing is unlike testimonial standing. I am interested, 
																																																								
     45 See also Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan’s (2004) widely cited study 
demonstrating racial disparities in callbacks for interviews. Resumes with White sounding names 
(Emily and Greg) received 50% more callbacks for interviews than resumes with Black sounding 
names (Lakisha and Jamal). It is important to note, however, that this research does not 
demonstrate perceptions of competency were a significant causal factor for callback disparities 
and there could exist alternative motivations among participants (e.g., overt racism, feeling more 
comfortable working with members of one’s own ingroup, or also assessments of competency).  
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however, to develop a broader conception of how identity-prejudiced stereotypes impact 
one’s deliberative standing than Fricker’s focus permits. I do this by examining not only 
the role of identity-prejudiced stereotypes in perceptions of credibility, but also their role 
in communicative and epistemic practices and habits that support the diminishment of an 
individual’s deliberative standing.  
One reason communicative democracy must broaden its catalog of identity-
prejudiced prabits beyond testimonial exchanges is that the type of communicative acts 
and knowledge practices that testimonial exchange restricts itself to, promotes too narrow 
and veritistic an account of knowing. That is, testimonial injustice focuses on assessments 
of testimony, the communicative and epistemic act of uttering a declarative statement 
about a fact of the matter, veritistic “truth-tracking” knowledge practices like those 
embodied in a criminal or civil trial procedure. In a trial procedure, hearers in a 
courtroom are tasked with evaluating the truth of statements brought forward by a 
defendant and witnesses.46  
But I have explained in Chapter 1 that the types of problems communicative 
democracy is interested in identifying, defining, and strategizing resolutions for, are far 
more like design problems in engineering than discovering the truth of a defendant’s 
claim to innocence.47 Certainly speakers’ credibility weighs into their deliberative 
standing in problem-solving discourse. One’s deliberative standing in this context is 
powerfully affected by her perceived credibility when she makes declarative statements, 
																																																								
     46 Fricker herself relies on Goldman’s veritistic social epistemology in her articulation of the damage 
that testimonial injustice imposes on the epistemic system. To be fair to Fricker, she does seem to resist 
some of this veritism and lean towards a standpoint epistemology through talking of “truths” rather than 
“the truth”: “Prejudice presents an obstacle to truth, either directly by causing the hearer to miss out on a 
particular truth, or indirectly by creating blockages in the circulation of critical ideas” (Fricker, 2007, p. 
43).  
     47 For an introduction to the design approach for solving moral problems, see especially Whitbeck 
(1996) and Cooper (2016). 
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but it is also impacted by other communicative practices. Besides declarative speech acts 
we have to consider a range of other communicative and epistemic prabits that are 
impacted by identity prejudices, for example, habits of interrupting and speech 
accommodation. A pragmatist feminist social epistemology will resist the tendency in 
traditional, veritistic social epistemology to analyze knowledge practices solely in terms 
of epistemic production. Owing to this, it will also resist thinking about epistemic 
practices (and communicative practices of an epistemic nature) solely in terms of 
declarative statements. 
In what remains of this section I will introduce some examples of identity-
prejudiced prabits that support identity-prejudiced diminished deliberative standing. This 
discussion is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of identity-prejudiced prabits, but 
to introduce some examples that collectively demonstrate the wide range of 
communicative and epistemic dimensions of communicative inequality. One of my 
interests here is to examine some of the communicative prabits that promote and 
deteriorate one’s testimonial credibility specifically, and one’s deliberative standing more 
generally. It is important to note that estimations of credibility motivate48 some 
communicative and epistemic practices and habits, so insofar as credibility is informed 
by identity-prejudiced stereotypes, resulting communicative practices will be as well. It is 
also important to acknowledge a reinforcing circle here: identity-prejudiced stereotypes 
that are housed in the collective social imagination motivate identity-prejudiced prabits, 
and identity-prejudiced prabits sometimes function to reinforce the problematic content 
of the collective social imagination.  
																																																								
     48 I use the term ‘motivation’ in the broad sense that social psychologists use it to denote underlying 
causes for action and behavior that the agent may or may not be consciously aware of in general, or may or 
may not be attending to in a given moment.  
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 Destructive language patterns often accompany identity-prejudiced estimations of 
credibility deficit. One example from the clinical psychology literature is that of “crazy-
making language” that questions the sanity of the speaker. This type of language often 
invokes the norms of dispassionate speech discussed in Chapter 1 to dismiss the 
testimony of an individual on the basis of its emotional delivery rather than it’s content. 
Here an individual’s alleged testimonial credibility deficit is supported through a 
communicative practice, as well as to bystanders.  
 It is reasonable to suggest that gender might be a salient trigger for crazy-making 
language in light of some recent research on gendered emotion stereotypes that was 
conducted by Lisa Barrett and Eliza Bliss-Moreau (2009). Barrett and Bliss-Moreau 
found gender disparities in whether subjects would evaluate a frowning or sad target face 
dispositionally (“S/he’s emotional.”) or situationally (“S/he’s having a bad day.”). Not 
surprisingly, they found that women were far more likely to be perceived dispositionally.  
This research demonstrates that someone’s gender is a significant indicator for 
whether she will be perceived as being emotional, or as expressing emotion because a 
particular situation warrants it (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009, p. 654). The identity-
prejudiced use of crazy-making language is situated within gender-inequality where 
rationality has historically been associated with masculinity, whiteness, and more elite 
social classes. Thus women and people of color may be particularly vulnerable to crazy-
making language. 
 The use of rhetorical questions in communicative interactions can also function to 
dismiss a speaker’s voice or marginalize her contributions. As Randi Gunther has 
explained, such questions “are never true questions of inquiry” and attack a person’s right 
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to even make a claim or argument” (Gunther, 2000). The use of rhetorical questions as a 
form of dismissal, challenge an individual’s moral standing in a relationship or in the 
community.  
Perhaps less pernicious than crazy-making language or dismissive questioning, is 
the communicative prabit of interruption. Evidence suggests that identity-prejudiced 
stereotypes can motivate interruption. For example, while Adrienne Hancock and 
Benjamin Rubin’s research did not find any notable differences in the language a 
participant used when speaking with a woman vs. a man, they did find that participants 
tended to interrupt more when their communication partner was a woman (Hancock and 
Rubin, 2014).  
Some political commentators have suggested that this research could explain 
patterns of interruption that occurred during the first of three presidential debates during 
the 2016 U.S. Presidential Race. Crockett and Frostenson (2016) reported that during the 
September 26, 2016 debate, Donald Trump interrupted Hillary Clinton 51 times whereas 
Clinton interrupted Trump only 17 times (Crockett and Frostenson, 2016). What is more, 
they also counted that Clinton was interrupted 70 times by moderator Lester Holt, 
whereas Holt only interrupted Trump 47 times (ibid.). In her analysis of the debate, 
Peggy Drexier also found that Lauer provided a more diverse series of questions to 
Trump than to Clinton (Drexier, 2016). 
Like dismissive questioning, identity-prejudiced norms of interruption can 
function to diminish a speaker’s standing to bring moral claims to her community. This 
message of standing can be conveyed both to one’s interlocutor and to bystanders of the 
communicative interaction. In the latter types of cases, the interrupter both assert’s his 
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dominant moral standing to his interlocutor and communicates information about his and 
his interlocutor’s relative epistemic standing to bystanders.  
Identity-prejudiced stereotypes can inform one’s style of speech as well. There is 
evidence that in competitive intergroup settings, there are often group-based linguistic 
disparities in how ingroup vs. outgroup members are described.49 Researchers observed 
racial disparities in how victims were depicted in media coverage of Hurrican Katrina 
(Sommers, et. al., 2006). For example, authors pointed to “the widely circulated photo 
captions that described a Black man as “looting” and a seemingly comparable White 
couple as “finding food”” (Sommers, et. al., 2006, p.40). This speech adjustment in 
describing outgroup members is particularly pervasive in political campaigns where one’s 
speech is intended to be persuasive.50  
There is also evidence that communicators will adjust their style of speech 
according to the perceived characteristics of their interlocutor. Janet Ruscher explains, 
“In intergroup settings, such assumptions often are based on the stereotypes associated 
with the listener’s apparent group membership” (Ruscher, 2017, p. 12). For example, 
communicators often use secondary baby talk (e.g., simplified and cute words, higher 
pitch, simpler words, and shorter sentences) in interactions with an elderly person who is 
demented or a person with a developmental cognitive disability, but owing to identity-
prejudiced stereotypes about the elderly as a social group and about the disabled as a 
social group, they may also overextend this speech style to elderly people in general or to 
a person with a physical disability who is not cognitively disabled (Ruscher, 2017).  
																																																								
     49 For a review of some of this literature see Anoll, Zurloni, and Riva, 2006, p. 238.  
     50 See for example Anolli, Zurloni, and Riva, 2006. 
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Speakers also sometimes under-accommodate speech for people when they do not 
feel (on some explicit or implicit level) that the listener or interlocutor deserves care, 
concern, or warmth. For example, speakers might be curt, dismissive, cold, or impatient 
with foreigners and immigrants they identify as outgroup members, implying that they 
“are not worthy of attention nor should they be accorded the privileges of valued group 
members” (Ruscher, 2017, p. 13). This underaccomodation towards outgroup members 
has also been observed in immediacy behaviors (e.g., smiling, leaning towards someone 
when speaking, open posture, nodding, etc.) in intergroup communicative interactions 
(Trawalter and Richeson, 2008).  
 Perhaps the most striking evidence for the impact of identity-prejudiced 
stereotypes on one’s deliberative standing has been demonstrated in the healthcare 
setting. Researchers found a correlation between physicians’ implicit bias levels and 
patient perceptions of care. Patients were given a Primary Care Assessment Survey that 
assessed perceptions of “patient-centered care”. This survey defined patient-centered care 
as consisting of: (1) patient-centered interpersonal relationship (e.g., feeling that the 
physician was caring and concerning), (2) communication (e.g., feeling that one’s 
questions were answered), (3) trust (e.g., perception that the physician has knowledge), 
and (4) contextual knowledge (e.g., feeling that the physician knows one’s values and 
beliefs). Based on these surveys, researchers found that patients who were black were 
much more likely to report having had unsatisfactory interactions when their physicians’ 
scored higher in implicit bias (Green et. al., 2007).51  
																																																								
     51 For a thoughtful and empirically backed compilation of the stories of people of color in the healthcare 
system, see especially Augustus White and David Chandoff’s (2011) book, Seeing Patients: Unconscious 
Bias in Health Care.  
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 It is important to note that the survey defined patient-centered care in a way that is 
consistent with shared decision-making models of patient care and physician-patient 
interaction. Within the medical ethics literature, shared decision-making is commonly 
contrasted with more paternalistic models which have been widely refuted on both 
theoretical grounds52 and on empirical grounds for failing to be effective in producing 
and supporting compliance in patients with their treatment plans. 
One benefit of shared decision-making is its ability to mitigate a potential conflict 
between respecting patient autonomy and fulfilling the physician’s obligation of 
beneficence to the patient. On this approach the patient and physician are seen are moral 
equals and work together to weigh the pros and cons of different treatment plans for the 
individual patient according to her values and realistic compliance possibilities (Katz, 
1992). Not surprisingly, in its early theoretical phases, some scholars referred to the 
shared decision-making model as a ‘deliberative model of care’ (Emanuel and Emanuel, 
1992). This research suggests that in some contexts, identity-prejudiced stereotypes can 
function to fundamentally shift a communicator’s mode of interaction from one of mutual 
epistemic respect and participation, to one of epistemic authority and elitism.53 
 
 
																																																								
     52 For an excellent review of these arguments see Buchanan, 2002. 
     53 Jose Medina’s work introduces another important perspective here, namely, that of the more general 
relationship between social identities and epistemic character. He hypothesizes that one’s tendency towards 
epistemic vices or virtues may be determined by her social identity. That is, social privilege may incline an 
individual towards epistemic attitudes and habits that contribute to the creation and maintenance of bodies 
of ignorance – vices of epistemic arrogance, epistemic laziness, and closed-mindedness. He asks the 
question, “Could the privilege of knowing (of always being presumed to know), of always being heard as a 
credible speaker, of always commanding cognitive authority, sometimes spoil people?” (Medina, 2013, p. 
30) By contrast, marginalized people may tend towards epistemic attitudes and habits that make them both 
better knowers, and also vulnerable to abuse by epistemically spoiled people: epistemic humility, 
intellectual curiosity and diligence, and open-mindedness. The interesting point to take from Medina’s 
work is that social identity can problematize deliberative equality even in the absence of identity-prejudiced 
prabits just in virtue of our epistemic vantage point.  
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4. Individualistic Tendencies in Theorizing about Prejudice and the Collective Social 
Imagination  
 
Fricker situates identity prejudices in “the collective social imagination”. She 
explains that “shared imaginative conceptions of social identity” constitute the collective 
social imagination and this is the socially sustained and informed conceptual framework 
through which identity power operates (Fricker, 2007, p. 14). Building from Fricker’s 
model, I want to suggest that this conceptual framework also produces (and is informed 
by) a wide range of identity-prejudiced prabits that support one’s testimonial standing, 
and even more broadly, her deliberative standing.  
Ultimately, I am critical that Fricker’s account of prejudice and construction of 
the collective social imagination is not conceptually rich enough to capture the 
pervasiveness of identity-prejudices in human interactions. Thus we need a broader 
understanding of the collective social and epistemic hermeneutical context that frames 
the role of identity-prejudiced stereotypes in communicative practices. In the next section 
of this chapter I will look to the social identity approach within social psychology as an 
ontological framework for doing this. 
Fricker detaches credibility deficit from credibility excess. This is something I 
want to resist in the account I am constructing here because it misses the interdependency 
of oppression and privilege in power relations. Fricker resists connecting credibility 
deficit to excess because she thinks this would reduce her account to a distributive 
paradigm of justice that is inappropriate for measuring epistemic goods (because 
epistemic goods are not material, finite, or in short supply) (Medina, 2013, p. 62).  
But this does not mean that credibility deficits and excesses are not 
interdependent in some contexts. One’s epistemic standing is the result of more 
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integrated and complex communicative processes. As many career women know, one can 
be made deficient in a meeting where her male colleague enjoys identity-prejudiced 
inflated epistemic standing or identity-prejudiced inflated intellectual esteem. This logic 
of interdependence applies to perceptions of moral esteem in social contexts as well, 
when for an example, during in conversation at a party a stay-at-home-mom is made 
deficient and invisible by contrast with a celebrated stay-at-home-dad who “even changes 
diapers!”  
This logic extends even further though, because the content of negatively-
valenced stereotypes for stigmatized groups are themselves informed and maintained 
through relationships of comparison with positively-valenced stereotypes towards 
dominant groups. The important point here is as Medina explains, “Perceptions of 
credibility and authority are forms of social recognition that are bound to be affected by 
the cultural habits of recognition available for differently positioned subjects with respect 
to different social groups” (Medina, 2013, p. 63). That is, what Fricker has called 
“negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes” are maintained in the same complex 
“collective social imagination” where other [more esteemed and non-disparaging] 
identity, prejudice, and stereotypes are cognitively and affectively housed. Moreover, the 
content of these negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes is maintained in relation to 
positively-valenced identity-prejudicial stereotypes. All this is all to say that Fricker’s 
inclination to pull credibility deficit apart from credibility excess has individualistic 
consequences for how we conceptualize the social relations that make up the collective 
social imagination. 
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Recall that I want to look to the social identity approach within social psychology 
to fill out our conception of the collective social imagination. The purpose of this is to 
both enhance my account of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality and to situate 
my account more fully in a relational ontology. The social identity approach within social 
psychology literature has important contributions to make to this project, specifically for 
the critique it offers of individualistic conceptions of prejudice and for its appreciation for 
the deeply relational nature of prejudices.  
Before defending the approach as a mechanism for understanding the relational 
nature of the collective social imagination and the identity-prejudiced stereotypes it 
informs, I will briefly situate the approach in the social psychology literature. There have 
been two trends in the social psychology literature on prejudice that have fueled and 
maintained an individualistic conception of the collective social imagination: (1) defining 
prejudice in terms of personality and (2) defining prejudice in terms of cognitive error. 
As we will see, the social identity approach in social psychology theory challenges this 
individualism and introduces a robust, relational account of the collective social 
imagination. The post-World War II intellectual economy saw an explosion of social 
psychology research on group processes that scholars suspected could explain the 
political violence of the Holocaust (e.g., conformity, obedience to authority, and 
prejudice).54 It is important to note that prior to this time, prejudice was not identified as a 
social problem, but rather, was widely perceived as natural and unproblematic.55  
																																																								
     54 Theodor Adorno explains the central problem that guided much of this research, to “explain the 
willingness of great masses of people to tolerate the mass extermination of their fellow citizens” (Adorno, 
1950, p. v). 
     55 For example, sociologist William Sumner introduced the term ‘ethnocentrism’ in his 1906 
sociological book, Folkways, to explain individuals’ universal tendency towards favoritism of their own 
group and negative evaluation of other groups by contrast with their own. His account is isolated from any 
appreciation for relations of power, social inequality, oppression, and privilege. He writes, “Each group 
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During this time, Theordo Adorno introduced the authoritarian personality model 
to explain prejudice (Adorno, 1950). Rooted in Freud’s psychodynamic model, Adorno 
constructed prejudice as a symptom of a personality structure in which repressed 
aggression towards one’s authoritarian parents manifests itself as out-group prejudice. 
The authoritarian personality is one where, “the individual respects and defers to 
authority figures, is obsessed with rank and status, is intolerant of ambiguity and 
uncertainty, has a need for a clearly defined and rigidly structured world, and expresses 
hatred and discrimination against weaker others” (Hogg and Abrams, p. 33). Adorno 
ultimately hypothesized that German upbringing in the 1920s created a society of people 
with authoritarian personality disorders primed to participate in the Holocaust. 
 Also during this era of intense investigation of intergroup conflict, Gordon Allport 
introduced the cognitive-error account of prejudice in his influential book, The Nature of 
Prejudice (1954). Here he defined prejudice as a negative attitude, “an antipathy [that 
may be felt or expressed] based on faulty and inflexible generalization” (Allport, 1954, p. 
9). Theorists working in the social identity approach point out that one assumption on this 
approach is that, “these attitudes are, in some deep sense, both unfounded and 
unreasonable” (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 48).  
The cognitive-error construction of prejudice holds that they are the inevitable 
results of individual cognitive processes, shortcuts that are necessary for navigating a 
complex social world (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 49). In this approach the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt 
to outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups 
have other folkways, these excite its scorn” (Sumner, 1906/2008, I.15). While Sumner is certainly not the 
first to observe the ease with which individuals group and the resulting behavior of that grouping, his 
introduction of the term ‘ethnocentrism’ marks the beginning of the modern, formal study of this 
sociological and psychological phenomenon.  
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social problem of prejudice gets reduced to “faulty and flawed”, yet necessary, 
psychological processes (ibid.). So while personality constructions of prejudice reduce it 
to individual personality, cognitive-error accounts run the risk of reducing prejudice to 
individual cognitive processes that, while seen as universal, are also assumed to operate 
in relative isolation from other individuals’ cognitive processes. 
The “cognitivist revolution” of the 1970’s and 1980’s continued this project of 
conceiving of prejudice in terms of cognitive error, emphasizing, “how normal 
psychological and social processes foster and maintain prejudice and stereotyping” 
(Dovidio, et. al., 2010, p. 4). Much of the research of this cognitive-error period 
demonstrated some serious concerns for personality constructions of prejudice on the 
basis of their predictive power. 56 Scholars whose research and theory would eventually 
become the social identity approach were influential in making some of these objections 
to personality models. Because they reduce prejudice to individual personality, 
personality constructions of prejudice struggle to predict which outgroup will be the 
target of social comparison as well as of the authoritarian’s aggression. Importantly, these 
accounts also fail to explain why prejudiced aggression is so often a collective 
phenomenon.  
Against the personality model, Henri Tajfel believed that intergroup conflict 
could be explained by far more ordinary cognitive processes and behavioral tendencies. 
Rather than a personality disorder, Tajfel’s research on minimal group paradigms 
demonstrated how basic and universal the tendency towards ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup prejudice is. It is independent of conflict, affect or relationship, or even 
perceived similarities. Researchers established group associations based in as 
																																																								
     56 See especially Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, 1972; Billig and Tajfel, 1973.  
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meaningless shared identities as possible, such as preference for one of two paintings. In 
his 1982 literature review, Tajfel points to a conservative estimate of 30 studies that all 
showed ingroup-favoring bias as a result of minimal or near-minimal categorizations 
(Tajfel, 1982, p. 24). The conclusion from this research is that social categorization is 
itself sufficient to cause intergroup competition and conflict. One need only draw a line 
in the sand. 
Tajfel’s cognitive emphasis is not without its flaws, however, and this can be 
demonstrated through turning to the recent research in implicit bias. Until now I have 
avoided discussion of implicit biases in my account of identity-prejudiced prabits. This 
may be strange in light of the vast amount of empirical research on it since the 
introduction of the implicit-association test (IAT) by Anthony Greenwald and colleagues 
(Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998). Here I want to sidebar briefly to explain why 
I have avoided framing my account of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality in 
terms of implicit biases.  
Recently the implicit bias research has come under significant scrutiny.57 Critics 
point out that often times the research pointed to in implicit training programs is not 
examining subconscious beliefs specifically, but rather, is examining communicative 
habits and patterns of prejudice more generally (without necessarily demonstrating how 
implicitly or explicitly these prabits are held). That is, researchers have failed to meet the 
burden of proof to sufficiently demonstrate that implicit biases are indeed implicit. A 
number of meta-analyses of the implicit bias research shows that the IAT test has both a 
low test-retest reliability and low predictability.58  
																																																								
     57 It is outside of the scope of my project to indulge this empirical debate in much detail here. 
     58 See for example Oswald, et. al., 2013; Forscher, et. al., 2018; and Goldhill, 2017. 
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Low test-retest reliability means that participants in a study could get better at 
taking the test with practice. Since IAT tests are now quite popularized and can even be 
taken online, one concern for low test-retest reliability is that a study on implicit bias 
research cannot assess whether participants’ results are being affected by external 
exposure and practice-sources. Take for example a participant in a gender-focused 
implicit bias study who has high IAT scores but has expressed egalitarian views about 
women. It is entirely possible that he could believe and regularly do a lot of very sexist 
things but simply be quite good at, and motivated in the laboratory setting to, self-
policing his responses to conform with what he knows are more “politically correct” 
responses. Thus his high IAT score is only explanatory of what he really believes and 
knows he believes, not an indication that he has beliefs about gender that he doesn’t 
know he has.  Take another example where a participant is good at both self-PC-policing 
and adjusting lower-cognitive levels of bias as a result of practice. He could have sexist 
beliefs, know that he has sexist beliefs, but be quite good at censoring those in both 
expressive and interactive contexts with others. Or he could just be a very good 
egalitarian person all the way down to his implicit core.   
It is also entirely possible that the attitudinal dualism assumed in the social 
psychology discourse is faulty. I have chosen to talk of identity-prejudiced practices and 
habits in terms of ‘prabits’ so as to bracket this debate. Recall that I have defined an 
identity-prejudiced prabits as any communicative or epistemic practice, habit, or modality 
of body comportment that is based in identity-prejudiced stereotypes. This is because I 
want to be able to refer to a collection of communicative and epistemic activities that as a 
whole support diminished deliberative standing. On my account, identity-based prabits 
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range on a spectrum between volitional activity and ‘attention to’ on one end of a 
spectrum and non-volitional activity and habitual compulsion on another end of a 
spectrum.  
Suffice it to say that various forms of intergroup communication often function to 
diminish the deliberative standing of stigmatized groups. In some individuals these biases 
may be consistent to the core with their explicitly held racist or sexist beliefs that they 
regularly indulge and ideologically maintain, and in some individuals these biases may be 
habituated patterns of interaction that are not entirely consistent with their expressed and 
perceived beliefs but are maintained and nurtured through the collective social 
imagination. The important point about thinking of the more “implicit” prejudices in 
terms of habit is that the language of “habit” captures the unfixed and developmental 
nature of attitudes in a way that the implicit/explicit dichotomy fails to capture.59 
One suggestion I want to make is that much of the contemporary discourse around 
implicit bias research reiterates the cognitive-error construction of prejudice because this 
discourse largely avoids discussion of, and in some cases even consideration of, the 
social and communicative processes that inform the conceptual content of the implicit 
biases themselves.60 61 What I would like to see the applications of implicit bias research 
																																																								
     59 It is outside of the scope of this chapter to test and defend this developmental hypothesis, however, 
this hypothesis would also seem to explain the low test-retest reliability for the IAT. I do not wish to deny 
the empirical significance of a study’s meeting a basic threshold of re- testability, only to introduce another 
perspective on people’s seeming ability to get better at the tests. Reframing lower-cognitive prejudices in 
terms of habits makes space for us to conceive of them as potential sources for social change.  
     60 I suspect that framing implicit bias in this way – as cognitive-error – is precisely what makes it a 
popular entry-point for talking about race- or gender- inequality among likely offenders. Olivia Goldhill 
explains, “One likely reason implicit-bias testing and training became to popular is that it’s socially 
unacceptable to be seen as prejudiced. Discrimination still clearly exists; we needed an explanation; 
implicit bias provided one. It’s personally convenient to recast subtle forms of prejudice as unconscious 
bias” (Goldhill, 2017). 
     61 I thank Officer Jarod Prado, part of a group within the Madison Police Department called Judgment 
Under the Radar for sharing with me his experiences working with and developing contemporary implicit 
bias training programs. Officer Prado’s approach appreciates the deeply relational nature of race-biases and 
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avoid is conveying a restrictive picture of prejudices where an individual’s implicit 
prejudices are understood solely in relation with that particular individual’s explicit 
beliefs, thoughts, or judgments. That is, the contemporary discourse around implicit bias 
research reduces prejudice to an internal dialectic that one has with oneself, dislocating it 
of its deeply social foundation in the collective social imagination. 
The important point to take from all of this is that these approaches ultimately 
promote an individualistic ontology of prejudice that misses the larger, social, 
institutional, and structural relations that inform the content of those prejudices (e.g., 
negatively-valenced stereotypes and categorical associations). The social identity 
approach that I introduce in the following section of this chapter interrogates these 
individualistic assumptions and argues that prejudice does not flow from faulty and 
flawed cognitive processes, but rather, from faulty and flawed social realities and, 
“through group identities and associated political and social ideologies, to shape the 
psychology of the individual” (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 50). Elizabeth 
Anderson puts this nicely, explaining that universal and ordinarily innocent cognitive 
processes can be “the vehicle[s] for spreading structural injustice to new contexts” 
(Anderson, 2012, p. 170).  
 
5. Grounding Identity-Prejudiced Communicative Inequality in a Relational Ontology 
Through the Social Identity Approach 
 
It is important to note that Henri Tajfel himself was careful to insulate his 
research from the individualistic cognitive-error turn in social psychology. In his 1981 
book, Tajfel explains that stereotypes do not create “intergroup social situations” and that 
																																																																																																																																																																					
emphasizes the influence of power relations in society for sustaining what I am referring to as “the 
collective social imagination” in this project. 
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neither the origins nor contents of stereotypes can “be disassociated from the prior 
existence and the special characteristics of a conflict of interests” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 225). 
While early theorists like Tajfel who emphasized the social cognitive perspective of 
intergroup relations were “clearly intrigued with the power of social categories, [they 
also] understood that the intense negative sentiments that often accompany intergroup 
dynamics were in fact the central problem to be addressed” (Park and Judd, 2005, p. 
109).62  
Tajfel’s colleagues explain that his research was, “anti-individualistic in 
orientation in that it attempt[ed] to explain large-scale, shared uniformities in social 
behaviour” and ultimately “derives social conflict and stability from people’s relations as 
group members” (Turner and Oakes, 1997, p. 240). Tajfel does this through introducing 
the concept of social identity, what he defines as, “the individual’s knowledge that he 
belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to 
him of this group membership” (Turner, 1975, p. 7; citing Tajfel, 1972, p. 292).  
Before Tajfel’s research and thought, social psychology had largely assumed a 
fixed and fundamental personal self, and any social dimensions of that self were 
conceived of as additives or as superimposed on top of that fixed personal identity 
(Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 64). With Katherine Reynolds, Turner explains 
that on Tajfel’s social identity theory (SIT), there is a crucial distinction between 
individual self-esteem, which is rooted in one’s personal identity, and collective self-
esteem, which is rooted in one’s social identity (Turner and Reynolds, 2001, pp. 139-
																																																								
     62 Park and Judd do point out that the cognitive approach did eventually come, “to define prejudice as a 
consequence of outgroup stereotypes, rather than negative outgroup stereotypes as a consequence of 
prejudice.” This launched a considerable amount of research that was, “devoted to stereotype elimination 
and change as a mechanism for achieving more harmonious intergroup relations” (Park and Judd, 2005, p. 
112).  
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140).63 64 Social identity is the part of the self-concept “that is determined by social 
categories” (Trepte and Loy, 2017, p. 4). 
Tajfel and colleagues eventually theorized that ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
prejudice are the results of attempting to achieve the positive distinctiveness of one’s 
social group in order to maintain positive self-esteem. Tajfel explains, one’s ingroup, 
“may provide a basis for the building up of a positive self-image, [particularly] if [the 
ingroup] managed to preserve a system of positive evaluations about “folkways,” mode 
of life, social and cultural characteristics” (Tajfel, 1982, p. 11).65  
Turner clarifies social identity, “An individual defines himself as well as others in 
terms of his location within a system of social categories – specifically social group 
membership – and social identity may be understood as his definition of his own position 
within such a system” (Tuner, 1975, p. 7). Turner theorizes that social identity cannot be 
had in isolation from comparative social categorization.66 Social groups do not exist in 
isolation from one another, and they do not come into existence merely through voluntary 
association. To the contrary, “A group becomes a group in the sense of being perceived 
																																																								
     63 For example, under some conditions individuals were found to endorse distributing resources in ways 
that would negatively impact them as individuals, but would promote the positive distinctiveness of their 
self-identified ingroup in contrast to an outgroup, showing that under certain conditions, the salience of 
one’s social identity can become so powerful that that they will act against their own individual self-interest 
(Turner, 1975). This research might explain the tendency of individuals to vote for candidates whose 
policies are in direct conflict with their own self-interest, but who are self-identified by voters as part of 
their ingroup.  
     64 On Turner’s clarification, positive distinctiveness is a cognitive activity of one’s social identity, not of 
one’s personal identity.  
     65 For a review of the critique of this self-esteem thesis, see Turner and Reynolds, 2001. 
     66 As early as 1978 Turner began refining his thinking about the process of self-categorization and 
eventually introduced the Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner, 1999). It is important to note that 
Turner’s SCT is not an alternative to social identity theory (SIT), but might be more appropriately seen as a 
development from it. Turner studied under Tajfel in the 1970’s and the two of them mutually researched, 
developed, and advanced SIT and so both of these theories “share many of the two researchers’ mutually 
developed ideas (Trepte and Loy, 2017, p. 1-2). I refer to this entire research program (SCT and SIT) as 
‘the social identity approach’. For a concise review of the major intersections and distinguishing features 
between SIT and SCT, see Trepte and Loy, 2017. 
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as having common characteristics or common fate only because other groups are present 
in the environment” (Turner, 1975, pp. 7-8; citing Tajfel, 1972, p. 295, the emphasis is 
mine). 
Tajfel’s early research on minimum group paradigms demonstrated the salience of 
group-identity for intergroup conflict and prejudice. But this research struggled to 
consistently demonstrate that social categorization was itself sufficient to predict ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup prejudice. Tajfel’s findings only seemed to support the claim 
that outgroup prejudice is a possible, not a necessary, result of intergroup relations 
(Turner, 2005). Michael Billig calls this invariance of prejudice, “the waxing and waning 
of warfare” and of prejudice (Billig, 2002, p. 178). That is, in intergroup relations, 
“sometimes there is socially shared bigotry; sometimes there is not; sometimes an 
ideology of tolerance might be widespread” (Billig, 2002, p. 178). 
Billig points out that some additional explanatory component beyond self-
categorization is called for to account for the waxing and waning of prejudice. He 
suggests that, “the additional elements are not psychological factors but are historical and 
cultural elements” (Billig, 2002, p. 178). He also suggests that because Turner assumes a 
cognitive approach to prejudice, even he fails to appreciate the affective dimensions of 
ideologies and social myths about groups (Billig, 2002, p. 178).67  
																																																								
     67 Billig’s suggestion is significant here because it interrupts the cognitive/affective dichotomy that is 
often assumed in the psychology of prejudice. Billig’s point is that, “What is required is not merely the 
addition of ‘emotional variables’ to the prevailing cognitive perspective but a theoretical reassessment of 
the apparent distinction between cognition and emotion…The emotion within an ideology of hatred is not 
something extra that is added to a cognitive interpretation; it is part of that interpretation” (Billig, 2002, p. 
184). There is a strong potential connection between Billig’s social constructionist position here and Tamar 
Gendler’s (2008; 2011) recent work on alief, but it is outside of the scope of this project to take this line of 
inquiry any further here. Since this constructionist position emphasizes the social and discursive 
construction of the emotions, it will also be interesting to consider how conceptualizing identity prejudices 
in terms of aliefs and conceptualizing identity-prejudiced prabits in terms of habits, could potentially clarify 
some of the assumptions that fuel the contemporary implicit bias debates.  
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What Tajfel missed in his initial studies was the role that the experimenters 
themselves played in introducing the salience of participants’ social identities. Turner 
explains that, “the major independent variable was not simply ‘group classification’,” but 
a temporary social identity that was provided by the experimenter (Turner, 1975, p. 14).68 
Researchers were introducing variables for people to base grouping on, as well as the 
insecure conditions that would motivate participants to try to maintain positive 
distinctiveness through ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice. On the whole, the 
laboratory setting itself made social identity salient, and it introduced the conditions that 
motivate a shift from personal to social identity. 
Like Billig, Turner (2005) is aware of the deeply context-sensitive nature of 
intergroup conflict, explaining that power and prejudice have “a social, political, 
historical, and ideological dimension which is in fact always at work in the experimental 
demonstration of supposedly generic facts” (Turner, 2005, p. 18, the emphasis is mine). 
In his later work, Turner examines how power emerges from, functions within, and 
sustains these systems of social categories.69 The important point for Turner’s account is 
that he sees group perceptions as indicative of social realities themselves, not 
“simplifications or distortions” of social reality (Haslam, Reicher, and Reynolds, 2012, p. 
207). So Tajfel’s initial experiments not only neglected the role the experimenter plays in 
introducing the salience of social identity and instigating outgroup prejudice through 
																																																								
     68 For an example of how stigmatized individuals are shifting the salience of social identities to their 
advantage in order to challenge the constraints of gendered social identities in blue-collar workplaces, see 
Amy Denissen’s (2010) paper, “The Right Tools for the Job: Constructing Gender Meanings and Identities 
in the Male-Dominated Building Trades”. Denissen shows that women creatively manipulate gender roles 
to exercise their agency and resist gender dualities in highly context-sensitive ways. One strategy she 
observes is that women often shift the basis for membership in the workgroup itself by implicitly drawing 
attention away from gender towards more shared identities such as class, regional identity, or race 
(Denissen, 2010, p. 1061).  
     69 See especially Turner’s 2005 paper, “Explaining the Nature of Power: A Three-Process Theory”. 
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making positive distinctiveness insecure, but they also neglected the various social, 
political, historical, and ideological contexts that frame intergroup relations and instigate 
outgroup prejudices.  
On the social identity approach, understanding prejudice requires an orientation 
not only to the nature of the cognitive and psychological processes that produce 
prejudice,70 but also “to the way in which these processes reflect and are responsive to 
variability in the social context and ongoing social and political dynamics” (Haslam et. 
al., 2012, p. 202). Turner recognizes that human beings are both individual persons and 
group members, and this is not just a social phenomenon, but a psychological one. Turner 
and colleagues explain:  
As well as being individual persons…people also have social identities that are 
grounded in their group memberships. Social identities reflect the cognitive and 
emotional significance of such groupings, and they are implicated in processes 
that are critical in shaping and changing people’s minds, motivations and 
behaviours. (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 55; citing Turner, 1982) 
 
In short, social identity formation does not happen in a vacuum from existing 
social and political patterns of exclusion, inequality, and oppression. These social 
relations make up the social world that social identity formation navigates. Far from 
being a collection of individual inductions of social groups, the content of the stereotypes 
and categorical associations relied on in self-categorization is the inherited result of 
social, political, historical, and ideological forces. This complex social world is the 
context that frames social grouping, social identity formation, and one’s efforts towards 
maintain positive distinctiveness. Turner and Oakes explain that processes like social 
																																																								
     70 On Turner’s framework these cognitive and psychological processes are possible sources of 
prejudices, but are more generally, “processes that allow us to be social and cultural beings” (Haslam et al., 
2012, p. 202). 
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influence and norm formation produce “a socially structured field within the individual 
mind” that consists of “in-group–out-group categorizations [that] more or less directly 
reflect social relations” (Turner and Oakes, 1986, p. 250). This “socially structured field” 
is precisely how we should think about the collective social imagination that frames 
identity-prejudiced prabits.  
Indeed, this is quite how Young explains the interaction between social identity, 
oppression, and situated knowledge: Individuals are thrown into “structured social fields” 
that are “prior to their individual subjectivity, both ontologically and historically” 
(Young, 1997b, p. 391). They are positioned in these structures through social processes 
and interactions (ibid., p. 392). This robust framework is what leads Young towards a 
pragmatist feminist social epistemology that necessitates more inclusive democratic 
communication and a “transformative deliberation” where the diversity of individuals’ 
social perspectives and situated knowledge are looked to as a resource in democratic 
communication (Young, 1997b, p. 402).71 This pragmatist feminist social epistemology 
was embodied in Jane Addams’s work and practice at Hull House, and is exhibited in the 
vibrant picture of democracy she shared in her writings. As Addams and her 
contemporaries like John Dewey knew, however, its fruition requires genuine 
communicative equality of the kind I have tried to develop in this chapter.  
 
 
 
																																																								
     71 Young’s explanation of this is insightful and worth including in full here. “The idea of social 
perspective presumes that differentiates groups dwell together within social processes with history, present 
arrangement, and future trajectories larger than all of them, which are constituted by their interactions. 
Each differentiated group position has a particular experience of a point of view on those social processes 
precisely because each is a part of and has helped produce the patterned process. Especially insofar as 
people are situated on different sides of relations of structural inequality, they have differing 
understandings of those relations and their consequences” (Young 1997b, p. 394). 
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6. Conclusion: A Relational Ontology of Prejudice as a Theoretical Basis for Identity-
Prejudiced Communicative Inequality 
 
 In Chapter 1, I explored Young’s concerns with how liberal individualism 
restricts understanding of social groups to individualistic, aggregative and associative 
models. As we saw, deliberative theorists who assume this individualistic framework are 
unable to conceptualize oppression as a structural and systematic feature of social 
relations between social groups. Deliberative theorists also often assume elitist and non-
inclusive constructions of deliberation that privilege the communicative norms that are 
common among the dominant group in society, and in so doing, theorize some people and 
some problems out of deliberation. One goal of this chapter has been to show how this 
individualistic account of the social group maps on to contemporary conceptions of 
prejudice, and how this could potentially limit and restrict contemporary attempts to 
understand the fullness of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.  
As was detailed in the previous chapter, non-elites and oppressed individuals may 
have difficulty formulating problems into argument form as a consequence of their poorer 
educational backgrounds (i.e., political poverty) or they may lack the kind of time and 
material resources required for political participation (i.e., too high of participation costs). 
But critiques of deliberation-as-argument and other communicative forms of cultural 
imperialism only capture disparate impact forms of deliberative inequality where 
communicative and epistemic prabits that are not directly the result of identity-prejudiced 
stereotypes disproportionately harm individuals on the basis of their oppressed social 
identity. In this chapter I introduced an account of communicative inequality that 
includes, but goes beyond disparate impact communicative inequality.  
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My claim has been that even if oppressed people do meet the conversational 
restraints of various forms of cultural imperialism (e.g., deliberation as argument), they 
are frequently subject to the identity-prejudiced prabits of their interlocutors in 
deliberative spaces in ways that diminish their deliberative standing. In this account I am 
ultimately trying to fill out Young’s depiction of the body aesthetic dimensions of 
oppression – “interactive habits, unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, and group-
related feelings of nervousness and aversion” – as they impact one’s deliberative 
standing (Young, 1990, p. 148).  
Identity-prejudiced prabits are surreptitious, pervasive, and systematic. They are 
surreptitious because many of them often operate on lower levels of consciousness and 
implicit levels below belief. They are pervasive because they result from universal 
cognitive-affective tendencies. They are systematic because of a cyclical relationship 
between the collective social imagination and the identity-prejudiced prabits that it 
informs, and the ways in which these prabits reinforce the collective social imagination.  
The picture of prejudice that the social identity approach provides, one that 
locates the collective social imagination and identity-prejudiced stereotypes in existing 
social realities, reveals that group processes are both a potential source of outgroup 
prejudice and a potential source for social change. The following two chapters of the 
dissertation draw on the contributions of American philosophers and social reformers, 
Jane Addams and John Dewey, for imagining strategies for transforming the collective 
social imagination in this way. Their radical, relational ontology and rich understanding 
of group moralities and prejudice anticipates Young’s conception of social identity and 
identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. And their writings and practice are rich 
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with resources for strategizing institutions, practices, and norms that on the whole, aim to 
challenge the identity-prejudiced stereotypes that fuel communicative inequality, and to 
construct genuinely inclusive deliberative spaces that protect, restore and nurture the 
deliberative standing of all individuals.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
INSIGHTS FROM JANE ADDAMS AND JOHN DEWEY FOR COMMUNICATIVE 
DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRACY AS SOCIAL ETHICS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Chapter 2 of the dissertation focused on filling out the relational ontology of 
communicative democracy through providing an account of communicatively structured 
deliberative inequality that emphasizes its identity-prejudiced dimensions. In what 
remains of the dissertation I will look to the thought and practice of American 
philosophers Jane Addams (1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952) to fill out the 
pragmatist feminist social epistemology that I grounded Young’s communicative 
democracy in, in Chapter 1.  
Communicative democracy, I have argued, makes theoretical space to name 
communicatively structured deliberative inequality as a problem for democracy. In doing 
so, it also introduces two important projects for democratic theorists, practitioners, and 
advocates: (1) imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of having 
named and acknowledged the presence of communicatively structured deliberative 
inequalities and (2) strategizing communicative practices and norms of interaction that 
can themselves challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes and mitigate their harmful 
effects on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.  
Addams and Dewey are important resources for my project for a number of 
reasons. First, they were strong advocates of a robust conception of democracy and 
democratic communication. Like Young, they believed that norms of democracy, 
particularly conceptions of political equality and inclusion, were vital for realizing social 
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justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social inequality and oppression. Like 
Young, they worried that narrow constructions of democratic communication (e.g., 
deliberation-as-argument) and norms of impartiality, consensus, and correctness 
problematized genuine inclusion. 
Second, they were critical of liberal individualistic constructions of the self and 
advanced a rich, relational ontology in its stead. Because they saw individuals in a given 
society as interconnected and interdependent parts of a whole, they saw oppression as a 
function of social relations. So like Young they were able to appreciate the complex ways 
that individuals can be excluded, particularly as participants in democratic processes and 
social life more generally.  
Addams and Dewey’s thought and work is situated in the period of urban 
industrialism of the late 19th and early 20th century, so they were not conscious of social 
identity in the same empirically based way that I developed it in Chapter 2. However, 
they were both ahead of their time in how they thought about social grouping and 
prejudice and the impact of these on participatory exclusion. As they saw it, many of the 
features of modern industrial capitalism – extreme wealth disparities, labor exploitation 
and hostile labor relations, urban poverty, displaced migrant and immigrant populations – 
exacerbated the epistemic limitations already inherent in human subjectivity through 
producing group divisions, social group hierarchies based in inequitable relations of 
power, and harmful prejudices towards more marginalized social groups.  
Thus a third reason to look to Addams and Dewey as resources for 
communicative democracy is because they saw democracy as itself a mechanism for 
resolving many of these problems. As Matthew Festenstein has recently pointed out, 
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Dewey appreciates that class hierarchies and social division distort social knowledge, and 
he believes democracy can counteract this (Festenstein, 2018). Although they did not 
articulate it in these terms, Addams and Dewey treated democracy as a type of social 
epistemology that appreciates that knowledge is socially situated and looks to inclusive 
communicative practices as a mechanism for identifying and resolving “problems of 
practical interest” (Anderson, 2006, p. 13).72  
Like Young, Addams and Dewey did not restrict their conception of democracy to 
formal institutions, check and balances, the protection of rights, and electorate processes. 
They saw such democratic institutions as “political machinery”, useful only insofar as 
they promoted and realized human flourishing. Throughout his works, Dewey contrasts 
political democracy with democracy understood as “a way of life”, and assuming this 
wider and fuller understanding of democracy, Addams frequently refers to democracy “as 
social ethics”.  
As I understand it, to say that democracy is a way of life and is a social ethics is to 
say that democratic norms of political equality, transparency, reasonableness, and 
inclusion must govern all of our social interactions so that through the implementation of 
those procedural values, human beings may fully participate in all of social life, including 
the formation of more substantive values and norms that will govern their collective 
social life. Dewey explains: 
The key-note of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as 
the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of 
the values that regulate the living of men together: which is necessary from the 
standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human 
beings as individuals. (Dewey, 1888/1996, LW 11. 217) 
																																																								
     72 Anderson explains that Dewey characterized democracy as an experimentalist process that requires, 
“the use of social intelligence to solve problems of practical interest”. In this description, she references 
Dewey’s (1939) “Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us” and Putnam, 1990.  
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By ‘social ethics’, Addams has in mind an evolution of morality from an 
individualistic and narrow conception of one’s obligations to her familiars, to a wider 
“acceptance of social obligations” to all of those with whom one is connected to under 
modern urban industrial life (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 8). Charlene Haddock Seigfriend 
explains Addams’s worries about an individualistic morality poignantly: “If, in our 
contempt for others, we limit the circle of our acquaintances to those whom we have 
already decided to respect, “we not only circumscribe our range of life, but limit the 
scope of our ethics” (Seigfried, 1999, p. 209; citing Addams 1902/2002, p. 8). By 
contrast, social ethics requires that citizens, “must turn out for one another, and at least 
see the size one another’s burdens” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 7).  
Thus democracy as social ethics makes ethical demands on citizens that are of an 
epistemic nature, ethical demands to know responsibly. Democracy requires “engaging 
the participation of epistemically diverse knowers” and “collective, experimentally-based 
learning from the diverse experiences of different knowers” (Anderson, 2006, p. 8). I will 
refer to the cooperative and inclusive social practices and processes that promote social 
knowledge, social inquiry.73 As Addams describes it, an ethics of “turning out for one 
another” and understood as a way of life, democracy socializes our ethics and requires 
responsible social inquiry. This requires an epistemic openness to inquire into the 
problems that face those with whom we fail to acknowledge under individualistic 
morality, and it requires an affective openness to be moved by these encounters. 
																																																								
     73 It is important to distinguish my usage of this term from Dewey’s. Dewey uses the term ‘social 
inquiry’ in places to denote the application of scientific investigation to social life and interaction, and he 
seems to have in mind the formal academic discipline of sociology which had been established at the 
University of Chicago only a few years before his arrival there (1892). See especially Dewey’s Logic: The 
Theory of Inquiry (1938/1996, LW 12).  
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Addams and Dewey saw democracy as a way to resolve the epistemic limitations 
of human subjectivity that are exacerbated in intergroup social relations of power where 
there is oppression, privilege, and group-based social inequality. They believed that 
through refinement from the grips of liberal individualism, democratic communication 
and interaction could potentially combat social inequality, exclusion, and prejudice. And 
like Young, they viewed difference as far from something that should be denied or 
assimilated, but as an epistemic resource for democratic communication (Young, 1997b). 
Many of the practices at Hull House aimed to combat group-based divisions 
among diverse immigrant populations living in cramped quarters with one another. 
Addams and Dewey saw Hull House as a model for what democratic relations could be in 
society as a whole, a community of different socially situated individuals engaging in 
cooperative and inclusive processes and practices of forming social knowledge.74 And, 
Addams used her writings about Hull House neighbors to combat identity-prejudiced 
stereotypes about marginalized citizens, the immigrant, the prostitute, and more 
generally, the urban poor. These stereotypes and social myths, housed in the collective 
social imagination, functioned to deteriorate the sense among social and political elites 
that such individuals were and should be treated as political equals. Thus a fourth reason 
to look to Addams and Dewey’s work and the practices at Hull House as a resource for 
communicative democracy, is because it is rich with strategies for realizing the more 
inclusive, democratic interactions that communicative democracy idealizes in light of 
communicative inequality.   
																																																								
     74 See especially Addams’s series of speeches on the social settlement in Addams, 1893a; Addams, 
1893b; and Addams, 1899. See especially Addams (1907/2005) Newer Ideals of Peace: The Moral 
Substitutes for War where she looks to the Hull House community as a model for a “cosmopolitan 
affection” for all of humanity that “breaks through the tribal bond” of the older ideals of peace (p. 6). 
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In the next section of the chapter (Section 2) I introduce the reader to Jane 
Addams, Hull House, and Addams’s and Dewey’s relationship. In Section 3 of the 
chapter I introduce the relational ontology that informed their shared vision of 
democracy. Here I draw some important connections between their thought and Young’s 
critiques of preference-aggregative conceptions of democracy.  
In Section 4 of the chapter I introduce the challenges that Addams and Dewey 
identified for realizing this conception of democracy. Like many of the pragmatists, 
Addams and Dewey were deeply worried about the epistemological and ethical 
limitations of human subjectivity. They were especially concerned that many of the 
conditions of modern industrial capitalism exacerbated this problem. They also 
combatted individualistic trends in their constructions of the social group and of 
prejudice, and in this, were remarkably ahead of their time.  
Addams and Dewey saw democratic communication as a type of social inquiry 
practice that could counteract exclusion. Although they do not specify it as such, 
democracy for them is social epistemology. Section 5 of the chapter demonstrates how 
they theorized democracy in this way, and in so doing, fills out the pragmatist feminist 
social epistemology that I based communicative democracy on in Chapter 1 of the 
dissertation.  
This chapter establishes some significant connections between contemporary 
communicative democracy rooted in the work of Iris Marion Young and Addams’s and 
Dewey’s conceptions of democracy as social ethics and as a way of life. As a whole, the 
chapter aims to begin to fill in the epistemology of communicative democracy by 
showing that Addams and Dewey saw exclusion as a serious social and political problem, 
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that they identified identity-prejudiced forms of exclusion, and that they looked to 
democratic norms and practices as a resource for social justice. This chapter establishes 
the basic ontological and epistemological framework of Addams and Dewey’s conception 
of democracy in order to set the stage for the final chapter of the dissertation where I will 
look more specifically at some of the practices, programs, and methods of inquiry that 
Addams and Dewey made use of in order to address deliberative inequality. 
 
2. Jane Addams, John Dewey, and Hull House 
 
Jane Addams is most renowned for her leadership in the social settlement 
movement and founding of Hull House in Chicago’s West Side during the industrial 
revolution and American progressive era. While Addams is well known as America’s 
first social worker, she is underappreciated within the historical philosophy canon for her 
contributions to American philosophy. She is often recognized for her practical rather 
than for her intellectual contributions to the progressive movement and pragmatist 
thought. Thus she has wrongly come to be seen as the hands and feet of the thought of 
American philosophers John Dewey, William James, and George Herbert Mead.  
Recent scholarship has begun to challenge this assumption that Addams was 
merely implementing American pragmatism in her work. Scholars have established that 
Addams’s writings are themselves philosophically significant. Additionally, Addams 
enjoyed intellectually rigorous friendships with John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, 
professional philosophers at the University of Chicago. There is persuasive evidence that 
professional philosophers like Dewey and Mead saw Addams as an intellectual peer and 
they were strongly influenced by Addams and their time with her at Hull House. 
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We should be careful not to reduce Addams’s contributions to American 
pragmatism to classic gender stereotypes. Hamington explains that while Dewey is 
remembered as “the great intellectual” and as “mind generating theory”, Addams is often 
seen as the woman activist, “body experiencing and caring”, thinker and doer 
(Hamington, 2009, p. 37). Against this historical memory of the two figures, Hamington 
among others75 point to evidence that Addams’s intellectual contributions were an 
important part of the development of Dewey’s thought, and that Addams’s writings were 
themselves philosophically significant. Moreover, a pragmatist feminist framework will 
challenge this dichotomies operative in such an assumption, dichotomies between 
thought/action, mind/body, theory/practice, and reason/affect. 
Addams co-founded Hull House in 1889 with her lifelong friend Ellen Gates 
Starr. The site they chose for Hull House was at the intersection of a number of working 
class immigrant neighborhoods on Halsted Street in Chicago. Hull House can best be 
described as a type of community based organization and center for social reform. Hull 
House coordinated social clubs and gatherings with the local neighbors and was a lively 
center of intellectual and political debate and social reform. Addams modeled it after 
Toynbee Hall, a social settlement located in a crowded and poor area in the East End of 
London that Addams visited while traveling as a young woman. Toynbee Hall was part 
of the social Christian movement within upper-middle-class circles in England. This 
movement, one that inspired Addams, emphasized living among the poor and “social 
cooperation among works and social cooperation across class lines” (Knight, 2010, pp. 
62-3; citing Knight, 2009, pp. 66-69). 
																																																								
     75 See especially Deegan, 1988 and Seigfried, 1999. 
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Residents of Hull House were women from privileged backgrounds who were 
dedicated to doing social good among the poor and committed to realizing the core ideals 
of the progressive movement (e.g., inclusive democratic communication, education, and 
economic reform). Hull House residents visited the homes of the most impoverished 
neighbors with charity baskets, but Hull House was far more than a mere charitable 
institution. It regularly hosted visits and lectures from scholars at the University of 
Chicago and leading social and political theorists, it provided seed money and meeting 
space for neighbors engaged in collective action, and it hosted meetings between 
employers and laborers. In this sense, it served as a forum for various democratic 
processes and as a facilitator for democratic participation. 
Addams’s leadership at Hull House was vital. One of the many roles she played 
was that of a type of University Chair. She facilitated social clubs,76 provided leadership 
in curriculum selection for these social clubs, and frequently lectured or hosted 
discussion during them.77 Hull House social clubs were a hybrid of intellectual activity, 
social activism, and play. Members were from different socioeconomic backgrounds and 
would often meet to read and discuss an academic text, a piece of literature, or a play. 
This time was deeply social and often followed by festivities like a dance or games.78 
																																																								
     76 Addams uses the term ‘social groups’ in places in her writings about these groups. She has in mind 
voluntary associations, however, so I have chosen to clarify these as ‘social clubs’ throughout in order to 
avoid confusion with my use of ‘social groups’ thus far in the dissertation. Addams clearly has in mind an 
association here, since these were voluntarily entered, ironically, by people from different social groups.  
     77 Addams recalls her involvement in building curriculum for social clubs (Addams, 1910, p. 347), for 
instance, through encouraging one social club to include Josiah Royce’s Aspects of Modern Philosophy so 
that they could see that, “Herbert Spencer was not the only man who had ventured a solution of the riddles 
of the universe” (Addams, 1910, p. 347). 
     78 Addams proudly wrote about the role that Hull House social clubs played an in the early education of 
many of the neighbors, “I see scores of young people who have successfully established themselves in life, 
and in my travels in the city and outside, I am constantly cheered by greetings from the rising young 
lawyer, the scholarly rabbi, the successful teacher, the prosperous young matron buying clothes for 
blooming children. “Don’t you remember me? I used to belong to a Hull-House club” (Addams, 1910, p. 
345-6). 
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In this project I draw on Addams and Dewey’s philosophy of democracy thought 
without significant distinction. Thanks to the remarkable scholarship of pragmatist 
feminists over the past 25 years, there is a substantial body of literature that has 
established the mutual interdependency of Addams and Dewey’s thought about 
democracy and social ethics.79 These thinkers have brought forward incredible evidence 
for Addams’s influence on Dewey’s thought, and from this have concluded that their 
work in this was mutually influential. Before moving on to provide an overview of their 
shared picture of democracy, I want to briefly highlight some of the significant work that 
has been done to connect their thought. Here I will also make a few humble contributions 
to this work through drawing attention to some important intersections in their work that 
has not yet been substantially explored in the literature, namely, their thought about 
social issues that they believed exacerbated democratic exclusion.  
Dewey moved to Chicago in 1894 to accept a research and teaching position at 
the University of Chicago and shortly after established the experimental school 
(Hamington, 2009, p. 37). He visited Hull house not long after it opened (1889) and 
praised Addams for her work there and for  “giving him insight into matters” 
(Hamington, 2009, p. 37). Maurice Hamington (2009) comments that Addams and 
Dewey were “intellectual soul mates” from this very first meeting (p. 37).  
Dewey eventually became a regular speaker at and visitor to Hull House.80 As 
Hamington explains, “There was much intellectual cross-fertilization between Hull 
																																																								
     79 See especially Mary Jo Deegan (1988), Marilyn Fischer (2004, 2010), Maurice Hamington (2001, 
2004, 2009), Charlene Seigfried (1991, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2013), Regina Leffers (1993), and 
Judy Whipps (2004). 
     80 Addams mentions Dewey’s “many talks” at Hull House as well as a series of lectures he gave on 
Social Psychology (Addams, 1910, p. 237, p.435). See also Deegan, 1988. She recounts that Dewey taught 
at Hull House both in an official capacity through University of Chicago Extension classes and lectured in a 
less formal capacity within various settlement social clubs (Deegan, 1988, p. 251). 
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House and the University of Chicago” (Hamington, 2009, p. 37).81 Addams was seen as 
an unofficial faculty member of the University of Chicago, and when Hull House 
incorporated in 1897, Dewey became a board member.  
Dewey’s thinking about democracy was deeply influenced by his friendship with 
Addams, from his time at Hull House, from the many conversations and correspondences 
he had with Addams, and from reading her writings themselves. Indeed he seems to be 
drawing on his experiences at Hull House in Democracy and Education (1916) 
(Seigfried, 1999, p. 213). And his daughter, named after Jane Addams,82 recounts in her 
Biography of Dewey that, “his faith in democracy as a guiding force in education took on 
both a sharper and deeper meaning because of Hull House and Jane Addams” (Deegan, 
1988, 252; citing Jane Dewey, “Biography of John Dewey”, pp. 29-30).  
Dewey frequently cites Addams’s speeches and writings in his work on social 
ethics and political philosophy, and footnotes to many of these passages are included in 
this discussion and throughout this chapter as a whole.83 A few of those passages in 
																																																								
     81 See also, Mary Jo Deegan (1988), who tracks Addams’s relationships with various intellectuals at the 
Chicago School. Deegan notes that the “religious” Chicago school of men treated Addams as an ally and “a 
vital leader, although primarily within women’s restricted sociological sphere” (p. 163). Mead, Thomas, 
and especially Dewey had greater openness towards women as colleagues and professionals, in part due to 
Addams influence on them. Deegan notes that Addams was an illustration to them of the intellectual 
woman, providing them “access to empirical data, controversial audiences and speakers, and organizational 
skills to fight for social change” (Deegan, 1988, 163). She concludes that Addams, Dewey, and Mead all, 
“had a fundamentally similar approach to social science, democracy, and education that bound them 
together as colleagues and friends” (Deegan, 1988, p. 250). 
     82 This in itself demonstrates the fondness with which Dewey thought of Addams. Additionally, Dewey 
dedicates Liberalism and Social Action (1935) “To the Memory of Jane Addams” and frequently publicly 
acknowledged the vital role of the social settlement and Jane Addams to the city of Chicago. See 
especially, Dewey’s address to a Child Health and Protection Annual Meeting (LW 17.517) and Dewey’s 
address to “Mrs. Swan, Mr. Chairman, Miss Addams and Friends” at his 70th birthday party where he 
specifically writes, “I have learned many things from Jane Addams. I notice that with her usual modesty 
she attributed to me some of the things in Chicago which she and her colleagues in Hull House did…” (LW 
5.421).  
     83 Indeed Dewey’s own remarks about women in philosophy are evidence that he would have considered 
Addams an intellectual peer. In “Philosophy and Democracy” (1918) he writes positively of diversity in 
philosophy, “…when women who are not mere students of other person’s philosophy set out to write it, we 
cannot conceive that it will be the same in viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the standpoint of the 
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particular are worth drawing attention to because they demonstrate the influence of 
Addams’s thought about social groups, prejudice, and social psychology on Dewey’s 
thought, topics that are particularly relevant to my project in the dissertation.  
For example, in his treatment of group behavior in Ethics (1908), Dewey engages 
in a discussion where he identifies a number of criticisms of ingroup virtues like loyalty. 
This discussion is brief, however, and he points the reader to Addams’s writings for 
further development on the topic since, “the problems which [these ingroup virtues] 
cause in modern democracy have been acutely described by Jane Addams” (Dewey, 
1908/1996, MW 5.135-6).84  
Maurice Hamington unveils a series of correspondences in which Dewey credits 
Addams for having changed his mind in the course of one of their debates at Hull House 
about a particular philosophical problem of antagonism (Hamington, 2009, pp. 37-38). 
Dewey writes to his wife about the event that Addams had “converted him” (Hamington, 
2009, p. 38; citing Menand, 2001, p. 313). Then he writes to Addams, “Not only is actual 
antagonism bad, but the assumption that there is or may be antagonism is bad….I’m glad 
I found out about this before teaching social psychology” (Hamington, 2009, p. 38; citing 
Menand, 2001, p. 314, the emphasis is mine). Indeed Dewey includes her work among a 
number of professional scholars in his list of references for his course, “Social 
Institutions and the Study of Morals” (Dewey, 1923-4/1996, MW 15.269, 272).85  
																																																																																																																																																																					
different masculine experience of things” (Dewey, 1918/1996, MW 11. 45). And later in his life he defends 
her writings as both containing a philosophy and of being transformative of philosophic method itself 
(Dewey, 1945/1996, LW 15. 195). 
     84 Here Dewey references Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), pp. 222-77 and Addams, 
Newer Ideals of Peace (1907), Chapter V. Later in this chapter I discuss these passages in more detail.  
     85 Here Dewey references two specific discussions in Addams’s Democracy and Social Ethics (1902): 
her accounts of the Pullman Strike and labor relations (Chapter 5: Industrial Amelioration) and her 
accounts of political reform (Chapter 7). 
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I draw attention to these passages and correspondences because they demonstrate 
the influence of Addams’s thought on Dewey’s, but also because the content of these 
passages demonstrates that Addams and Dewey regularly conversed about intergroup 
conflict and the conditions that exacerbated it. Dewey praised Addams’s work at Hull 
House because he believed it embodied the kinds of communicative and epistemic 
practices that could combat the intergroup social processes that fueled intergroup conflict, 
processes I have identified as ingroup and outgroup biases and identity-prejudiced 
stereotypes. Seigfried explains, “He thought especially noteworthy its ability to ‘provide 
means for bringing people and their ideas and beliefs together, in such ways as will lessen 
friction and instability, and introduce deeper sympathy and wider understanding’” 
(Seigfried, 1999, 213).86 
 
3. Situating Addams and Dewey’s Conception of Democracy in Their Relational 
Ontology 
 
Addams and Dewey’s conception of democracy is shaped by their ontology. Like 
Dewey, Addams held that human beings are primarily social and relational creatures, not 
isolated and atomistic individuals. Seigfried notes that this “principle of the 
interdependency of persons on one another” is a central thesis in all of Addams’s writings 
(Seigfried, 2013, p. 151). Regina Leffers praises Addams for her “distinctive ability to 
see individuals as wholes that are interconnected and interrelated parts of ever-larger 
wholes…When she saw the gentleman wearing a nicely finished suit, she saw at the same 
time the woman who must have finished that suit in a rank and dingy basement” (Leffers, 
1993, p. 69). 
																																																								
     86 See especially Dewey’s “The School as Social Centre” (1902/1996, MW 2. 91). Here he looks to Hull 
House as a model for the school.  
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Marilyn Fischer’s language of “organic interconnection” captures this feature of 
their ontology nicely (Fischer, 2010, p. 51).87 Addams believes that as society becomes 
more interdependent given the evolving and more complex organization of human 
associative life under industrialism, it becomes more appropriate to conceive of it as an 
“organic aggregate”.  
 Dewey also rejects the individualism assumed under classical liberalism, likening 
the sociopolitical sphere to an organism.88 This relational ontology informs Dewey’s 
conception of “individuality”, by which he has in mind political agency or political 
agency:  
The fact is, however, that the theory of the “social organism,” that theory that men 
are not isolate non-social atoms, but are men only when in intrinsic relations to 
men, has wholly superseded the theory of men as an aggregate, as a heap of grains 
of sand needing some factitious mortar to put them into semblance or order…For 
the picture which is drawn of democracy is, in effect, simply an account of 
anarchy. To define democracy simply as rule of the many, as sovereignty chopped 
up into mince meat, is to define it as abrogation of society, as society dissolved, 
annihilated. (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 231)89  
 
Not only does this passage give insight into Dewey’s relational ontology of 
political agency, but it also reveals the tension he identifies between this relational 
conception of political agency and a preference-aggregative conception of democracy. 
Rather than seeing individuals as isolated individuals, Dewey defends a view of 
individuals as relational where the wellbeing of each is inextricably linked to the 
wellbeing of the whole. That is, we come into our fullest individuality (i.e., political 
																																																								
     87 Fischer references and draws this language from Addams’s Philanthropy and Social Progress (1893) 
here. 
     88 See especially two of Dewey’s earlier works on democracy, The Ethics of Democracy (1888) and 
“Christianity and Democracy” (1893). 
     89 In “The Ethics of Democracy”, Dewey also defends an account of democracy that aims to protect it 
from mob rule in the same sense as Joseph Bessette (1986), something I developed in Chapter 1 of the 
dissertation. Dewey writes, “But the heart of the matter is found not in the voting nor in the counting the 
votes to see where the majority lies. It is in the process by which the majority is formed” (Dewey, 
1888/1996, EW 1. 234).  
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agency) in and through relationships with others, not independently and apart from 
society.90 Dewey sees that his notion of individualism cannot be realized through the 
uncoordinated exercise of individual rights or through decision-making based on tallies 
of citizens’ uncoordinated preferences. Rather, liberties and preferences must be 
coordinated “with the pursuit of the social good of all” (Shook, 2013, p. 9).  
Dewey challenges the individualistic assumptions built into his contemporaries’ 
conceptions of democracy. Assuming an atomistic and aggregative conception of 
individuals, these conceptions of democracy reduce it to a framework more suitable to 
aristocracy, where one special interest group of political and social elites coercively 
governs another group. Liberal individualism maps this dichotomy onto a conception of 
democracy, rendering a narrow account where democracy is reduced to those formal 
institutions and mechanisms that protect the governed from abuse by the governing (e.g., 
checks and balances, individual rights and liberties, and electorate processes).    
Democracy properly understood, however, ruptures this dichotomy between the 
‘governing’ and ‘governed’ because it idealizes the government as itself the expression 
and articulation of the will of the society. “Society, as a real whole”, for Dewey, “is the 
normal order” (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 232). That is, political democracy is an 
expression of society, not a distinct entity from that Society. A government can be said to 
be democratic in this sense when it “represents men so far as they have become 
organically related to one another, or are possessed of unity of purpose and interest” 
(Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 232).  
																																																								
     90 This resonates strongly with Young’s own account of the social group. See especially Young, 1990 
where she writes, “Societies do not simply distribute goods to persons who are what they are apart from 
society, but rather constitute individuals in their identities and capacities” (p. 27). 
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On the individualistic ontology of classical liberalism, political agency is 
constructed as something that is sacrificed, or undergoes a restriction, as a result of the 
coercive force of government. When located in the relational ontology of Addams, 
Dewey, and Young, democracy is reconceptualized – both in its formal, institutional 
structures and as a feature of all social relations – as a mechanism through which 
individuals can come into their fullest potentiality.  
Addams and Dewey were critical of liberal individualistic conceptions of political 
agency, what Dewey explains in some of his later works as an “opportunistic, laissez-
faire conception of freedom”.91 For Dewey, individual freedom is not understood as 
freedom from interference, but rather, as a freedom to participate in human social life and 
through that, the completion of one’s own individuality. Democracy as a way life is the 
process whereby the individual “is brought to completion” (Festenstein, 1997, p. 79).92  
The language of deliberative democracy is useful for understanding the central 
role of participation in Addams and Dewey’s thought. Addams and Dewey take it that 
inclusive participation and communication is so valuable for democracy because it is the 
means by which citizens explore and test their individual preferences in coordination with 
others. During this social inquiry, wider preferences emerge and values evolve from 
individualistic morality into social ethics. This is because as Matthew Festenstein 
explains, “Traditions of shared communication [like those that Addams and Dewey 
endorsed and practiced] tend to establish bonds of trust and sympathy and to lead 
																																																								
     91 See, Liberalism and Social Action (1935) and Freedom and Culture (1939). See especially Dewey’s 
essay, “The Future of Pacifism” (1917). Here Dewey both demonstrates his appreciation for Addams as an 
intellectual and contrasts her pacifist position with “laissez-faire” accounts of pacifism that were 
philosophically underdeveloped and “opportunistic” (Dewey, 1917/1996, MW 10.266-7; citing Addams’s 
(1917) paper, “Patriotism and Pacifists in War Time”).  
     92 Robert Westbrook explains that Dewey saw any “limitations on full democratic participation in social 
life [as]… a subtle way of suppressing individuality”. To the contrary, “the development of individuality 
required the democratization of all social institutions” (Westbrook, 1991, pp. 433-434). 
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individuals to identify their interests with those of the broader community” (Festenstein, 
1997, p. 88). Democratic communication has a “transformative effect” on individuals 
(Festenstein, 1997, p. 88). Thus institutions and social practices and norms that 
emphasize inclusive participation, create space for individuals to explore their values and 
transform them from self-interested, to more socialized interests.  
This conception of political agency is remarkably consistent with Young’s 
connection of social justice with two overarching values that are constitutive of the good 
life, self-determination and self-development. Young defines self-development in contrast 
with the social condition of domination, as the ability to “participate in determining one’s 
actions and the conditions of one’s action”, and she defines self-development in contrast 
with the social condition of oppression, as the ability to “develop and exercise one’s 
capacities and express one’s experiences” (Young, 1990, p. 37). Young clarifies that 
social justice is not itself the realization of these values, but “the degree to which a 
society contains and supports the institutional conditions necessary for the realization of 
these values” (Young, 1990, p. 37).  
Although Young does not speak in terms of political agency here, the connection 
she draws between social justice and the institutions and practices that enable for self-
determination and self-development gets at the heart of Dewey’s individualism and the 
conception of political agency that is central to communicative democracy (Young, 1990, 
pp. 37, 39). This account of political agency is the logical consequence of a 
communicative democracy framework that is based in a relational ontology, makes space 
to name oppression through a rich conception of social identity, and views the inclusion 
of diverse social perspectives as a vital feature of social inquiry practices and processes 
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that aim to identify and define practical problems and social conflicts and coordinate 
efforts to resolve them. In her later work where she specifically introduces 
communicative democracy, Young explains that under ideal social and political 
conditions of “inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity”, citizens would fulfill 
their political agency in this way (Young, 2000, p. 31).  
Addams explains the notion of organic connection through the language of unity. 
She explains that like an organism, in order to function well the various parts or an 
organization or of society must work towards a common aim, “make an effort to unify it, 
and protest against its over-differentiation” (Addams, 1893a, p. 23). But this should be 
clarified from the type of forced consensus that communicative democracy is cautious of. 
Addams does not understand efforts to unify the social organism as a process that occurs 
at the expense of individuals. She idealizes democratic communication as a mode of 
insulating the process of unification from a false consensus through moving from the 
expressed needs of each individual part towards a conception of the good of the 
organism.93  
Like Young, Addams defines unity by contrast to coercion and false consensus.94 
She was critical of the tendency among political leaders , as well as in social settlement 
houses, to set goals for American social life without forming genuinely inclusive social 
																																																								
     93 Regina Leffers (1993, p. 73) explains Addams, “Looking at the broader community as an organic 
whole also requires us to value its individual parts and take into consideration the needs of the community 
as a whole together with its resources. This broader scope requires that we investigate problematic social 
conditions and do what we can to improve them, endeavor to refine our methods of democratic government 
so that an ever-increasing number of voices are able to contribute to decision making, educate people of all 
ages to value difference when it is expressed, appreciate and respect the voice of others, and 
conscientiously work cooperatively with others.” 
     94 Dewey explains that at the heart of Addams’s philosophy is the goal of replacing coercion with the 
full consent of the governed, and this consent is grounded in (1) education, (2) democratic institutions, and 
(3) the process of forming common social ends among “the cosmopolitan inhabitants of this great nation” 
(Dewey, 1945/1996, LW 15. 196; referencing Addams). It is worth noting that in this passage Dewey not 
only provides an analysis of Addams’s conception of democracy as social ethics, but defends Addams’s as 
having a philosophy. 
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knowledge of the needs of the most marginalized. She explains eloquently, “No one so 
poignantly realizes the failures in the social structure as the man at the bottom, who has 
been most directly in contact with those failures and has suffered the most” (Addams, 
1910, p. 183).95  
Neither Addams nor Dewey endorsed a philosophy of assimilationism. For them, 
unity does not entail uniformity. Dewey condemns the “melting pot” theory of 
assimilation in a critical discussion of American nationalism: “Our unity cannot be a 
homogenous thing like that of the separate states of Europe from which our population is 
drawn; it must be a unity created by drawing out and composing into a harmonious whole 
the best, the most characteristic which each contributing race and people has to offer” 
(1916/1996, 10. 202-211). 
And while Dewey does mention the value of the public school to ‘assimilate 
different races to our own institutions’ in “The School as Social Centre” (1902), he 
shortly thereafter clarifies this as a type of process of Americanization that is distinct 
from de-nationalization. In de-nationalization, which he condemns, “[Children] lose the 
positive and conservative value of their own native traditions, their own native music, art, 
and literature” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 85). Dewey’s writings on assimilation must 
be understood in the context of the inclusive conception of communicative democracy 
that he would have endorsed. In his advocacy of Americanization and assimilation to 
American institutions, he has much more in mind an invitation to immigrants to 
participation in political and social life, something much more akin to Addams’s 
conception of organic connection and unity. 
																																																								
     95 See also Dewey, 1945/1996, LW 15. 196-7 where he verifies and celebrates this feature of Addams’s 
thought. 
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To borrow Young’s terms, the organic connection of the social organism requires 
that the community as a whole attend to fostering the institutions, norms, and practices 
that both protect and nurture each individual’s capacity for self-determination and self-
development. This requires that the community advance institutions, norms, and practices 
that protect and nurture each individual’s ability to bring forward moral concerns, 
through protecting each individual’s epistemic and moral standing in her community to 
bring such concerns forward and participate in processes of strategizing resolutions for 
these problems.  
Dewey praises Addams’s appreciation for diversity as an epistemic resource.96 As 
Hamington explains in his development of Addams’s philosophy of diversity, “[Addams] 
came to view culture as both a source of moral knowledge and as source of social 
energy” (Hamington, 2009, p. 115). He continues, “She did not distinguish between the 
moralities of different cultures – one being more desirable than the other. A culture with a 
long history of development has a cache of moral wisdom to impart” (p. 117).97  
Addams and Dewey’s appreciation for diverse social perspectives bears striking 
resemblance to Young’s point in “Difference as a Resource for Democracy”, that 
different social perspectives contain differently situated knowledge and, “from each 
perspective some aspects of the reality of social processes are more visible than others” 
(Young, 1997b, p. 394). And like Young, this shared feature of their thought is what 
motivates all of these thinkers towards the endorsement of inclusive and responsible 
																																																								
     96 See especially Dewey’s introduction to the (1922/1945) reprinting of Addams’s Peace and Bread in 
Time of War (LW 15. 537). 
     97 See especially Hamington’s (2009) Chapter 6, “Widening the Circle” for an excellent, but not 
uncritical, consideration of Addams’s philosophy of diversity.  
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social inquiry, a framework that I have labeled a pragmatist feminist social epistemology 
in this project.  
 
3. Epistemic Concerns 
 
Thus far I have argued that Addams and Dewey saw democracy as a way of life 
and as a social ethics that transcends formal political institutions. I have tried to 
demonstrate that much like Young, they valued participatory democracy as an important 
resource for theorizing and enacting social justice. Although Addams and Dewey do not 
use the contemporary language of deliberative democracy, they idealized democratic 
norms of political equality, inclusion, transparency, and reasonableness in much of their 
work. Communication and interactions that are governed by norms of equality and 
inclusion affirm the moral standing of each individual, and this inclusive participation is 
epistemically valuable because it counteracts the epistemic limitations inherent in human 
subjectivity, limitations that are exacerbated in intergroup social relations of power where 
there is oppression, privilege, and group-based social inequality. 
In this section of the chapter I highlight some of the problems that Addams and 
Dewey constructed this account of democracy as social ethics and responsible social 
inquiry, around resolving. While some of the specific problems they grappled with were 
unique to their own context in an emerging industrial capitalist society (e.g., migration of 
Blacks to Northern industrial cities in the aftermath of the Civil War, and immigration on 
a scale that is massive in comparison to today’s numbers), my claim here is that they 
identified group-based exclusion as the central ethical and epistemic problem for their 
society, and they were critical of institutions, norms, and practices that exacerbated the 
underlying identity-prejudiced stereotypes that enabled and sustained that exclusion. As 
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we will see, Addams and Dewey seem to appreciate a more relational account of the 
social group and of oppression, and this informed their conception of exclusion and their 
resulting vision for an inclusive social epistemology that I will discuss in further detail 
later in the chapter. 
Addams and Dewey envisioned democratic communication, properly understood, 
as a cooperative and inclusive practice and process of forming social knowledge, and this 
is motivated by their pragmatist appreciation for the socially situated nature of knowledge 
and the epistemic limitations of human subjectivity. The pragmatists rejected a spectator 
theory of knowledge, and this was a particularly prominent feature of Dewey’s 
epistemology. Dewey amusingly writes, “A standpoint which is nowhere in particular 
and from which things are not seen at a special angle is an absurdity” (Dewey, 1931, 
1996, EW 3. 14-15). So long as we remain spectators, we remain blind to the meaning of 
another’s experience.  
Traditional philosophy positively idealizes a disconnect from blindness (e.g., 
Descartes’ thinking self; Rawls’ veil of ignorance; Kant’s impartiality) and views the 
spectator’s stance as a means to escape our subjectivity. But on the pragmatist account, 
we are all spectators of the lives and meaning of others, and so objectivity is not had by 
detaching oneself from her ‘subjectivity’, but by immersing oneself in the subjectivities 
of the lives and projects of others with whom one shares associative life. Put simply, 
objectivity is made through inclusive intersubjectivity.  
Concerns with the epistemic limitations of subjectivity are a central feature of 
pragmatist standpoint social epistemology. William James explained it in terms of 
“blindness in human beings” and advocated the importance of moving towards an 
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understanding of the inner lives and meanings of others for forming more conclusive 
social knowledge (James, 1899/1983). James’s essay explores the epistemic limitations of 
human subjectivity, and moreover, reflects on the harms that arise from this, namely, a 
failure to appreciate the inner meaning and significance of others’ lives. Seigfried (1996) 
explains, “We…often misjudge the significance of lives different from our own…This 
congenital blindness toward the feelings of peoples and creatures different from ourselves 
is the greatest obstacle of the ethical life” (Seigfried, 1996, p. 222).98  
Addams and Dewey were particularly concerned that some of the consequences 
of their contemporary time exacerbated these epistemic limitations inherent in human 
subjectivity. Thus they constructed democracy as a kind of social ethics and social 
inquiry, what I am modeling a pragmatistic feminist social epistemology after in this 
project, with this problem in mind specifically. What I am calling their pragmatist 
feminist social epistemology attempted to grapple with these problems and protect and 
advance their rich notion of human organic interconnection and political agency in light 
of them.  
They believed that the conditions of the modern city under industrial capitalism 
introduced new social problems that were unique to their time. This evolving form of 
associate life brought with it new ethical challenges: “growing ranks of the working poor 
and unemployed”, the exploitation of workers, inadequate housing and labor conditions, 
and the challenges of immigration and relocation from rural to urban settings which 
included crime and social dislocation (Seigfried, 1999, 213). In response to this evolving 
social context, one’s understanding of her moral obligations must evolve from 
																																																								
     98 Seigfried has in mind William James’s (1899/1983) essay, “On Certain Blindness in Human Beings”.  
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individualistic morality to a wider acceptance of her social obligations to all of those with 
whom she is connected to under modern urban industrial life.99  
Most notably, Addams and Dewey believed that industrial economies increased 
the interdependency and interconnection of citizens. But they also saw that the division of 
labor and the complexity of society produce a façade of economic and social 
independence. It is important to note here that one of the ways that this façade of 
independence was sustained during this time was by Bootstrap theories of morality that 
explained poverty as a function of individual failure rather than a structural social 
problem.100  
Under conditions of gross economic inequality, elites have the power to retreat 
from the kinds of social experiences that are vital for responsible social inquiry into the 
industrial system that frames collective life. That is, those that benefit from industrial 
capitalism also enjoy the privilege of retreating from the suffering that this system 
produces for others. This class-based spatial stratification has both moral and epistemic 
dimensions and implications. Dewey explains the epistemic distortions that arise from the 
interaction of human subjectivity with increasing wealth divides in society: “[The 
aristocrats become ignorant of the needs and requirement of the many; they leave the 
many outside the pale with no real share in the commonwealth” (Dewey, 1888/1996, 
																																																								
     99 Addams was deeply influenced by John Stuart Mill’s thought. Louise Knight (2010) notes that 
Addams read the The Subjection of Women (1869) when it was reissued in 1885 with On Liberty (1859) 
(pp. 56-57). His thinking on the tyranny of tradition served as a basis for Addams’s pragmatist view that as 
social structures evolve, so must our moral thinking. Addams’s and Dewey’s pragmatist habit of 
questioning the origin and relevance of practices, norms, and mores echoes Mill’s concerns about the 
tyranny of tradition, that is, that we must examine the original basis for and continued relevance of 
traditions to ensure that they do not tyrannically impede human development and progress. Indeed, Addams 
proclaims in rhetorical fashion in Newer Ideals of Peace (1907/2005), “How far are we responsible when 
we allow custom to blind our eyes to the things that are wrong?” (p. 95). Addams also refers to his 
philosophy of the individual in a society, in her discussion of the individual as part of a social organism 
(Addams, 1902/2002, p. 117). 
    100 Addams is critical of this discourse of poverty. In Chapter 4 I develop this in further detail through 
analyzing her account of charity in Democracy and Social Ethics (1902/2002). 
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EW1. 242).101 In this passage Dewey draws a connection between the epistemic 
limitations of privilege and the exclusion of the oppressed from social life.  
Addams’s articulates more precisely the implications of this on our ethics. She 
explains that the patriotic sense of responsibility to one’s neighbors that is quite natural in 
a small village become lost in the great city: 
When the villager becomes a city resident and finds his next-door neighbors 
prosperous and comfortable, while the poor and overburdened live many blocks 
away where he would never see them at all, unless he were stirred by a spirit of 
social enterprise to go forth and find them in the midst of their meager living and 
their larger needs. (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 131) 
 
Hull House residents did not insulate themselves from the poor spatially or 
emotionally. Addams, residents, and visitors had epistemic access to the fact that, “all 
about [them were] men and women who have become unhappy in regard to their attitude 
towards the social order itself…All are increasingly anxious concerning their actual 
relations to the basic organization of society” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 6). In this way, 
Hull House was an “epistemological portal into urban life”, and one aim of the final 
chapter of the dissertation is to examine these practices and programs as a resource for 
communicative democracy (Hamington, 2001, p. 106).  
Addams and Dewey also both have a rich appreciation for how ingroup favoritism 
and prejudices problematize democratic inclusion and deliberative equality. Addams 
generally has in mind the social psychological phenomenon of ingroup favoritism in her 
																																																								
     101 It is worth citing some important passages in Dewey that remarkably parallel Young’s own 
descriptions of marginalization, powerlessness, and self-determination (Young, 1988). In non-democratic 
societies, “there are individuals who are not organs of the common will, who are outside of the political 
society in which they live, and are, in effect, aliens to that which should be their own commonwealth” 
(Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 237). Dewey is here referencing those who are, for some reason, not free to 
participate in the structuring of the social organism. The freedom is stifled when democracy slides into 
aristocracy. Even if political elites can and sometimes do act wisely for the common good, aristocracy fails 
for a second reason: it robs the individual of the possibility to find his or her own place in the social 
organism because it coercively mandates their place (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW1. 243). 
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discussions of “group moralities” (Addams, 1907). Addams and Dewey use the term 
“prejudice” quite loosely in their work to refer to ingroup favoritism, stereotypes, and 
prejudices as I have developed them in Chapter 2. However, there is reason to believe 
that when they do have in mind outgroup prejudice, they do not theorize it in isolation 
from the social and political historical patterns of oppression and domination that have 
produced the specific group divisions of her time. They invoke neither a personality nor a 
cognitive-error account of prejudice, but have a structural and relational one. 
Addams overarching thesis in Newer Ideals of Peace (1907) is that older ideals of 
peace – namely the virtues of group loyalty (i.e., ingroup favoritism), group identity 
formation by way of opposition to another group (i.e., outgroup prejudice), and peace by 
way of coercion – are inadequate for establishing peace in the changing American, and 
even global, context.102 This context is one where peoples of different ethnicities, 
religious traditions, and cultural mores are increasingly coming into more contact with 
one another and, in the case of the modern American city immigrant, living amongst each 
other. While perhaps necessary in earlier times. The older ideal of peace, “gets in the way 
and prevents the growth of that beneficent and progressive patriotism which we need for 
the understanding and healing of our current national difficulties” (Addams, 1907/2005, 
p. 132). 
Addams provides a host of examples where this patriotism of the clan harms 
social relations: the conception of the immigrant had by her contemporaries, the 
																																																								
     102 Addams (1907/2005) explains that “mutual hate” is often the basis for group affiliation, and that 
while this “tribal fealty” may have roots in fellowship, “When it is carried over into civilized life it 
becomes a social deterrent and an actual menace to social relations” (pp. 87-88). The attitude of the original 
Americans (she has in mind the Framers and early-American colonizers) persists in her contemporary time, 
to the detriment of democracy. She characterizes the framers as, “members of the newly conscious nation 
[who] considered all those who were outside as possible oppressors and enemies, and were loyal only 
towards those whom their imagination included as belonging to the national life” (p. 75). 
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conception of “the criminal” held by the police officer and politician, the view that the 
weak are justified in being dominated by the strong held by advocates of child labor, and 
the conceptions employers associations and trade unions have of one another. It is 
important to admit that in her discussions here, Addams largely talks of tribal loyalty in 
terms of ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice) 
and seems to depict these as functioning in a social context of relative social equality, and 
this is particularly the case in her discussion of labor relations.103 So here her thinking 
about prejudice does not move beyond the individualism of the cognitive-error ontology 
of prejudice I brought criticism against in Chapter 2.  
There is reason to believe that Addams was concerned with how some forms of 
ingroup favoritism were connected with particular prejudices, however; and also, that she 
saw that these disproportionately functioned to harm marginalized individuals in society. 
Explaining the group morality of the ‘original American’ towards the new wave of 
immigrants she writes that Americans have “not yet admitted them into real political 
fellowship” (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 22). She explains that this is rooted in “an attitude of 
contempt, of provincialism, this survival of the spirit of the conqueror toward an inferior 
people” (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 29).104  
Addams sees that stigmatizing attitudes towards immigrants are more than a mere 
result of flawed cognitive processes. She understands that they are situated in structural 
relations of power. Although she does not invoke the language of prejudice here, she 
appreciates that the present power relations in society are in some way functioning to 
																																																								
     103 See especially Addams discussion of labor relations in Newer Ideals of Peace (1907/2005).  
     104 Seigfried notes that Addams is “far ahead of her time in her awareness of her own class and ethnic 
privilege and in her insights into how such privilege subtly undermines the dignity and effectiveness of the 
poor and working classes and less favored ethnic groups” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xii). 
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inform the content of those prejudices and determine which groups will be targeted and 
harmed through them.  
For example, in “Our National Self-Righteousness” (1933), Addams discusses her 
concerns with “the spirit of superiority” held by so many original Americans (In Elshtain, 
2002). And in “Americanization” (1919), she proclaims that the collective stigma against 
aliens in the United States is “particularly stupid” (In Elshtain, 2002, p. 246). Seigfried 
characterizes Addams as having spent a life filled with “unceasing efforts to explain the 
contributions of diverse ethnic groups to an American public that wanted to treat them as 
an undifferentiated underclass” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xxxv). Addams often depicts the Hull 
House residents as initially prejudiced towards the neighbors, and she uses stories of 
these encounters between residents and neighbors to dismantle some of the popular 
pejorative prejudices of the poor that were held by upper- and middle-class “original” 
Americans.105 She does not make excuses for their prejudices or explain them away as 
ingroup/outgroup processes, but rather, condemns them and corrects them.   
Addams’s criticisms of group morality are insightful because they point to a basic 
incompatibility between ingroup and outgroup biases and democratic communication. 
The morality of group loyalty (i.e., ingroup and outgroup biases) is a morality of force, 
rule by power and coercion. Addams admits that even some of the labor unions, which 
she is generally charitable towards in her descriptions, are often hasty to wage war and 
slow to diplomacy.  
Addams and Dewey were remarkably ahead of their time in their understanding of 
the impact on democratic social relations, of both the more general and universal 
																																																								
     105 See for example Addams’s discussion of the fictional charity worker in the chapter entitled, 
“Charitable Relations” in Democracy and Social Ethics (1902/2002). 
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cognitive processes of ingroup and outgroup biases, and of the socially informed 
processes of identity-prejudiced stereotypes. This is particularly evident in Dewey’s 
“Racial Prejudice and Friction” (1922). Unlike many of his contemporaries, Dewey sees 
race as a social construct and explains prejudice in terms of a political and social history 
of social relations.  
Dewey situates the roots of racial prejudice in the universal cognitive tendency in 
humans to fear what is new and strange (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 245). He seems to 
have in mind here, the concepts of ingroup and outgroup bias and stereotypes. He 
explains them in terms of pre-cognitive habits, “a spontaneous aversion which influences 
and distorts subsequent judgments” (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 243). 
But Dewey does not resort to the cognitive error account of prejudice held by his 
contemporaries, that prejudices are reducible to universal cognitive processes of hasty 
generalization (what he calls the popular “intellectualist” view). Rather, he seems to 
profoundly appreciate the social, economic, and political factors that give content and 
social life to particular prejudices about particular social groups. Race prejudices do not 
exist in a society in an egalitarian way, that is, they do not equally disadvantage all 
groups. Rather, they are conceived and nurtured in contexts of inequality and oppression. 
Like John Turner, Dewey seems to take it that prejudices do not themselves cause 
oppression, but rather, they are a result and reflection of problematic intergroup social 
relations of power. 
On this framework, Dewey would have worried that a more powerful, more 
dominant group can introduce, frame, and maintain the negatively-valenced stereotypes 
of marginalized groups as a function of maintain social power. Dewey seems to 
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appreciate the fact that negatively-valenced stereotypes of identified outgroups often 
function to justify the existing relations of power and social inequality in both the minds 
of the dominant class and of the marginalized.106 As I have shown, Addams too seems to 
appreciate this on some level. While she speaks of the problematic patriotism of the clan 
as a universal human tendency, she does not see its negative effects as egalitarian. Groups 
who occupy positions of social, economic, and political power influence and give social 
life to the content of the prejudices of groups who lack power.  
Dewey defends a rather unpopular view of race at the time that gives insight into 
how he thought about social groups.107 He explains as a matter of scientific fact that races 
are not biologically distinct categories, writing,  
Race is an abstract idea; according to science it is largely a mythical idea, since all 
peoples now powerful in the world are highly mixed. But mankind requires 
something concrete, tangible, visible, audible to react against. Race in its popular 
usage is merely a name given to a large number of phenomena which strike 
attention because they are different. (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 246) 
 
Addams also endorses this view, writing in the early pages of Newer Ideals of 
Peace (1907),  
Early associations and affections were not based so much on ties of blood as upon 
that necessity for defense against the hostile world outside which made the life of 
every man in a tribe valuable to every other man. The fact of blood was, so to 
speak, an accident. The moral code grew out of solidarity of emotion and action 
essential to the life of all. (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 6) 
 
While Dewey sees that “scientifically, the concept of race is largely a fiction”, he 
also has an appreciation for the “practical reality” that this social categorizing has had on 
																																																								
     106 For example, Dewey mentions the large sums of money African Americans spend on “devices to take 
the kinks out of their hair” to assimilate, demonstrating an appreciation for this complex social process 
(Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 246). 
     107 Indeed, Dewey’s lecture, “Racial Prejudice and Friction” was given in 1922 at the height of a 
eugenics movement among academics in the U.S. The 1915 World’s Fair in San Francisco hosted a 
“Eugenics Booth” and the Museum of Man celebrated its 1915 opening in San Diego with an exhibit of 30 
busts that purported to demonstrate seven distinct and hierarchical racial categories (See San Diego 
Museum of Man, 2017).  
150 
 
some groups (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 251). Gregory Pappas explains that Dewey 
saw that “each racial prejudice has its own particular history and unique set of causes” 
(Pappas, 1996, p. 54). Dewey believes that it can be “safely concluded” that the political 
factors are the most responsible “for converting antipathy to the foreign into definite 
racial friction” (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 249).  
What is perhaps most striking about Dewey’s analysis of race prejudice and 
friction is his appreciation for the ways that political opportunists exploit the universal 
roots of race prejudice, the fear of what is new and strange. What has its roots in growth 
and self-preservation is exploited by humans “as an efficacious way of accentuating the 
antagonism between groups” (Pappas, 1996, p. 53). Dewey later writes in an address at 
the 23rd Annual Gathering of the NAACP in 1932, “…those who want the greatest profits 
and those who want the monopoly, power, influence, that money gives, can get it only by 
creating suspicion, dislike and division among the mass of the people” (Dewey, 
1932/1996, LW 6. 230).  
Dewey’s sense is that political elites have and continue to introduce chaos and 
division among the public so as to break down democratic social relations and enable for 
the persistence of aristocracy. They prey on “race, color and creed, and…other things…to 
divide people in order that a few may have a monopoly of privilege, power and 
influence” (Dewey, 1932/1996, LW 6. 230). Because they divide so as to conquer, he 
suggests here that the resolution for this breakdown is, “a cooperative economic and 
social order” (Dewey, 1932/1996, LW 6. 230). As we will see in Chapter 4, many of the 
cooperative and democratic social relations Dewey has in mind were embodied through 
Hull House activities and programs. 
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5. Democracy as Social Ethics  
 
Addams and Dewey’s account of social inquiry, and what I am modeling a 
pragmatistic feminist social epistemology after in this project, is critical of narrow 
constructions of deliberation-as-argument, idealizations of impartiality, and veritistic 
constructions of knowledge. Recall from the earlier discussion that on Addams and 
Dewey’s framework, social inquiry as I have developed it in the Chapter is valuable 
because it protects and fulfills political agency. But it is also valuable because it produces 
better knowledge.  
Like Young, the pragmatists were suspicious of the claim that one could observe 
and theorize from an impartial standpoint. The epistemic limitations of human 
subjectivity necessitate a kind of inclusive social standpoint epistemology for Addams 
and Dewey. No individual knows from an impartial standpoint nor has perfect or 
complete epistemic access to a fact or a truth. 
Addams believes that the only appropriate response to an acknowledgement of 
human subjectivity and interdependence is an epistemic openness to inquire into the 
problems that face those with whom we fail to acknowledge under individualistic 
morality. In closing Democracy and Social Ethics, her most notable defense of social 
ethics, Addams points to the epistemic and moral implications of her relational ontology 
in light of the problems of industrial capitalism:  
We are all involved in this political corruption, and as members of the community 
stand indicted. This is the penalty of democracy, - that we are bound to move 
forward or retrograde together. None of us can stand aside; our feet are mired in 
the same soil, and our lungs breathe the same air. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 112) 
 
Thus individuals who enjoy political, economic, and social power in societies 
where there are group divisions, social group hierarchies based in inequitable relations of 
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power, harmful prejudices towards more marginalized social groups, and resulting spatial 
stratification have an obligation to seek out meaningful social relations with diverse 
Others. Addams was sensitive to how class, race, and gender could limit one’s 
knowledge of social problems, and also of how it could limit one’s epistemic and moral 
standing in a community. Epistemic responsibility in this context requires unveiling 
faulty assumptions of objectivity and privileged social perspectives, what Young has 
articulated in terms of “cultural imperialism” (Young, 1988). 
Addams came to realize that privilege enables for people to avoid encountering 
the poor and the powerless, and that power enables for people to avoid taking seriously 
the knowledge claims of the poor and powerless. Yet to get to a full understanding of a 
social system, one must consider the totality of subjective experiences of that social 
system. Addams explains, “No one so poignantly realizes the failures in the social 
structure as the man at the bottom, who has been most directly in contact with those 
failures and has suffered the most” (Addams, 1910, p. 183). Thus privilege and power 
exacerbate the epistemic limitations of one’s subjectivity and enable for social ignorance, 
as well as the perpetuation of social myths about marginalized groups. 
Gaining epistemic access to how diverse others experience shared systems of 
associative life (e.g., industrialism) is a necessary requirement of evaluating those 
systems of associative organization.108 In fact, Judy Whipps (2004, 127) explains that 
Addams’s “stress on the importance of diversity and pluralism” is rooted in pragmatist 
concern that “multiple viewpoints are essential to the process of philosophical 
epistemology.” Building from Addams, Whipps characterizes knowing on the pragmatist 
																																																								
     108 For a discussion of Addams’s social epistemology in relation to recent literature in standpoint 
epistemology, see Reginal Leffers’s (1993) paper, “Pragmatists Jane Addams and John Dewey Inform the 
Ethic of Care”, especially page 70. 
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model as: (1) a social endeavor (2) that is experience dependent and (3) always 
conditional in that it rests on multiple voices which are always being introduced. 
The emphasis on responsible social inquiry is a central feature of Addams’s social 
ethics. She proclaims in the first pages of Democracy and Social Ethics, “We are under a 
moral obligation in choosing our experiences, since the result of those experiences must 
ultimately determine our understanding of life” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 8). Addams 
assumes that a wide range of experiences with diverse others will result in sympathy and 
habits of care towards them.109 She sees this resultant sympathy as the basis for the health 
of the social organism and “the foundation and guarantee of Democracy” (Addams, 
1902/2002, p.7).  
Dewey understands what I am calling “social inquiry” in terms of a “method of 
cooperative intelligence” whereby intelligence gets “socialized” (Dewey, 1935/1996, LW 
11. 39). He explains that democracy requires far more than political machinery like 
voting110 and the protection of individual rights, but cooperative and inclusive knowledge 
practices that permeate all of society.111 Here Dewey connects this social epistemology to 
his account of political agency, explaining that the use of these cooperative processes of 
																																																								
     109 See Hamington (2009), especially Chapter 4, where he develops Addams’s belief in the potential of 
genuine embodied encounters with different others for stimulating affective and active habits of care.  
     110 While voting is an important democratic institution, Dewey believes that it merely acknowledges the 
current pulse of the organism and marks an open-ended decision in the life of the society. Dewey values the 
quality of public discussion more than the consensus had through voting. See especially Anderson, 2006, 
who explains, “On Dewey’s model, votes and talk reinforce one another, the votes helping to insure the 
government officials take citizens’ verbal feedback seriously, the talk helping to define and articulate the 
message conveyed by votes” (p. 14). See also Pappas, 2012, who explains that for Dewey, public 
discussion aims for “the amelioration of a particular shared problem that affects everyone to different 
degrees” (p. 66).  
     111 See Anderson 2006, who explains, “Dewey stressed that for democracy to work, it was not enough to 
simply institute legal arrangements such as representation and periodic elections. Culture had to change 
too, so the citizens at large, interacting with one another in society, welcome diversity and discussion, and 
take an experimental attitude toward social arrangements” (p. 14).  
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intelligence is the means by which to develop the capacities of each individual for the 
health of the social organism.  
In social inquiry, agents move from disagreement towards universalization 
through public deliberation about knowledge claims that have been put forward as 
“candidates for universalization” (Droege, 2002, 175). Much like in the natural sciences 
and in the design approach I developed in Chapter 1 of the dissertation, better knowledge 
is produced when the process is one of cooperative and inclusive, ongoing dialogue and 
when the conclusions these processes yield are viewed as experimental and open-ended. 
Another benefit of this open-endedness is that it insulates knowledge practices from a 
false consensus.  
In order for social inquiry to be democratic, it must be possible for individuals of 
all backgrounds to bring forth knowledge claims, and those claims must be 
acknowledged and validated by the community and then fairly and collectively 
interrogated. Dewey takes it that disagreement in this process can often be a sign that the 
parties to dispute are not similarly situated, that some factor from one of their standpoints 
has failed to have been considered in the assertion of the fact (Droege, 2002, p. 175). This 
resonates with Bohman’s point that when a group in society fails to get a hearing in the 
community, this is an indication that there is some kind of faction in society that begs 
address. Such factions are not remedied on an institutional level through laws and 
policies, but in social relations themselves. 
The practice of bringing forth knowledge claims for public consideration is 
educative and potentially preference-transformative for citizens, and it is central to 
Dewey’s conception of political agency. Participation in democratic forms of life 
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cultivate what Dewey calls ‘the scientific morale’ which he characterizes in Freedom and 
Culture (1939) as,  
…[A] willingness to hold belief in suspense, ability to doubt until evidence is 
obtained; willingness to go where evidence points instead of putting first a 
personally preferred conclusion; ability to hold ideas in solution and use them as 
hypotheses to be tested instead of as dogmas to be asserted; and (possibly the 
most distinctive of all) enjoyment of new fields for inquiry and of new problems. 
(Dewey, 1939/1996, LW 13. 166) 
 
Another important feature of Addams and Dewey’s understanding of social 
inquiry is that it challenges the tendency in academic philosophy to divorce epistemology 
from ethics. Addams and Dewey would have agreed with Fricker that, “It does seem…a 
pity that ethics has not traditionally taken our epistemic conduct into its remit” (Fricker, 
2007, p. 2). The connection between our epistemic and ethical lives is poignantly 
conveyed in Addams’s objections to “shutting one’s self away from that half of life” that 
struggles and suffers. Here she explains that such a retreat from the knowledge of others 
is, “to live out but half the humanity to which we have been born heir and to use but half 
our faculties” (Addams, 1893a, p. 2).  
 
6. Conclusion: Intersecting Voices 
 
Like Young, Addams and Dewey were critical of epistemological norms of 
impartiality, consensus, and correctness, norms that are assumed in narrow constructions 
of democratic participation (e.g., deliberation-as-argument). They were also concerned 
that social inequality and oppression and domination could produce false and coercive 
consensuses. Because of this, they rejected conceptions of knowledge that idealized 
impartiality, and favored a standpoint social epistemology instead. They did not see 
democratic communication as a mechanism for arriving at correct answers, but rather, 
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envisioned democracy as “a community of critical inquiry” much more akin to the design 
approach I developed in Chapter 1 than to a veritistic social epistemology (Festenstein, 
1997, p. 79).   
As in design, citizens must first identity the various stakeholders to a problem and 
consult them as epistemic resources for identifying and articulating it’s various 
dimensions. During that process we may come to understand the problem in new ways. 
Much like deliberations in engineering design problems, this inclusive participation is 
instrumental to citizens’ self-development because it creates space for the expression of 
one’s political agency and it fosters the social conditions for citizens to nurture their 
political agency through discourse with others.    
As in design where there are limited resources, time constraints, and competing 
obligations to stakeholders, deliberations must be inclusive of the various stakeholders to 
the problem, and those stakeholders must be seen as both an epistemic resources and 
moral authorities for designing and evaluating possible resolutions for the problem. This 
is because as in design, the uniquely correct solution or remedy rarely just presents itself. 
When the problem-solving communicative exercise is framed as a cooperative rather than 
an antagonistic one, this can motivate people to consider the perspectives of others and be 
open to reconsidering their own perspectives in light of that hearing. If it comes down to 
deciding between two possible remedies, deliberators determine which alternative is 
better than the other. Group processes of defining the “better” and “worse” alternatives 
will inevitably bring to the forefront values and assumptions that themselves can become 
subject to deliberations in the decision-making process. The language of “correctness” in 
such group processes is out of place.  
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Design thinking relies on listening and engagement with stakeholders, and thus it 
can be empathetic. It relies on collaborative brainstorming for potential remedies and 
discussion that weighs the various pros and cons of these potential remedies for the 
various stakeholders considered. In this sense, design thinking can be cooperative and 
inclusive. It also involves the eventual implementation of the selected “better” remedy, 
and thus it is active. It frames this remedy through the scientific attitude. The remedy is 
seen as a temporary and intermediary solution, one that we are comfortable continuing to 
monitor for shortcomings or when newly effected stakeholders or problems emerge from 
the evolving systems that the remedy operates in. Thus design thinking is critically 
reflective, fallibilist, experimental, open-ended, process- rather than production-aimed, 
and systems-oriented.  
As Addams and Dewey envision it, democracy is about a way of living together 
and a way of knowing one another, and thus, it requires habits conducive to that aim. 
Pappas suggests that these habits include, “the virtue of openness, with a willingness to 
test and revise”, “a certain sensitivity to context”, “sensitivity to whose interest counts in 
one’s community”, patience and an ability to not always expect “a quick fix or result”, 
and an ability to “embrace uncertainty” (Pappas, 2012, p. 72).  
I think Addams and Dewey have the beginnings of something like this in their 
philosophy of democracy and practice of it at Hull House, and I introduce this in Chapter 
4 as a political virtue of sympathetic inquiry. In this chapter I also look to the programs at 
Hull House, as well as to Addams’s writings about Hull House, for examples of practices 
and norms that attempted to challenge the intergroup cognitive processes that fuel 
identity-prejudiced communicative inequality and to construct genuinely inclusive 
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deliberative spaces that protect, restore and nurture the deliberative standing of all 
individuals.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
DEEPENING COMMUNICATIVE DEMOCRACY: WIDENING INGROUPS AND 
RECONSTRUCTING THE COLLECTIVE SOCIAL IMAGINATION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3 of the dissertation I aimed to show that Addams and Dewey were 
deeply concerned with various forms of group-based participatory exclusion in order to 
set the stage for the fourth and final chapter of the dissertation. In this Chapter I will turn 
to their thought as well as the activities, programs, and practices at Hull House as a 
resource for the two projects I identified for communicative democracy when I opened 
Chapter 3: (1) imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of having 
named and acknowledged the presence of communicatively structured deliberative 
inequalities and (2) strategizing communicative practices and norms of interaction that 
can themselves challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes, work towards reconstructing 
the collective social imagination that houses them, and mitigate their harmful effects on 
individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.  
Like Young, Addams and Dewey endorsed a broader understanding of 
deliberation and democratic communication than traditional deliberative theorists. As 
Dewey powerfully explains, “argument alone breeds misunderstanding and fixes 
prejudices” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2.91). For Addams and Dewey, democratic 
communication transcends argument. It involves habits that “go beyond the intellectual 
capacities associated traditionally with reason and logic” (Pappas, 2012, p. 61).  
Modes of communication and interaction like play, storytelling, and even activism 
are important facilitators of justice. Addams and Dewey believed that these types of 
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practices were a means for reducing prejudices and widening “ingroups”, and to borrow 
the language of Young, “for speaking across difference” (Young, 1997b). Hull House 
was the experimental locus for this investigation, and for this reason, it is the subject of 
this final chapter of this dissertation.  
Hull House activities and social life embodied the broadened account of 
democratic communication that Young idealizes, and Addams exemplifies methods of 
forming social knowledge responsibly in intergroup contexts that are based in social 
relations of power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social 
inequality. Thus there is good reason to look to their work for resources for 
communicative democracy, specifically for imagining new ways of relating and 
communicating with one another that appreciates the complex ways that intergroup 
processes of ingroup and outgroup biases and identity-prejudiced stereotypes function in 
communicative contexts to deteriorate deliberative standing.  
Recall from Chapters 2 and 3 that I contrasted ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., 
ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice) from identity-prejudiced stereotypes. 
Borrowing from Fricker, I initially defined an identity-prejudiced stereotype as, “a widely 
held disparaging association between a social group and one or more attribute, where this 
association embodies a generalization that displays some (typically, epistemically 
culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment” 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 35). Identity-prejudiced stereotypes have origins in the universal 
cognitive tendency towards ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup prejudice). But as I developed in Chapter 2, they should be clarified from these 
intergroup processes in two senses: (1) they operate in a specific social context of social 
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inequality between two or more social groups, and (2) they function in those intergroup 
relations to sustain the dominance or elite status of one group over the other(s). That is, 
identity-prejudiced stereotypes are unique from universal, cognitive tendencies of 
ingroup and outgroup bias in that they target a particular social group and are a result and 
reflection of intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression, privilege, and 
group-based social inequality.  
The chapter begins (Section 2) by looking to some of the Hull House 
programming and activities as examples of democratic social inquiry in practice. In this 
discussion I specifically focus on Addams’s appreciation for Play and Education in 
democratic relations, and how this emphasis informed her leadership in Hull House 
programs and activities. I use this discussion as a way of developing and demonstrating 
the conception of social inquiry that is at the heart of the pragmatist feminist social 
epistemology of communicative democracy that I introduced in Chapter 3. Recall that in 
Chapter 3, I explained social inquiry as, “the cooperative and inclusive social practices 
and processes that promote social knowledge”, and I anticipated this in my discussion of 
the design approach in Chapter 1. As will demonstrate, Addams was drawn to these 
forms of human interaction because of their potential for combatting intergroup processes 
of ingroup and outgroup bias and widening ingroups.  
Section 3 of the Chapter introduces Addams’s method of sympathetic inquiry as a 
regulatory mechanism for social inquiry. Addams believes that Hull House neighbors, 
people from diverse immigrant populations, could widen their perceived ingroups and 
enjoy meaningful social life with one another because of a spirit of sympathetic inquiry. 
Similarly, Hull House residents who were from more privileged social standpoints than 
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immigrant neighbors were able to have responsible and meaningful epistemic encounters 
with neighbors because they practiced sympathetic inquiry.112 In this sense, sympathetic 
inquiry can function to both widen one’s ingroup and to combat identity-prejudiced 
stereotypes about marginalized citizens, the immigrant, the prostitute, and more 
generally, the urban poor.  
Because of socially and economically based spatial stratification in the modern 
industrial city, the reach of Hull House programs and activities was limited to neighbors 
who lived near Hull House and to progressive social elites who visited there. In Section 4 
of the Chapter, I demonstrate how Addams makes use of her writings about Hull House 
to reach a wider public in order to combat identity-prejudiced stereotypes about the poor, 
and to educate this wider public in the method of sympathetic inquiry itself.  
Addams does not develop sympathetic inquiry as a political virtue, but she does 
introduce it often in her discussions of political virtues that she is critical of for failing to 
enact, or blatantly contradicting, democracy as social ethics. Thus there are some benefits 
to thinking about Addams’s method of sympathetic inquiry in a virtue ethics framework. 
I consider how constructing sympathetic inquiry as a type of hybrid epistemic-moral 
political virtue might be particularly useful for combatting communicatively structured 
deliberative inequality and for communicative democracy more generally.  
 
2. Communicative Democracy in Practice at Hull House 
 
Dewey called Hull House as “a social clearing house”, a place where there was “a 
mixing people up with each other…under conditions which will promote their getting 
																																																								
     112 This is especially evident in Addams’s reflections Twenty Years at Hull House (1910). 
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acquainted with the best side of each other” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 90). His 
characterization of it paints a vibrant picture that is worth including in full here.  
It is not merely a place where ideas and beliefs may be exchanged, not merely in 
the arena of formal discussion – for argument alone breeds misunderstanding and 
fixes prejudices – but in ways where ideas are incarnated in human form and 
clothed with the winning grace of personal life. Classes for study may be 
numerous, but all are regarded as modes of bringing people together, or doing 
away with barriers of caste, or class, or race, or type of experience that keep 
people from real communion with each other. (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 90)  
 
Play performed a vital role in establishing social conditions for people from 
diverse backgrounds to get acquainted in this way, “with the best side of each other”. 
Addams believed that play was an important mechanism for creating community. Hull 
House hosted a variety of social events and social clubs that were facilitative of play, and 
the imaginative processes of play were vital to Addams’s philosophy of education.  
Addams was deeply sympathetic of young people living in the modern industrial 
city, which seemed to be deprived of space for play.113 Unlike earlier forms of work on 
the homestead, industrial labor provides no outlet for expression, play, or creativity. 
Addams values play for a host of reasons. First, play provides joy to its participants and 
offers an escape from the monotony of factory work. Second, observing the Play of 
children can be a source of great pleasure for members of the community. The vibrant 
imagination of the child “reaffirm[s] the beauty and joy in the world” and can be “a 
wellspring of refreshment to a jaded city” (Addams, in Elshain, p. 416). 
																																																								
     113 Addams applies this sympathetic view to an analysis of restless and problematic youth in the city. 
She explains that the thrill of being chased by the “coppers” among urban boys is not unlike the “the 
practice of country boys who go forth in squads to set traps for rabbits or to round up a [rac]coon” 
(Addams, 1902/2002, p. 26). Both are expressions of the spirit and restlessness of youth. Here she draws 
attention to the shared desires and needs of the original American and the immigrant, but the different 
social structures that frame those desires and needs.  
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Third, play is particularly valuable for marginalized people because it generates a 
space where one can, “be at ease in a ‘world’,” with others who may be different from 
them (Lugones, 1987, p. 12). María Lugones draws attention to the fact that marginalized 
people must often travel to worlds where they cannot be at ease, because in those worlds, 
they must be constantly be subjected to the “arrogant perception” of those who occupy 
positions of privilege within the existing social relations of domination and oppression 
(Frye, 1983). Arrogant perception imagines the Other as for him, or as Frye explains, 
“organize[s] everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests” (Frye, 
1983, p. 67).  
Play, however, makes new worlds for people to share. Lugones is clear that it is 
an attitude of playfulness, not the game itself, that generates this social space. Much like 
the pragmatist feminist conception of social knowledge, playful activities are 
experimental and open to surprise. They have no rules, or at least, have no fixed rules that 
are sacred. In the world that is generated through playful activity, individuals interact 
intentionally and creatively, but they “are not wedded to a particular way of doing things” 
or to playing a particular role competently (Lugones, 1987, p. 16).  
And fourth and finally, play generates a world where oppressed people who are 
regularly subjected to the identity-prejudiced stereotypes of the collective social 
imagination, can be at ease. But it also generates a new world where people who occupy 
different positions in structural relations of inequality, can discover one another and one 
another’s worlds, where arrogant perception is transported into loving perception. 
Lugones depicts this as epistemically valuable particularly for combatting privileged 
people’s epistemologies of ignorance:  
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We discover that there are “worlds” in which those who are the victims of 
arrogant perception are really subjects, lively beings, resistors, constructors of 
visions even though in the mainstream construction they are animated only by the 
arrogant perceived and are pliable, foldable, file-awayable, classifiable. (Lugones, 
1987, p. 18) 
 
Besides this social value, Addams also sees that play has epistemic and social 
value. Play is a facilitator of the imaginative life. It promotes and trains participants in the 
skills necessary for social inquiry. Addams suspects this is the reason that so many artists 
are preoccupied with trying to recapture the spirit of youth (Addams, in Elshain, p. 417). 
She celebrates the diverse group of immigrants’ children who play with one another at 
Hull House, demonstrating another reason why play is both epistemically and socially 
valuable. Play with diverse others gives citizens opportunities for imagining possibilities 
with others as well as for imagining oneself into the lives and experiences of other 
individuals’ worlds. Play cultivates the imaginative capacities that are epistemically 
valuable for imagining creative resolutions for social problems in social inquiry. It also 
gives participants practice at considering the contributions of diverse socially situated 
knowers.   
Hull House responded to the deprivation of space for play and time for recreation 
in the modern industrial life through establishing various forums for play (Addams, 
1893b).114 Besides organizing adult social clubs, Hull House started a kindergarten and 
hosted boys and girls clubs for teenagers. They added an art gallery in 1891, a 
playground of almost a full acre in 1892, a gymnasium that included rooms for men’s 
																																																								
     114 In “The School as Social Centre”, Dewey (1902/1996, MW 2. 91-2) specifically points to Hull House 
activities as an example of how to realize democratic education through play. Dewey remarks that he 
“sometimes think[s] that recreation is the most overlooked and neglected of all ethical forces”, explaining 
further that, “there is no force more likely to count in the general reform of social conditions than the 
practical recognition that in recreation there is a positive moral influence which it is the duty of the 
community to take hold of and direct.” 
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clubs and a “diet kitchen” for providing food to the poor and sick in 1893, a club house in 
1898, and a theater with a coffee house in 1899 (Knight, 2010).115 At its peak, Hull 
House involved over thirteen buildings over an entire city block. Further additions 
included a swimming pool, art studio, music school, library, labor museum, drama 
groups, and a boarding club for girls (Knight, 2010). 
Addams’s appreciation for the value of play, game, and recreation in a democratic 
society developed out of her intellectual relationship with George Herbert Mead (1863-
1931). Mead came to the University of Chicago in 1894 by invitation from Dewey 
shortly after Dewey’s appointment there (Hamington, 2009, p. 38). Like Dewey, Mead 
enjoyed an intellectual friendship with Addams and spent time visiting and lecturing at 
Hull House.116 
Mead does not develop an ethics in his writings, but his general way of thinking 
about the self as a social process echoes Dewey’s conception of “individuality” (i.e., 
political agency) has ethical implications. He introduced a social interaction theory of the 
self, and this is a foundational principle of identity that is assumed by social identity 
																																																								
     115 While many of the activities at Hull House were important features of social life in the neighborhood, 
the playground project at Hull House is worth mentioning specifically. At the time of its inception, the 
notion of a playground was a relatively new idea that became widely publicized due to Jane Addams’s 
influence, which initiated what sociologists refer to as “the playground movement”. Addams served as a 
vice-president of the Playground Association of American (PAA) when it was formed in 1907 and 
furthered the movement more still with her defense of the value of play in her 1909 publication of The 
Spirit of Youth and City Streets. The PAA went on to implement many of the first urban playgrounds in 
America. Hull House’s playground boasted open space of almost an acre, sandboxes, swings, outdoor game 
areas and play structures, and indoor play areas. See Frost, 2010. 
     116 For an excellent historical account of their relationship, see Deegan (1988, pp. 118-121). Deegan 
explains that Mead and his wife, Helen, became involved in Hull-House almost immediately after their 
arrival in Chicago. Mead was an advocate for women’s rights, and wrote significantly on “issues directly 
related to Addams’s interests; education, war, democracy, labor, immigrants, social settlements, and the 
relation between theory and practice” (p. 106). Besides a list of social programs the Mead worked on with 
Addams, Deegan also provides an in depth analysis of how Addams’s thought and practice influenced 
Mead. She cites correspondences in which Mead thanks Addams for her “very remarkable paper”, 
compliments her on her recent publication of Twenty Years at Hull House, and offers a charitable review of 
Newer Ideals of Peace. In the last of these, Mead criticizes some of the logical organization of Addams’s 
argument, but nevertheless validates and reiterates Addams’s argument, “that government must reflect the 
will of the people instead of being an arm of repression” (p. 119). 
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theorists as well as by Young. For Mead, the self “arises in the process of social 
experience and activity”, that is, it is a product of social interaction (Mead, Mind, Self 
and Society, 1934, 135; cited in Keith, 333).117 Heather Keith explains, “Mead’s 
commitment is to a vision of the self as always growing within a wider ecology of others 
– a web of relationships – while still retaining the uniqueness of an individual organism” 
(Keith, 1999, p. 333). Because society emerges from the self, which is always understood 
in relation with other selves, there arises from this interdependency an obligation to 
attend to the social institutions and social practices that frame the formation and 
cultivation of that self.  
Like Mead, Addams saw Play and Game as vital parts of nurturing political 
agency. Play and Game are important social process for the developing social self 
because they stimulate the process of thinking and feeling in terms of others. Young 
children engage in role-playing when they play ‘house’ or ‘cops and robbers’, an activity 
that involves taking on the attitudes and perspectives of others. Game, a more advanced 
form of play, introduces an entire complex system of social interaction that frames these 
various forms of role-playing. At this higher level of social interaction, individuals begin 
to think of themselves (or their role) as parts of a whole, anticipating the reactions of 
others and envisioning their role in the establishment, maintenance, and evolution of the 
system.  
It is important to note that when Addams and Mead conceive of Game as a more 
advanced form of Play, they do not have in mind the strategic, rational-choice conception 
																																																								
     117 See especially Keith (1999). Keith argues that Mead’s conception of the social self serves as an 
important psychological foundation for politicizing an ethics of care.  
168 
 
of Game advanced within Game Theory.118 In her descriptions of children doing Play, 
Addams avoids describing it in agonistic terms like “contest, winning, losing, 
battling”.119 Unlike the playful attitude, Game assumes rules, “rules that inspire 
hostility”, the importance of competence, and the spirit of “a conqueror, and imperialist” 
(ibid.). This form of play is hostile to the cultivation of cooperative skills. And it is the 
antithesis of loving perception among differently socially situated individuals.  
Play was a vital part of Addams’s social ethics because it created safe worlds for 
differently situated individuals to see themselves as political equals. It also enabled for 
people to cultivate the imaginative, creative, and cooperative skills necessary for social 
inquiry. Hamington argues that Addams extends Mead’s conception of play much further 
than he himself does (Hamington, 2009). She sees that the social interactions and 
imaginative processes that occur in children’s play are themselves “the basis for a 
democratic citizenry that can sympathetically understand diverse community members” 
(Hamington, 2009, p. 153).120 
I wish to highlight two additional features of Addams’s social ethics that are 
brought forward in this discussion of Play at Hull House (and that might be a valuable 
lesson for contemporary community-based organizations). First, Hull House residents 
resisted the urge to paternalistically coordinate Play at Hull House. Addams explains that 
																																																								
     118 It is outside of the scope of this project to provide a developed critique of Game Theory. However, it 
should be noted that as a kind of social choice theory, Game Theory is subject to a number of the critiques 
of a preference aggregative model of democracy that I outlined in Chapter 1 of the dissertation.   
     119 See Lugones, 1987, who uses these descriptors in her account of agonistic play (p. 15). 
     120 See especially, Hamington, 2009, who explains, “Play is the great social stimulus, and it is the prime 
motive which unites children and draws them into comradeship. A true democratic relation and ease of 
acquaintance is found only among the children in a typical factory community because they readily 
overcome differences of language, tradition and religion, which form insuperable barriers to adults. ‘It is in 
play that nature reveals her anxious care to discover men to each other’ and this happy and important task 
children unconsciously carry forward day by day with all the excitement and joy of co-ordinate activity. 
They accomplish that which elders could not possibly do, and they render a most important service to the 
community” (p. 153; citing Addams, 1905, p. 132). 
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the organizing and running of adult spaces for Play was itself “a neighborhood affair” 
(Addams, 1893b). Second, this insulated them from introducing the kinds of agonistic 
Games of the conqueror. The conquering player destroys the types of worlds where one 
can be at ease with herself in communion with differently socially situated others.  
Addams’s philosophy of education emphasizes the significance of Play as I have 
developed it here. Like her picture of Play, Addams believed education was valuable 
insofar as it prepared citizens for responsible social inquiry through cultivating skills in 
“cooperative intelligence, contextual relevance, connected learning, and imaginative 
exploration” (Hamington, 2009, p. 151).  
Addams is critical of the conquering attitude within many of the adult education 
programs made available to immigrants and the poor. She explains that while these 
programs may equip some with the tools of reading and writing, it “gives them no real 
participation in the industrial and social life with which they come in contact” (Addams, 
1899). It is important to note, that Addams connects this failure to provide the kinds of 
educational opportunities that might prepare and enable people for participation, with the 
identity-prejudiced stereotypes of educators (i.e., social elites) towards their students (i.e., 
Hull House neighbors who were immigrants and poor). She explains this identity-
prejudiced stereotype as connected to a social myth among educators, “that it is not 
possible for the mass of mankind to have experiences which are themselves worth 
anything, and that accordingly, if a neighborhood is to receive valuable ideas at all, they 
must be brought in from the outside, and almost exclusively in the form of books” 
(Addams, 1899).  
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On Addams’s and Dewey’s conception of democracy, education that prepares 
people for citizenship should nurture political agency in the sense I developed it in 
Chapter 3. This is nurtured through the bringing of people from differently socially 
situated perspectives together under ideal conditions that will promote their ability to get 
to know one another sympathetically and equip them with the skills in social inquiry. 
Dewey praises the programs at Hull House for embodying this, “Classes for study may be 
numerous, but all are regarded as modes of bringing people together, of doing away with 
barriers of caste, or class, or race, or type of experience that keep people from real 
communion with each other” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 91).121 In this way, Play and 
Education as Addams understands them can be facilitative of developing the capacities 
among marginalized people that are vital for fuller participation.  
Thus in this way, Addams’s leadership in Hull House programs and activities can 
be understood as an attempt to respond to the “political poverty” form of deliberative 
inequality that was highlighted in Chapter 2.122 But Play is also facilitative of reducing 
communicative inequality. When implemented properly, Play and Education have the 
potential to facilitate both imaginative and real space that is conducive to cultivating 
sympathetic understanding among diverse community members and equipping them with 
the kinds of habits that are necessary for social inquiry.  
What is interesting about the facilitative role of Play and Education in producing 
the habits necessary for responsible social inquiry, is that social inquiry is itself 
facilitative of widening ingroups. So in this way, these activities are not only facilitative 
																																																								
     121 And throughout her writings, Addams celebrates the great example children are for society in this: 
“They readily overcome differences of language, tradition and religion, which form insuperable barriers to 
adults… [accomplishing] that which elders could not possibly do, and [rendering] a most important service 
to the community” (Addams, 1905, p. 132). 
     122 See especially Bohman, 1996, p. 110. 
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of combatting the political poverty form of communicative inequality, but they are also 
facilitative of combatting the identity-prejudiced form of communicative inequality.  
It is helpful to turn back to John Turner’s work at this point to support my claim 
here. On Turner’s approach to social identity theory, social competition (i.e., ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup prejudice) is one among three ways that individuals can achieve 
positive distinctiveness of one’s social group in order to maintain self-esteem. Social 
competition is triggered where social identity is made salient and where it is made 
insecure by unstable power hierarchies (Turner and Reynolds, 2001). Thus because Play 
and Education reduce the salience of social identity through widening the ingroup 
through appealing to more shared identities, and because they generate space that 
alleviates some of the insecurities that are operative in unstable power hierarchies, they 
reduce social competition.  
This is precisely why Addams’s uses Hull House as an example in many of her 
writings, but particularly, in Newer Ideals of Peace (1907) where she develops her 
pacifist position. Here she condemns the older, coercive source of peace in “tribalistic 
morality”, in favor of a newer ideal of peace that results in “cosmopolitan affection” 
(Addams, 1907/2005, p. 131). Whereas past eras brought people together through 
opposition to a common enemy (e.g., war), Addams believes her current time requires the 
bringing of people together through social sympathy, what I am characterizing here in 
terms of widening ingroups. 
 
3. Addams and Dewey’s Philosophy of Perplexity and Method of Sympathetic Inquiry  
 In the opening pages of Democracy and Social Ethics (1902/2002), Addams 
points out that one’s experiences determine her understanding of life, and this occasions 
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an obligation to choose diversified experiences. This obligation flows out of Addams’ 
epistemology: each is epistemically limited by her subjective experiences of the social 
world, thus each can only gain fuller knowledge of social problems and possible 
resolutions for those problems through more diversified encounters with other subjective 
experiences of that social world. 
At the heart of both Addams’s and Dewey’s social epistemology and conceptions 
of democracy is a philosophy of perplexity. Seigfried (2002) has introduced this as a 
method of perplexity and Hamington (2009) has called its result ‘sympathetic 
knowledge’. He explains sympathetic knowledge: “[It] entails openness to the possibility 
of caring for others,” which has the potential for motivating individuals to “act on behalf 
of others so that they may flourish and grow” (Hamington, 2009, p. 71). 
For Addams and Dewey, democratic social relations depend on more than mere 
exposure to difference, that is, on more than diversified human experiences, particularly 
because of the features of industrial capitalism that exacerbate the epistemic limitations 
of human subjectivity. Exposure to diversity alone is inadequate to address the social ills 
of industrialism, particularly if it rests on misunderstandings of, and indifference towards, 
one another. Thus for Addams and Dewey, exposure to differently socially situated 
Others must be conditioned on sympathetic social inquiry. Building from our definition 
of social inquiry, sympathetic social inquiry (hereafter sympathetic inquiry) is: the 
sympathetic, cooperative, and inclusive social practices and processes that promote social 
knowledge. 
As Dewey and Addams develop perplexity, it is an uncomfortable and 
“bewildering” experience occasioned by new and strange experiences that the agent lacks 
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the resources to explain, understand, and resolve (Addams, 1910, p. 68).123 Perplexity is a 
cognitive-affective with significant epistemic potential, a possible starting place for 
learning and deeper understanding. This uncomfortable emotional phenomenon 
postulates a choice for the agent: either grant or deny perplexity its epistemic potential, 
“either continue to hold onto her assumptions or call them into question” (Seigfried, 
2002, p. xxvi).  
Dewey’s contrast between mental habits of uncritical thinking and reflective 
thinking is helpful for thinking about the choice that perplexity prompts. Uncritical 
thought is a habit of holding onto assumptions, whereas reflective thought is, “an attitude 
of suspended conclusion”, a willingness “to maintain the state of doubt and to carry on 
systematic and protracted inquiry” (Dewey, 1910, MW 6. 191).  
Similar to Dewey’s model of moral development, for Addams perplexity 
functions to initiate further inquiry that can lead to wider understanding and as Seigfried 
notes, “more effective value orientation” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xxix).124 The epistemic 
potential of perplexity is only fulfilled, however, when the agent moves beyond uncritical 
thinking towards reflective thinking, when the agent begins to engage the perplexing 
encounter with a kind of sympathetic inquiry. This move happens when the perplexed 
agent chooses not to explain away the encounter, but to engage in the encounter with 
sympathetic inquiry. Dewey explains the choice to inquire further as “more or less 
																																																								
     123 Addams describes the bewildering experience of perplexity at poverty in Twenty Years at Hull House 
(1910, pp. 68-9; as cited in Knight, 2010, p. 49). And interestingly, Dewey cites this fear of new and 
strange experiences as the very source of race prejudice and friction (Dewey, 1922, MW. 13. 243). 
Although the term was not formally introduced in psychology until 1957 by Leon Festinger, I suspect what 
Dewey really has in mind in his development of perplexity is a type of cognitive dissonance. 
    124 Seigfried also notes that Addams shows in her writings, “how social sympathy can be aroused and 
developed through the perplexities we feel in the normal course of everyday life, specifically those caused 
by the clashes of beliefs, habits, and interest inevitable in highly diversified societies” (Seigfried, 2002, p. 
xxiii). 
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troublesome” because it requires that the agent have a “willingness to endure a condition 
of mental unrest and disturbance” (Dewey, 1910/1996, MW 6. 191).  
Because perplexity is so unsettling, people often attempt to resolve it as quickly 
and easily as possible with past experiences and existing knowledge, accepting the first 
and easiest explanation at its “face value” (Dewey, 1910/1996, MW 6. 191). Because 
prejudices are framed by complex social histories and social myths operating in the 
collective social imagination, the mind often has prejudicial resources readily at its 
disposal for explaining away encounters with Others that occasion perplexity. 
Sympathetic inquiry is epistemically valuable because it is attentive to the 
collective social imagination and not determined by it. Assuming the experimentalism of 
a pragmatist feminist social epistemology, sympathetic inquirers consider other 
perspectives, try on arguments, imagine differently socially situated perspectives. 
Eventually through the practice of sympathetic inquiry, individuals can come to care for 
the problems others face, expand their sense of obligation beyond their own “world”, and 
coordinate their preferences with the pursuit of the social good of others. Sympathetic 
inquirers form a conception of “shared interests” with the Other, and this makes it 
possible for them to acknowledge problems that face the Other as public problems.125 
Wider preferences emerge and values evolve from individualistic morality into social 
ethics.  
Dewey explains that sympathy has a kind of moral knowledge that brings an 
individual to an appreciation for “the claims of others” (LW 7.270):  
Sympathy, in short, is the general principle of moral knowledge…because it 
furnishes the most reliable and efficacious intellectual standpoint. It supplies the 
																																																								
     125 This language of “shared interest” is particularly prominent in Dewey’s Democracy and Education 
(1916) and “The Public and Its Problems: An Essay on Political Inquiry” (1927). 
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tool, par excellence, for analyzing and resolving complex cases…sympathy 
supplies the pou sto for an effective, broad, and objective survey of desires, 
projects, resolves, and deeds. (MW 5.303; cited in Pappas, 2008, p. 199) 
 
On my reading, Addams’s conceives of sympathetic inquiry as the formation of 
narrative knowledge where narrative knowledge is understood as narratively based 
understanding and where ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’ are seen as an experimental 
and ongoing epistemic process of coming to understand and appreciate as opposed to a 
more traditional definition of knowledge as a completed, and closed results of inquiry.126 
Its constitutive properties are epistemic patience and non-paternalistic listening. The 
result of this process is kind of empathy as analogical thinking, a cognitive-affective state 
of wider social understanding and appreciation of the Other. 
Narrative knowledge plays an important role in sympathetic inquiry. Whereas 
statistical knowledge arises as a result of looking in on and observing the Other, narrative 
knowledge arises in the process of engaging with the Other. Statistical knowledge avoids 
perspective taking and a genuine encounter with the Other, thus it fails to escape an 
individualistic ontology. Acceptance of a relational ontology and an appreciation for the 
epistemic limitations of subjectivity, exacerbated by industrial capitalism, necessitates 
moving beyond statistical and observational knowledge to narratively based and 
perspectival types of understanding.  
The formation of authentic narrative knowledge requires the suspension of 
prejudicial cognitive explanations that might be more readily available to the inquirer. 
This suspension of judgment is the epistemic patience Dewey has in mind in his account 
of reflective thinking. Addams speaks to the importance of epistemic patience and 
suspension of immediate judgments in “The Subjective Necessity for Social 
																																																								
126 I use the terms ‘narratively based understanding’ and ‘narrative knowledge’ interchangeably hereafter.  
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Settlements”. Here she explains that Hull House residents ought to have “a scientific 
patience in the accumulation of facts” (Addams, 1893a, p. 23). They cannot compromise 
the philosophy of the solidarity of the human race on the basis of one “drunken woman” 
or “idiot boy”, and they must be “emptied of all conceit of opinion and all self-assertion, 
and ready to arouse and interpret the public opinion of their neighborhood” (Addams, 
1893a, p. 23).  
Pointing to Hull House as an example, Addams emphasizes the importance of 
non-paternalistic listening in the formation of narrative knowledge and resolution of 
social problems. She explains that Hull House functions in a diverse neighborhood 
without preconceived notions of the needs of the neighborhood residents. Rather, Hull 
House waits for interaction with neighborhood residents to prompt and articulate its 
purpose. Addams defends this conception of non-paternalistic listening and care 
consistently throughout Democracy and Social Ethics (1902) as well as in “The Function 
of a Social Settlement” (1893).127  
Unlike a charitable institution, Hull House residents under the leadership of 
Addams emphasized working with the poor, rather than for them. For instance, 
Hamington points out that Hull House provided, “seed money and organization support 
for [the] start-up… of a boarding club that would accommodate working women and 
provide flexibility in rent collection should hard times, such as strike, arise,” but the 
																																																								
     127 Addams’s practice anticipates Tronto’s four-pronged model of care, particularly the last requirement 
of responsiveness. As Tronto (2009) develops this feature of care, care giving requires both competence 
and responsiveness to the needs of the care receiver. This entails that one use the needs of the care receiver, 
as well as the care receiver’s response to the care giver, as an epistemic resources for providing care. 
Developing on this, Sheldene Simola explains, “Sensitivity and responsiveness to the feelings, concerns, 
and particular circumstances of individuals is critical” (Simola, 2003, p. 354). Working within the business 
ethics literature, she points to examples of crisis management resolutions that both succeeded and failed to 
condition care on this feature of responsiveness, and in more successful cases, company’s “sought to hear, 
understand, and be responsive to the subjective voices, experiences, and contexts of community members 
… rather than operating on an assumed knowledge of the members” (Simola, 2003, p. 358). 
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club’s leadership was turned over to working women themselves (Hamington, 2001, p. 
113). In this way, Hull House sought to arrive at an understanding of human needs 
discursively, and to politically empower the poor and oppressed. 
Narratively informed social knowledge sees problems that the observer may miss. 
What is more, the process itself of forming narrative knowledge – listening and 
interacting with another as she tells her story, and perhaps even exchanging one’s own 
story – is a deeply social activity during which a kind of deliberation happens. Beliefs, 
commitments, customs, and decisions are socially and historically framed for one 
another. Explaining one’s beliefs, commitments, and customs through the storytelling act 
itself and answering questions about those beliefs, commitments, and customs for the 
story listener is a type of deliberative negotiation process during which values and 
preferences are shared, compared, and perhaps revised in light of newly formed 
understanding of the Other. 
 
4. Widening Ingroups and Combatting Identity-Prejudiced Stereotypes 
 
Many of the Hull House activities and programs aimed to disrupt ingroup and 
outgroup biases among Hull House neighbors, immigrants who stood in relations of 
relative socioeconomic equality with one another. In the larger context of American 
society, however, Hull House neighbors were stigmatized cultural minorities who lived in 
or near poverty. Addams observed the persistence of identity-prejudiced stereotypes 
among her contemporaries, people of affluence and influence that did not directly come 
into contact, let alone have meaningful encounters, with Hull House neighbors. Such 
citizens played important roles in maintaining and benefiting from industrial capitalism, 
one benefit being the ability to spatially remove themselves from the neighborhoods of 
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the working poor. Given their unacknowledged interdependence, Addams saw this 
insulation of the privileged from the poor as epistemically irresponsible.  
Spatial stratification that is based in socioeconomic or racial grouping poses a 
significant challenge for Addams’s conception of deliberative equality because it enables 
for people with socioeconomic and political power to retreat from meaningful encounters 
with those who are different from them. Addams’s speeches, papers, and books offer 
more than a mere recounting of Hull House programs and residents’ experiences with the 
neighbors. Her writings are themselves an important part of advancing her social 
epistemology and combatting identity-prejudiced stereotypes about the immigrant groups 
and marginalized neighbors of Hull House.  
In the opening pages of Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), Addams provides 
expressed permission of it’s reprinting in The Atlantic Monthly, The International 
Journal of Ethics, The American Journal of Sociology, and The Commons. Ellery 
Sedgwick describes the editors, writers, and reading public of The Atlantic Monthly as a 
progressive “high-cultural elite” with “waning influence” on the political and social 
climate of the day (Sedgwick, 1994, p. 2). Given Addams use of these forums for 
distributing her writings, as well as the high illiteracy rates concentrated among the 
industrial urban community, it is reasonable to conclude that Addams is using her 
writings to reach a broader audience than she interacted with on a daily basis at Hull 
House.  
Addams is concerned about the public perception of social settlements, and she is 
concerned to ensure that communication about settlements to the reading public do not 
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misrepresent and soften the urban challenges neighbors and residents faced.128 
Hamington explains, “Addams used what she learned through listening to people’s stories 
to inform her writing and activism” (Hamington, 2004, p. 109). More than this, Addams 
used what she learned through listening to people’s stories to inform others through her 
writing, and this writing was a part of her activism.  
Addams frequently relies on narrative throughout her writings to challenge 
identity-prejudiced stereotypes of immigrants and the poor in an effort to reconstruct the 
collective social imagination of her contemporaries. Her arguments for economic and 
political reform are most always accompanied by the stories of marginalized people’s 
experiences of industrial capitalism, the urban youth, the immigrant, the prostitute, or the 
factory worker.129 Addams’s fictional charity visitor in Democracy and Social Ethics 
(1902) is probably not an actual person, but rather, an example of what Hull House 
residents are like upon their arrival at Hull House. The charity visitor “is a young college 
woman, well-bred and open-minded” (Addams, 1902, p. 12). Yet she struggles at first to 
understand her encounters with the working poor. She is awkward, she lacks experience 
of their ways, and she is quick to cast moral judgment on them.130  
In her story of the fictional charity visitor, Addams emphasizes that the charity 
visitor at first feels a kind of discomfort and bewilderment as she observes the visited 
																																																								
     128 This is most clearly evidenced in the Preface to what she calls her “reminiscences”, 20 Years at Hull 
House (1910). Addams explains two purposes for the book, the first of which is to offer some insights into 
the early struggles of Hull House in the hopes that this would combat an increasing public perception of the 
“superficiality” of social settlements. Her second motive, what she considered a more “unworthy” one, 
stems from her desire to “extinguish” two proposed biographies that depicted life at the Settlement as “all 
too smooth and charming” (Addams, 1910, p. viii). 
     129 Indeed Addams’s approach to social and political philosophy, a rhetorical approach that develops her 
argument in accompaniment with narrative, is perhaps why many traditional philosophers have failed to see 
her philosophical contributions. In response to this I reiterate Dewey’s point that argument alone “breeds 
misunderstanding and fixes prejudices” (Dewey, 1902, MW 2.91). 
130 Addams’s own reflections on the early mistakes of residents at Hull House demonstrate that she 
probably sees the charity visitor, a good-willed but naïve young woman, as a reflection of herself when she 
first opened Hull House (Twenty Years at Hull House, 1910). 
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family. She is confused by many of their practices, she is judgmental of how they 
prioritize their financial decisions given their state of poverty, and at times she is even 
disgusted by them. She is shocked by the head of the visited family’s familiarity with the 
“horrors of the salon,” disturbed by the daughter’s imprudent spending on dresses despite 
her pitiful home furnishings “little decorations, [and] scanty supply of books”, concerned 
about the ease with which the visited family greets the early marriage of their daughters, 
and morally reproachful of urban gangs of boys who are so frequently arrested. 
The reader becomes more acquainted with the visited family through the charity 
visitor.  The head of the family has recently been blacklisted in a strike. In his absence 
from work, he has “sunken down into martyrdom,” content to visit the public library 
daily to indulge in reading and take visitations from other workman, counseling them in 
their efforts in labor relations (Addams, 1902, p. 13). Meanwhile, his wife shows no signs 
of disdain for this, and even supports him with a “scanty income” earned through sewing 
and cleaning. The charity visitor initially concludes that this man is lazy and his 
supportive wife imprudent.  
At this point it is important to note that Addams is doing something important 
with her story of the charity visitor here. She is demonstrating for the reader what a 
failure to greet perplexity in a responsible way looks like. Thus far the charity visitor has 
explained away her perplexity, accepting the first and easiest explanation at its “face 
value”, which in her case is based in identity-prejudiced stereotypes (Dewey, 1910, MW 
6.191).  
Addams pushes the story of the charity visitor further, however. She means to 
demonstrate not simply how the charity visitor initially fails to realize the epistemic 
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potential of perplexity, but to also demonstrate how one might embrace and fulfill that 
epistemic potential through continued processes of sympathetic inquiry. The charity 
visitor continues to visit the family and in the process, gets to know their stories. She 
even begins to think analogically about her own experiences and those of the visited 
family.  
The charity visitor reflects on some of her own experiences and begins to 
compare them with her growing understanding of the visited family. She thinks of two of 
her own friends from more privileged backgrounds who are presently supporting their 
husbands. Her companions actually encouraged their husbands to pass on employment 
opportunities that were inconsistent with their moral convictions and might tarnish their 
reputations in their social circles. Both the head of household of the visited family and the 
charity visitor’s  friends’ husbands are enjoying a life of reading and political 
engagement as a result of their temporary unemployment.  
The charity visitor gains a new appreciation for the choices of the visited family 
because she perseveres towards sympathetic inquiry in response to an initially perplexing 
experience. Her moral condemnation of both the head of household and his supportive 
wife become reframed for the reader in a way that disrupts socioeconomically 
constructed differences and distance. The charity visitor begins to realize a certain 
inconsistency about praising her own friends’ moral character for supporting their 
husbands while rebuking the striker’s wife for her imprudence. She sees that the striker’s 
wife has made the greater sacrifice than her own friends because the stakes are so much 
higher. The charity visitor begins to wonder if the wife of the visited family is actually 
more morally mature than her own acquaintances.   
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After further investigation, the charity visitor sees that the clothing the daughter 
spends all of her earnings on ‘imprudently’ is a social necessity for her. She uses it to 
communicate a higher social standing than she holds, and through that, gain entrance into 
more elevated social circles. Early marriage limits the amount of mouths that need fed in 
a household. The prospects for a family are even better if one’s daughters marry into a 
more elevated social circle. The charity visitor comes to see that the thrill of being chased 
by the “coppers” among urban boys is not unlike “the practice of country boys who go 
forth in squads to set traps for rabbits or to round up a coon” (Addams, 1902, p. 26). The 
problem for urban youth is not a moral failing on their own parts, but it is based in a 
social problem that results from industrial capitalism: the universal restlessness of youth 
attempting to navigate an urban environment with limited outlets for play. The charity 
visitor comes to see the social systems that frame the lives and choices of the visited 
family.  
Through her use of the narrative of the fictional charity visitor, Addams invites 
her insulated reading public into the perplexity experienced Hull House residents 
themselves. She puts their perplexity on display and then directs the reader through the 
proper response to perplexity, which for Addams is through sympathetic inquiry towards 
wider social understanding. This process is made more accessible to the reader because 
the narrative is told from the perspective of someone like them: the charity visitor is an 
important mediator for social comparison. Vicariously and imaginatively, the reader is 
invited on the charity visitor’s journey towards wider social knowledge. Through this 
mediation the reader learns “to penetrate to deeper levels of meaning – to go below the 
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surface and find out the connections of any event or object, and to keep at it” (Dewey, 
1916, MW 9.335). 
Addams believes that narrative has important epistemic power. Unlike the 
newspapers, she appreciates literature because it brings people into “contact with social 
experience” (Addams, 1902, p. 8). On this she writes, “The popular books are the novels, 
dealing with life under all possible conditions, and they are widely read not only because 
they are entertaining, but also because they in measure satisfy an unformulated belief that 
to see farther, to know all sorts of men, in an indefinite way, is a preparation for better 
social adjustment – for the remedying of social ills” (Addams, 1902, p. 8). Indeed, the 
most profound stories and characters are often based in authors’ real experiences with 
different people and their ability to bring readers to a genuine encounter and 
understanding of those characters. And the moral wisdom of a reader or literary critic is 
rooted in her wide range of experiences with different socioeconomically and spatially 
located characters. 
As Richard Rorty has explained, narrative is valuable for moral thinking because 
it introduces readers to, “strange people (Alcibiades, Julien Sorel), strange families (the 
Karamazovs, the Casaubons), and strange communities (the Teutonic Knights, the Nuer, 
the mandarins of Sung)” (Rorty, 1989, p. 80). Narratives enable readers to imaginatively 
explore potential resolutions to problems and their meanings for the parties involved. 
They function to reveal, “how a situation comes to be the particular problem that it is” 
(Walker, 2007, p. 72). Unlike a moral dilemma posed in an ethical theory course 
textbook, narrative more authentically represents moral problems because it brings 
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forward the values and obligations, and most importantly, the relations, that frame the 
moral problem and moral decision-making of the character (Walker, 2007, p. 116).  
Another important feature of narrative is its ability to make us vulnerable to the 
Other. When we read a novel, we quite naturally indulge in an open-minded 
consideration of the perspectives shared through the story. We sympathize with the 
villain. We grasp the complexities of an immoral act without despising the actor herself. 
Yet in real life encounters with the Other, the persistence of prejudices are such that we 
frequently avoid taking on this novel-like sympathy.  
Novel-like sympathy is difficult to implement in everyday interactions for a few 
reasons. Many of the social spaces in which our real life encounters with the Other 
happen, fail to make space for or even discourage the exchanging of our narratives. 
Additionally, we may avoid taking on this novel-like sympathy in real life encounters 
because unlike the solitary activity of reading a novel, real-life encounters require making 
oneself vulnerable to another person. While reading a novel, one can safely suspend her 
own beliefs, commitments, and customs without feeling a sense of jeopardizing her 
identity. One can pretend to agree with the main character without fearing that her own 
beliefs, commitments, and customs will be lost in social space, without fearing that her 
listening, appreciation, and understanding will go unreciprocated or be abused. Thus SI 
requires an openness to seeking out narratively based understanding, and the formation of 
this kind of understanding requires a kind of social trust in the Other.  
True perspective taking requires trying on the beliefs, commitments, and customs 
of the Other. Importantly, and particularly in contexts when we disagree strongly with the 
beliefs, commitments, and customs of the Other, this requires considering how the Other 
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could have come to form those beliefs, commitments, and customs and why she might 
feel a sense of communion with them. This perspective-taking feature of the formation of 
narrative knowledge moves the listener to a kind of analogical thinking, and interestingly, 
analogical thinking is an important feature of empathy.131 
There is a kind of meta-narrative process at work in Addams’s tale of the charity 
visitor and in Addams’s use of the first-person perspective in much of her writing more 
generally. The charity visitor, and Addams’s herself when she writes from the first 
person, are more readily available analogical references for Addams’s readers. The reader 
can ease into the perplexing experience through her connection with the charity visitor or 
her connection with Addams. Addams’s story of the charity visitor is a narrative about 
someone forming narratively based understanding of the Other, and that ‘someone’ is 
someone very much like Addams’s readers.  
Because of how the political ideologies and social myths propagated by the more 
powerful can highjack the narratives of the marginalized, Addams’s introduction of 
alternative narratives through her writings has the potential to challenge the collective 
social imagination towards reconstruction through challenging the validity of these 
narratives as well as to “show how restricted the scope of the dominant identities 
[themselves] really [are]” (Walker, 2007, p. 155).  
 
5. Conclusion: Beyond Mere Method, Sympathetic Inquiry as a Political Virtue 
 
Addams does not develop sympathetic inquiry as a political virtue, but she does 
introduce it often in her discussions of political virtues that she is critical of for failing to 
																																																								
     131 See especially Gentner, et. al., 2013; Thagard and Shelley, 2001.  
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enact, or blatantly contradicting, democracy as social ethics (e.g., charity).132 There may 
be some benefits to thinking about Addams’s method of sympathetic inquiry in a virtue 
ethics framework, however. In this final section of the Chapter I want to consider how 
constructing sympathetic inquiry as a type of hybrid epistemic-moral political virtue 
might be particularly useful for combatting communicatively structured deliberative 
inequality and for communicative democracy more generally.  
In her discussions of social ethics most specifically, Addams expresses a concern 
for citizens to extend the sympathy that is more naturally felt towards one another within 
familial and private institutions to the larger social and political institution (Addams, 
Democracy and Social Ethics, 1902/2002).133 In her concerns to widen sympathy, 
Addams demonstrates an appreciation for the fact that, unlike the concern and care that is 
felt naturally for familial relations, concern and care for the Other must be worked at and 
cultivated. Indeed, the sympathy that is called for in sympathetic inquiry may not 
naturally arise. Thus like the virtues, it may be something the agent has to actively work 
towards cultivating and habituating if not trained in the proper way towards it. 
Sympathetic inquiry does seem to be more of a habit than a skill, however. 
Indeed, Dewey develops thinking in these terms, as thinking habits and habits of inquiry. 
He also believes that these thinking habits have implications for the moral life. While 
																																																								
     132 Pragmatists were deeply rooted in Aristotle, and I think it can be argued that they would have 
developed sympathetic inquiry in terms of the virtue ethics framework. However, it is outside of the scope 
of this project to defend Addams and Dewey as virtue ethicists. 
     133 On this she writes, “Just when our affection becomes large enough to care for the unworthy among 
the poor as we would care for the unworthy among our own kin, is certainly a perplexing question. To say 
that it should never be so, is a comment upon our democratic relations to them which few of us would be 
willing to make” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 31). See also, Whipps (2004, p. 123) who explains, “Addams 
believed that to stay isolated from people engaged in the daily struggle for survival “deadens the 
sympathies and shrivels the power of enjoyment”…Addams understood that neither individuals nor groups 
could have a meaningful existence or advance in complex industrial and technological societies without 
jointly creating societies that allow space for public work together towards mutual aims. Interdependence, 
diversity, or the need for hearing the voices of “others,” is essential to Addams’s pragmatist and feminism – 
indeed she believed that having many diverse experiences was a moral responsibility.” 
187 
 
Dewey does not expressly discuss the role of sympathy for reflective thought in How We 
Think (1910), in his discussion of social feeling in Psychology (1887) he emphasizes that 
“it is impossible to over-estimate [its] importance in the emotional life” and that it is “the 
source of all moral feeling” (Dewey, 1887/1996, 2. 285, 288). As Gregory Pappas (2008) 
explains, “Dewey insisted on emphasizing the habits of inquiry required to find out what 
a present morally problematic situation calls for” (p. 126).134  
Because communicative democracy as I have developed it in this project consists 
of interactive practices, sympathetic inquiry can be conceptualized in terms of the 
regulatory habits (virtue) that govern those practices. The pragmatist feminist social 
epistemology of communicative democracy rejects the possibility that moral reasoning 
can be conducted from a neutral, impartial standpoint, healthy habits of inquiry in social 
relations are critical. The ability to take on the attitude of others is how the self comes 
into its completion, and the habit of sympathetic inquiry promotes that. It brings people 
into their fuller “individuality”135 so that they may flourish, by making possible the 
overarching values that are constitutive of a good life, self-determination and self-
development.136 
 Sympathetic inquiry is a political virtue because it brings individuals into their 
political agency through the interactive practices of communicative democracy. That is, it 
is conducive to expanding one’s orientation to a wider public. As I explained earlier, 
through the practice of sympathetic inquiry, individuals can eventually come to care for 
the problems others face, expand their sense of obligation beyond their own “world”, and 
																																																								
     134 Pappas cites Dewey: “Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of the disagreeable, 
balance of interest enabling us to undertake the work of analysis and decision intelligently are the 
distinctively moral traits – the virtues of moral excellence” (1920/1996, MW 12.173-4). Dewey  
     135 See Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 231. 
     136 See Young, 1990, p. 37. 
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coordinate their preferences with the pursuit the social good of others. Sympathetic 
inquirers form a conception of “shared interests” with the Other, and this makes it 
possible for them to acknowledge the problems that are problems for the Other, as shared, 
public problems. 
 On a virtue ethics framework, sympathetic inquiry would be understood as a 
mean response (between excess and deficiency) to some sphere of action or feeling, 
which in our case, is perplexity. Recall that I have defined sympathetic [social] inquiry as 
the sympathetic, cooperative, and inclusive social practices and processes that promote 
social knowledge, and I developed its constitutive properties as epistemic patience and 
non-paternalistic listening.  
I want to suggest something like Marilyn Frye’s (1983) conception of arrogant 
perception may be a good candidate for an epistemic-moral vice that is deficient of the 
mean in its response to perplexity. The arrogant perceiver assimilates the Other to his 
own use, and through this, subverts her political agency and her deliberative standing. 
The arrogant perceiver denies recognition to the Other’s needs and in so doing, 
diminishes her moral standing. He denies her the communicative context to express those 
needs effectively, and in so doing, diminishes her epistemic and deliberative standing. 
Because the arrogant perceiver sees the Other as for him, he comes close to missing, or 
misses entirely, experiencing the perplexity that the encounter occasions itself, because 
the Other is not even an Other in relation to him, but is an object under and for him. 
 I also want to suggest that something like dis-authorized perception may be a 
good candidate for an epistemic-moral vice that is an excessive of the mean in its 
response to perplexity. By contrast with the arrogant perceiver who misses perplexity, the 
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dis-authorized perceiver is paralyzed by it. He is baffled and disoriented by his 
appreciation for the radical subjectivity and differently socially situated perspective of the 
Other. She is too much an Other for interaction and communication. I borrow the 
language of “dis-authorization” from Linda Alcoff’s use of it in a critique of the popular 
resistance to speak for others among academics as the result of a [proper] appreciation for 
the epistemic salience of one’s privileged social perspective.137 In this case, the radical 
subjectivity of the Other, “is taken as an absolute dis-authorization of all practices of 
speaking for” (Alcoff, 1991-2, p. 29). Because the dis-authorized perceiver experiences 
the perplexity that the encounter with the Other occasions so severely, she marginalizes 
the Other. Rather than subverting the Other’s political agency like the arrogant perceiver, 
the dis-authorized perceiver abandons the Other’s political agency to seclusion and 
isolation from all of social life.    
 What is interesting about this thought experiment is that in both arrogant 
perception and dis-authorized perception, there are signs of a perceiver who has little 
practice interacting in meaningful ways with differently socially situated others. The 
arrogant perceiver lacks a wide range of experiences of relations of social equality, so he 
is unmoved by perplexity. The dis-authorized perceiver lacks a wide range of experiences 
of relations of social inequality, so he is overwhelmed by perplexity. This points to the 
significance of some forms of “exposure therapy” for the cultivation of the political 
virtue of sympathetic inquiry, which I would like to suggest can be observed at places 
like Hull House.  
																																																								
     137 See also Young’s (1997a) paper, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and 
Enlarged Thought”.  
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Sympathetic inquiry is a substantive virtue in the weak sense of arising from the 
assumption of democratic norms of political equality, transparency, reasonableness, and 
inclusion. But it is procedural in the sense that it does not itself endorse a particular 
account of these norms in practice, but rather, methodologically regulates the epistemic 
and communicative practices that define them (a process which is ongoing, experimental, 
and open-ended). Because sympathetic inquiry is procedural in this sense, it insulates 
itself from two common critiques of the virtue ethics tradition. First, there is the charge 
that the virtues are too culturally relative, and as such, can be distorted in ways that 
benefit the dominant class and sustain the existing power relations in a given society.138 
But sympathetic inquiry is not substantive enough to produce this problem, and it is 
constructed with the expressed aim of remedying this kind of cultural imperialism.   
Then there is the charge that the virtues are too individualistic and that they do not 
readily map on to ethical concerns about structural relations of power. Elizabeth 
Anderson has raised this concern for Miranda Fricker’s (2007) virtue-based resolution for 
testimonial injustice, the epistemic virtue of testimonial justice” (Anderson, 2012). As 
Anderson explains, testimonial injustice is a transactional and structural form of injustice 
in that it arises from “particular exchanges or interactions between one person and 
another” (Anderson, 2012, p. 164-165). Fricker herself constructs it in this way. But then 
she looks to an “individual virtue-based remedy” that Anderson worries may not be able 
																																																								
     138 For an example of this type of argument, see Susan Okin’s (1998) paper, “Feminism, Moral 
Development, and the Virtues”. Okin argues that Aristotle’s political and ethical picture is so dependent on 
the exploitation of oppressed classes that it is not, without substantial revision, a salvageable theory. 
Maurice Hamington (2001; 2009) also worries about this and resists developing sympathetic inquiry in the 
virtue ethics framework because of it, preferring instead to develop it in an embodied ethics of care. 
Hamington believes along with Nel Noddings that one concern for virtue theory is that it “does not 
challenge liberal notions of isolated individualism the way that care theory does” (Hamington, 2015; citing 
Noddings, 2010, pp. 125-137). I do not object to Hamington’s construction of sympathetic knowledge as 
such, I simply want to try on the virtue ethics framework here to see if it is useful for thinking about the 
relationship between sympathetic inquiry and deliberative equality. 
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“to address structural epistemic injustices that may have locally innocent (non-
prejudicial) causes” (ibid., p. 167). Linda Alcoff frames the problem with the 
interrogative: “Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices?” 
(Alcoff, 2010, p. 128). 
As Anderson explains, there are other ways beyond identity-prejudices that 
“disadvantaged social groups can be unjustly denied credibility” (Anderson, 2012, p. 
169). She cites ingroup favoritism and shared-reality bias as examples. Both are universal 
cognitive tendencies with epistemic advantages in some contexts. What is interesting 
about Anderson’s critique, for my purposes here, is that she ultimately points towards 
some kind of conception of epistemic democracy as the virtue of epistemic justice for 
transactional injustice of this kind!  
And this is precisely how I have tried to develop sympathetic inquiry, as a hybrid 
epistemic-moral political virtue that is constituted through social processes rather than in 
individuals. If “group segregation along lines of social inequality”, is the vector that turns 
innocent cognitive biases into “vehicles for spreading structural injustice to new 
contexts”, then perhaps the picture of communicative democracy and sympathetic inquiry 
as I have developed it in this dissertation are conducive for remedying communicatively 
structured deliberative inequality (Anderson, 2012, pp. 171, 170).  
If responsible social inquiry is constructed as a capacity that is brought to fruition 
through relational and developmental processes like Play and Education,139 then it may be 
a candidate for being nurtured as the corrective habit for reconstructing the collective 
social imagination and its identity-prejudiced habits of social inquiry and communication. 
																																																								
     139 See especially Julia Annas’s (2004) paper, “Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing” where she 
introduces a developmental account of the virtues.   
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Sympathetic inquiry should not be understood as a practice of “controlling one’s 
biases and prejudices”, mind over matter.140 I have tried to show in this chapter that 
properly cultivated, sympathetic social inquiry has affective dimensions and reaches 
down into disposition, and that this can stimulate the natural widening of ingroups. And it 
can challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes and in so doing, begin the processes of 
reconstructing the collective social imagination that houses them for the sympathetic 
inquirer. Thus understood as a political virtue of sympathetic inquiry, it could be 
potentially transformative for affectively reconstructing the experience of perplexity 
itself, and it could in this way, be an incredibly robust potential resource for alleviating 
the harmful effects on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic 
interactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
     140 It is important to point out that this language is incredibly common in the contemporary trend 
towards implicit bias training in various workplaces and public agencies. Thus one practical implication of 
developing sympathetic inquiry in the virtue ethics framework, is that it creates the conceptual resources to 
push our theorizing about ingroup and outgroup biases out from this legalistic framework and into a more 
unified conception of the social self.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Addams and Dewey would have agreed with Young that democratic norms of 
political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and inclusion are a vital starting place for 
theorizing justice. Although they were separated by almost a century in time and 
grounded in distinct philosophical traditions, they valued and developed a construction of 
democracy that promotes open and transparent reason-giving processes in politics. They 
rejected power-based and preference aggregative constructions of democratic decision-
making, that gets implemented through special interest group politics.  
Addams and Dewey would have also agreed with Young, that because 
deliberative theory has largely developing these norms through the lens of liberal 
individualism, it has failed to appreciate the ways that relations of power, oppression, 
privilege, and social inequality impact the realization of those norms in both formal 
democratic institutions and in all of social life.  
The very core of communicative democracy, I have argued, is a relational 
ontology that makes theoretical space to name communicatively structured deliberative 
inequality and to identify, identity-prejudiced epistemic and communicative practices and 
habits. Relations of power that produce oppression, privilege, and social inequality have 
consequences on our deliberative standing, on whether we will be received, included, 
acknowledged, and genuinely respected and heard by others as a political equal, as a 
Deliberator. 
Deliberative theorists put forward a refined and narrow construction of 
deliberation-as-argument that excludes people who lack the opportunities to develop the 
capacities necessary for this form of participation (i.e., political poverty). Argument 
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emphasizes the importance of agreement as a starting place and/or goal for discussion, 
and because of this, it can function as a vehicle for the perpetuation of culturally 
dominant norms.  
There is a second layer to the cultural imperialism of deliberation-as-argument. 
The discourse of argument idealizes the speaker as dispassionate, articulate, quick-witted 
and clever, and impartial. This functions to privilege elites, who are more likely to be 
educated and skilled in the cultural traditions of argument. In the context of social 
inequality, oppression, and privilege, the assumption of argument itself functions as a 
form of cultural imperialism where it is normalized and is assumed as a neutral discourse.  
Because argument has historically been valorized as the appropriate method for 
discovering truth both within modern philosophy and in the American judicial system, 
and because truth has historically been conceptualized within the liberal tradition as 
discoverable and as singular, this conception of deliberation-as-argument struggles to 
map on to more complex problem-identification and problem-solving processes like those 
that societies must grapple with.  
But even more than all of this, the assumption of deliberation-as-argument 
reduces a robust and wider world of democratic communication solely to deliberation, 
and in doing so, it limits the scope of our social knowledge. Young, Addams, and Dewey 
appreciate both the moral and the epistemic benefits of inclusion. At its best, inclusive 
democratic communication can protect, restore and nurture the deliberative standing of 
all individuals, and it yields better social knowledge. 
Beyond narrow constructions of deliberation-as-argument, Addams in particular 
saw that the emotional and imaginative domains of human social life are vital features of 
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communication.141 To borrow from Dewey again, “argument alone breeds 
misunderstanding and fixes prejudices” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2.91). Young 
introduces five additional communicative methods in her work: greeting and 
acknowledgement of one’s interlocutors, rhetoric, narrative (Young, 2000), and even 
questioning (Young, 1997) and protest (Young, 2001). Anticipating Young’s 
communicative democracy, Addams takes up Young’s invitation to situate argument in 
narrative. And she looks to activities and practices like Play as a mechanism for 
producing epistemic goods, like imaginative inquiry, practice at cooperative exploration, 
and practice and appreciation for diverse social perspectives.  
In Chapter 3 I argued that Addams and Dewey were deeply concerned with 
ingroup and outgroup biases as well as identity-prejudiced stereotypes. Recall that 
identity-prejudiced stereotypes are unique from universal, cognitive tendencies of 
ingroup and outgroup bias, in that they target a particular social group and are a result 
and reflection of intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression, privilege, 
and group-based social inequality. Thus prejudice harms particular socially situated 
groups. I have made the case that Addams and Dewey saw this, and that they were 
motivated to construct their conception of democracy around resolving it.  
There is a tendency in the contemporary political discourse to overlook the 
significance of ordinary communicative processes in our understanding of democracy. 
Deliberative theorists also tend to limit the expanse of democratic communication in 
assuming that its appropriate place is in formal, institutionalized political venues (and 
perhaps only even in a representative form). To the contrary, communicative democracy 
																																																								
     141 Dewey advocates the role of imagination and emotional sensitivity even in his account of 
deliberation in the natural sciences (Pappas, 2012, p. 61). 
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widens democratic communication to include a broad range of interactive practices and it 
challenge us to think of democratic space as boundless.  
Addams and Dewey go so far as to say that social space is the proper place and 
origin of healthy democratic communication and democracy more generally, and that the 
institutionalization of democracy into formal processes only a side effect. They would be 
critical of contemporary democratic experimentalism programs that tend to reduce their 
focus for democratic reform to institutions. Such programs do not go deep enough. The 
emphasis on arriving at formal principles for the design and structure of democratic 
institutions misses an integral aspect of democracy for Dewey, namely, “the embodiment 
in citizens of certain virtues” in their ordinary communicative and epistemic practices 
(Pappas, 2012, p. 71). 
It is interesting that Young eventually looks to “City Life” as a normative ideal 
for communicative democracy, especially in contrast with Addams’s and Dewey’s 
concerns with the negative potential effects of the modern urban city for social 
knowledge and meaningful social life (Young, 1990). But all of these theorists 
appreciated the fact that in the city, “being together entails some common problems and 
common interests” (Young, 1990, p. 238) and that because of this, “we are bound to 
move forward or retrograde together” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 238).  
 Hull House protested the challenges of the modern city, and so I believe Young 
would have felt quite at home there. The city is filled with problems but boundless in its 
potential for enriching social life. Hull House was a laboratory for democracy and 
democratic communication and inquiry. So there is good reason to continue to look to 
activities and programs, as well as Jane Addams’s and other thinkers’ writings about Hull 
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House, for further resources for strategizing democracy, and deliberative equality more 
specifically. 
Young suggests four virtues of the normative conception of the city: social 
differentiation without exclusion, variety, eroticism, and publicity. Future research should 
develop the political virtue of sympathetic inquiry in the context of this ideal city. 
Speaking specifically to the eroticism of the city, Young describes it in terms of a place 
where one can “lose one’s identity” and where we can “take pleasure in being open to 
and interested in people we experience as different” (Young, 1990, p. 239). There is 
much more to be said about this erotic mystery and Play as I developed it in Chapter 4. I 
am particularly interested to explore this line of research further as a way of constructing 
an account of public reason. This account would develop democratic rationality in terms 
of the design approach of Chapter 1, and would function to fill out Addams’s and 
Dewey’s conception of social inquiry. 
The language of “implicit bias” is becoming increasingly more popular in 
mainstream culture, and organizations – private and public – have increasingly been 
looking to “implicit bias training programs” as a way to affirm the importance of 
inclusion and diversity. But this discourse has struggled to escape the individualistic, 
cognitive-error account of prejudice that I developed and expressed concerns about in 
Chapter 2. I also mentioned in this chapter my resistance to two dualisms within the 
social psychology literature, between cognitive and affect and between implicit and 
explicit attitudes. I am hopeful to further my critique of this discourse through examining 
how conceptualizing identity-prejudiced communicative activity in terms of a habit may 
interrupt both of these dualisms. This may give us conceptual space to interrogate what is 
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really going on in “implicit bias”. It will be interesting to explore the possibilities of 
sympathetic inquiry if communicative inequality is reconstructed in terms of habit.  
 One worry for sympathetic inquiry is its dependency on narrative, as I have 
constructed it. While narrative can give us access to the inner meanings of Others, 
narratives can also be used to propagate social myths and motivate divisiveness. So much 
more work needs to be done that establishes ways to protect sympathetic inquiry from 
this risk. I suspect that one way to insulate sympathetic inquiry from this problem is to 
emphasize its attitudinal and relational context, a spirit of inclusive, experimental, and 
open-ended communicative practices among diversely situated social perspectives.  
Young, Addams, and Dewey all looked to practice as an inspiration for theorizing 
about social justice and democracy. This reorientation of philosophic method brings into 
focus the significance of practice and activity in the social world. In conceptualizing 
democracy, the arrogant perceiver sees a thing to be had, something you can get, possess, 
own, with the right political machinery. This mechanization of participation 
compartmentalized it from our ethos, from our way of life and of interacting with and 
knowing one another. The dis-authorized perceiver is overwhelmed by the difference, the 
complexity, the potential chaos, and retreats from participation. But these perceivers both 
miss something important, namely, that democracy is not a thing, but it is a verb. We do 
democracy, and we do it together.  
…As members of the community [we] stand indicted. This is the penalty of 
democracy, - that we are bound to move forward or retrograde together. None of 
us can stand aside; our feet are mired in the same soil, and our lungs breathe the 
same air. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 112, the emphasis is mine) 
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